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305 pp. 
This dissertation examined the therapeutic components 
within Beck's cognitive-behavioral treatment in relation to 
changes in global measures of depression and in specific 
response classes relevant to depression. Furthermore, the 
dissertation noted which response classes were influenced 
by each component and attempted to predict responsiveness 
to components by subject classification on frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts. 
Thirty-seven moderately to severely depressed subjects 
participated in cognitive-behavioral group therapy. Beck's 
treatment was divided into the following components: self-
monitoring dysfunctional thoughts (Component A), logical 
analysis (Component B), and hypothesis testing (Component C). 
To control for order effects, half the subjects were 
exposed to the components in the sequence ABC and half to 
the sequence ACB. Using initial frequency scores from 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, subjects were 
divided into two subtypes—those with a high versus a low 
frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. 
Subject classification did not predict responsiveness 
to components. The scores on the global and specific 
measures were significantly better after subjects received 
treatment than before treatment. The therapeutic effects 
of logical analysis or hypothesis testing were significantly 
greater than the weak effects produced by self-monitoring. 
Multivariate analyses of the global and specific measures 
and univariate analyses of scores from the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory--Depression Scale and 
the Depression Adjective Check List showed no significant 
difference between the effects of logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing. The belief scores from the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire and subscales of the Pleasant 
Events Schedule and the Interpersonal Events Schedule 
suggested that logical analysis produced more adaptive 
changes than hypothesis testing. Analyses of the Beck 
Depression Inventory scores and the frequency scores from 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (within the sequence 
ACB) showed that the treatment received last produced the 
most change. Multivariate analyses of the global measures 
and univariate analysis of the frequency scores from the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire demonstrated that the 
combination of all components was significantly more 
effective than only Components A and C. Analyses of the 
Beck Depression Inventory scores and the frequency scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire suggested that 
the combination of all components was significantly more 
effective than only Components A and B. 
Mechanisms producing change and assessment considera­
tions were discussed. 
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During the past 5 to 10 years, researchers in the social 
sciences have begun to focus more on the clinical phenomenon 
of depression by describing the people and responses involved, 
by hypothesizing possible causes, and by designing effective 
treatment. The increasing interest in depression within be­
havior therapy is well documented in several recent books 
devoted to the topic (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Clarkin 
& Glazer, 1981; Rehm, 1981). Such interest can be contrasted 
with Becker's following statement, in the preface of his book: 
Although depression has the highest mortality rate 
of any personality disturbance and possibly the 
highest incidence as well, it has been relatively 
neglected by most social science disciplines. In 
the writer's opinion, social scientists are over­
looking an intensely interesting burgeoning of 
bio-social-psychological findings on depression 
that are as yet tentative, fragmentary, unreplicated 
and unsynthesized yet intriguing and richly prom­
ising of alleviation for one of humankind's severest 
afflictions. (1974, p. xi) 
Although the inconclusive nature of the research on de­
pression remains unchanged since Becker's 1974 statement, the 
National Institute of Mental Health's (NIMH) organization and 
support of three major research programs on depression is 
evidence that currently social science in general, as well as 
behavior therapy in particular, is not overlooking depression. 
The NIMH research programs include the study of (a) the 
2 
psychobiology of depression, (b) the long-term use of drug 
therapy in recurrent affective disorders, and (c) psycho­
social treatments of depression (Teuting, Koslow, & Hirschfeld, 
19 81). Within behavior therapy, Lewinsohn, Seligman, and 
Beck have each developed theories of and therapies for de­
pression which are the focus of current work in depression 
from a behavioral perspective. 
Presumably the prevalence and the associated adversities of 
the depressive disorders have prompted the recent interest in de­
pression. For example, in a National Institute of Mental 
Health report, Teuting and associates (19 81) estimated that 
over 127 million of the world's people suffer from depression. 
Approximately 8 to 20 million Americans currently suffer 
from depression (Teuting et al., 19 81), and approximately 
one-fourth of the U.S. population will encounter a clinical 
depression during their lifetime (Weissman, Myers, & Harding, 
1978). The President's Commission on Mental Health reported 
in 1978 that these affective disorders are the most prevalent 
forms of major mental illness and account for the majority 
of the U.S. psychiatric hospitalizations, independent of 
social class, race, sex, or ethic group. At the same time, 
the Commission reported that the occurrence of depression 
among women, separated or divorced persons, nonwhites, the 
poor, and the less educated is higher than the occurrence of 
3 
depression among the opposing counterparts of these groups. 
(The interested reader is referred to Boyd and Weissman, 
1982, for more on the epidemiology of depression.) 
Teuting et al. (1981) estimated that in the United States 
treatment for depression costs over $10 billion each year; 
they also noted that this estimate is conservative, as 25% 
of the people who would be diagnosed as depressed never seek 
treatment. They estimated that at least 15% of depressed per­
sons commit suicide and that 80% of all suicides are thought 
to be precipitated by depression. In addition, these authors 
emphasized the "human cost" of depression in terms Of sub­
jective discomfort, dysfunctional family life, divorce, child 
abuse, accident proneness, physical injury, drug abuse, 
criminal behavior, work capacity, and underemployment. 
Recognizing that depression is a common and serious 
clinical problem which is receiving attention from a variety 
of researchers, this dissertation limited its focus to 
cognitive-behavioral therapy for and assessment of nonbipolar 
depression. In particular, this research examined the 
mechanisms which contribute to the effectiveness of a cognitive-
behavioral therapy for nonbipolar depression and identified 
some of the depressive responses influenced by this treatment 
•for two subtypes of depressives. Three basic research questions 
were posed in this dissertation: What components within cognitive-
behavioral therapy produce the greatest change in depression? 
What are some of the response classes within the depressive 
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cluster which are influenced by each therapeutic component? 
Will subject classification produced by behavioral assessment 
help predict responsiveness to different components of 
cognitive-behavioral therapy for depression? 
Before these questions are examined in detail, it is 
necessary to survey the context in which they were asked. 
First, a brief description and delimitation of depression will 
be provided. Second, a behavioral interpretation of depres­
sion, as well as several behavioral theories and therapies 
for depression, will be described. Third, assessment con­
siderations, particularly the necessity of matching treatment 
and assessment (termed "treatment validity") will be outlined. 
Finally, relevant interpretational and philosophical issues 
will be acknowledged briefly. 
Depression: Defined and Delimited 
The concept "depression" falls within the general cate­
gory of clinical problems termed "affective disorders," or 
"disturbances of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic 
or depressive syndrome, that is not due to any other physical or 
mental disorder" (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, p. 205). 
As Andreasen (19 82) has noted, although the concept of affective 
disorder is historically old, controversy continues on how to 
limit its boundaries (i.e., how to distinguish affective dis­
orders from normality, schizophrenia, or anxiety and whether 
to use continua or dichotomies, categories or dimensions) and 
how to classify the affective disorders into subtypes (e.g., 
bipolar vs. unipolar, primary vs. secondary, endogenous vs. 
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reactive, pure vs. spectrum, disease vs. nonfamilial). 
In the present study, individuals who had a history of 
mania or were psychotic at the time they were interviewed 
were excluded from the investigation. Exclusion accorded 
with the conceptual definition of depression offered by 
Craighead (1981, p. 76) : 
Depression is a label for a feeling or affective 
state of dysphoria as experienced by a person. 
This affective state may be precipitated by, occur 
simultaneously with, or result in a specific set 
of maladaptive or dysfunctional somatic-motor, 
cognitive, and physiological responses. 
Somatic-motor responses characteristic of depression include 
both behavioral deficits (e.g., minimal participation in 
social events, psychomotor retardation, neglect of grooming, 
inability to do daily work) and behavioral excesses (e.g., 
weeping, crying, screaming, suicidal behavior, easy fatiga­
bility) . Cognitive responses typical of depression, as indi­
cated by seIf-reports, include self-criticism, self-blame, 
inability to experience pleasure, negative expectation of 
the environment, helplessness, hopelessness, powerlessness, 
poor concentration, and indecisiveness. Physiological re­
sponses indicative of depression include loss of interest in 
food, drink, and sex; headaches, sleep disturbances, weight 
loss, fatigue, and generalized pain (Craighead, 1980; 
Lewinsohn, Biglan, & Zeiss, 1976; Rush, 1982). 
For practical purposes, the category of depression 
studied here is most likely to be termed "major or minor de­
pressive disorder" when one is using the Research Diagnostic 
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Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978) or "major 
depressive disorder or dysthymic disorder" when one is using the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition (DSM-III) (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). 
This general category is "nonbipolar" depressives 
(sometimes called "unipolar" depressives) which Hollon (1981, 
p. 35) demarcates as "individuals who have never experienced, or 
are unlikely to experience,.a manic episode." ' The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980) specifies that a manic episode lasts at least one week 
and includes at least three of the following difficulties: 
increased activity, pressured speech, flight of ideas, ex­
aggerated self-esteem, decreased need for sleep, distracti-
bility, and excessive involvement in activities which have 
the potential for unfortunate consequences (e.g., buying 
sprees, reckless driving). Bipolar depressives (individuals 
showing a history not only of depressive, but also of manic 
symptoms) were excluded from this research; at present 
there are no data to suggest that bipolar depressives respond 
to psychotherapy better than they respond to lithium or anti­
depressant medication (Rush, 1982). 
Behavioral Interpretations of Depression 
Behavioral theories of and therapies for depression tend 
to emphasize selected responses within the combination of 
responses labeled "depression." In Craighead's (1980, p. 123) 
words: 
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Each of these models of depression portrays de­
pression as a polydimensional phenomenon; however, 
each model views one characteristic as the primary 
one in depression, from which all other characteris­
tics of depression stem. The primary characteristic 
is, in turn, presumed to have a primary, unitary 
etiological pattern. 
The next section of this paper will illustrate this approach 
by examining three cognitive-behavioral models of depression: 
Lewinsohn's (1974) social learning model, Seligman's reformu­
lated learned-helpless model(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978), and Beck's (1972) cognitive model. The primary 
characteristic that Lewinsohn emphasizes is withdrawal from 
typical activity, with the hypothesized cause being a low rate of 
response-contingent reinforcement. Seligman stresses be­
havioral deficits in depression and maintains that they result 
from the depressive's belief that his/her responses have 
no effect on the events which follow. Beck emphasizes 
depressives' negative view of the self, the world, and the 
future, which Beck hypothesizes results from dysfunctional 
thoughts and assumptions. If one compares these problem areas 
to the description of depression outlined in the previous 
section, it is obvious that each of these behavioral research­
ers emphasizes a specific problematic response within the 
"polydimensional" disorder of depression and identifies a 
single cause for the specific problem. Furthermore, each 
researcher argues that the primary response influences other 
secondary responses within the depressive cluster (Craighead, 
1980). 
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The present author previously has argued that depression 
represents a challenge to behaviorists because the disorder 
"is a cluster of responses which occur with great frequency, 
but not with great consistency across individuals." Similarly, 
the author has maintained that it is useful to conceptualize 
depression as a number of response classes (Jarrett, 1980, p. 19). 
Such a conceptualization encourages researchers and clinicians 
not to consider depression as a global "construct," but to 
measure the specific, discrete, problematic responses within 
this combination of responses (Craighead, 1980; Jarrett, 1980). 
This strategy recommends multivariate analyses within depres­
sion research and may aid researchers in teasing apart 
the relationships among depressive responses. Such 
research may be able to specify the conditions under which 
changes in one set of depressive responses are preceded by 
changes in another set of depressive responses. 
With the preceding criticism as background, the follow­
ing section illustrates three unitary models of depression, 
all cognitive-behavioral models, and reviews some of the 
therapies and outcome research that each has stimulated. 
Three Cognitive-Behavioral Models of 
and Therapies for Depression 
Lewinsohn's Social Learning Model of Depression 
In their conceptualization of depression, Lewinsohn and 
his associates (1975) used a social learning theory (Bandura, 
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1977; Rotter, 1954) which strove to integrate stimulus-response 
theory and cognitive theory. Lewinsohn and Arconad (1981) 
argued that one must examine the interactions between personal 
factors (e.g., cognitive processes, expectancies), behavioral 
factors, and environmental factors in order to understand 
depression. They maintained that these factors are "interde­
pendent" and that the relative impact of any one factor varies 
with the setting and behavior involved. Within social learning 
theory, behavior can not only result from personal and environ­
mental factors, but interact with them. Bandura (1977) has 
termed such influence "reciprocal determinism." 
Lewinsohn emphasized the relationship between reinforce­
ment and depression. In particular, he hypothesized that a 
low rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement sets 
the conditions for depression to occur (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, 
& Shaw, 1969; Lewinsohn, Youngren, & Grosscup, 1979). Lewinsohn 
and Arconad (19 81) defined reinforcement as "the quality of 
one's interactions with one's environment." Positive rein­
forcement consists of positive, "person-environment inter­
actions" and strengthens behavior. By "contingent" Lewinsohn 
means that there is a temporal relationship between behavior 
and reinforcement (i.e., behaviors precede their consequences 
or reinforcers). Lewinsohn does not define the word "posi­
tive," but appears to mean that the subject experiences the 
person-environment interaction as pleasant. Lewinsohn 
emphasized deficits in behavior and related dysphoria and 
asserted that not only a low rate of positive reinforcement 
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but also a high rate of aversive events can serve as the ante­
cedent (s) for depression. Lewinsohn and his co-workers 
(Grosscup & Lewinsohn, 1980; Lewinsohn et al., 1979) stated 
that this high rate of punishment (i.e., person-environment 
interactions with unpleasant, disturbing outcomes) can cause 
depression (termed the "corollary hypothesis"). 
Lewinsohn stated that the availability and potency of 
reinforcers and/or punishers, as well as the individual's 
skill in obtaining reinforcement or coping with punishment, 
are significant in determining the rate of response-contingent 
positive reinforcement and/or punishment. According to 
Lewinsohn (Lewinsohn, Sullivan, & Grosscup, 1982), depression 
can result when (a) the availability of reinforcers is low 
and/or the availability of punishers is high, (b) the indi­
vidual has skill deficits 'in obtaining reinforcement and/or 
in coping with punishment, and (c) the potency of positive 
reinforcement is diminished and/or the influence of punish­
ment is increased. 
The series of studies Lewinsohn cited to support this 
model is largely correlational (Grosscup & Lewinsohn, 19 80; 
Lewinsohn, 1975; Lewinsohn & Menson, 1978; Lewinsohn et al., 
1976; Lewinsohn & Talkington, 1979; Lewinsohn et al., 1979; 
MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1974). These studies suggest that 
depressed subjects report fewer pleasant and more unpleasant 
events than do normal and psychiatric controls. Clinical 
improvement for depressives was correlated with increases 
in positive reinforcement and decreases in punishment. 
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Lewinsohn and Amenson (1978) reported that the absence of 
particular "reinforcing" events ("positive sexual experiences, 
rewarding social interactions, fun-filled outdoor activities, 
solitude, and competency experiences") and the presence of 
specific "punishing" events ("marital disorder, work hassles, 
and receiving negative reactions from others") are relevant 
when depression occurs. In addition to the preceding corre­
lations , Lewinsohn and his co-workers (Lewinsohn, Mischel, 
Chaplin, & Barton, 1980; Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973) have shown 
that depressives often show deficits in social skills (i.e., 
the skills that individuals need to elicit positive reinforce­
ment from their social environment). 
Although correlations exist between depression and infre­
quent pleasant events, frequent unpleasant events, and social 
skills deficits, the causal relationship between depression 
and any of these variables has been difficult to demonstrate. 
As Hollon and Beck (1979) have noted, analysis of time-
lagged correlation between pleasant events and decreases 
in depressed mood (Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973) have not adequately 
demonstrated a causal relationship. At the same time, Harmon, 
Nelson, and Hayes (1980) found that self-monitoring increases 
in pleasant activities decreased depressed mood more than 
self-monitoring decreases in depressed mood increased 
pleasant activities. (It should be noted, however, that 
self-monitoring improvements in mood did have some small 
reciprocal effect on activity.) More research is needed to 
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support the undirectionality of Lewinsohn's model of depression. 
Lewinsohn and his associates have designed treatment 
strategies and packages to parallel the social learning 
theory of depression. In general, the goals of the treatment 
are to (a) increase the frequency of pleasant events, (b) de­
crease the frequency of unpleasant events; (c) increase the 
enjoyability of pleasant events; (d) reduce the potency of 
/ 
unpleasant events; and (e) foster maintenance of treatment 
gains. The general strategy that Lewinsohn has used to accom­
plish these goals is to identify (for the individual) the events 
which correlate most with changes in mood and to implement 
procedures to reduce (if negative) or increase (if positive) 
the frequency and/or impact of the events'. The assessment 
devices that Lewinsohn used included the client'.s daily 
monitoring of mood and activity as well as questionnaires 
such as the Pleasant Events Schedule (PES) (MacPhillamy & 
Lewinsohn, 1971) and the Unpleasant Events Schedule (UES) 
(Lewinsohn & Talkington, 197 8). These questionnaires list 
of events that people typically rate as enjoyable (PES) or 
aversive (UES). The respondent is instructed to indicate how 
frequently the event occurred during the past month (i.e., the 
frequency rating) and to rate the enjoyment or aversiveness 
of the event (i.e., the impact rating). Lewinsohn used these 
data to conduct a "functional analysis" or to select the 
difficulties which need treatment. Lewinsohn has de­
signed several types of treatment packages which focus on 
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increasing pleasant events, on decreasing unpleasant events, 
or on both increasing pleasant events and decreasing un­
pleasant events. Lewinsohn and Arconad (1981) reported sig­
nificant differences between pretreatment and posttreatment 
global measures of depression after implementing any of the 
three types of treatment packages. Common techniques used 
in the packages include environmental intervention (e.g., 
change jobs, move to a new city), social skills training, 
time management (e.g., planned activity schedules), contingency 
management, cognitive skills (e.g., rational-emotive concepts, 
increasing coping self-statements), and stress management 
skills (e.g., relaxation training).. 
Lewinsohn has provided treatment to depressives through 
individual sessions (see Lewinsohn et al., 1982, for examples 
of case studies), group sessions (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, & 
Alper, 1970) and "classroom instruction" (Brown & Lewinsohn, 
1979, cited by Lewinsohn & Arconad, 1981). Lewinsohn maintains 
that all modes of presentation produce significant improvement. 
Lewinsohn and Arconad (19 81) proposed that some of the critical 
components in short-term therapy for depression may include 
an understandable and usable rationale, adequate mastery of 
skills which match the rationale, independent use of the 
skills outside the therapy context, and improvements which the 
client attributes to his or her skills (rather than to the 
clinician's skills). 
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Seligman's Reformulated Learned Helplessness 
Theory and Therapy 
Much research has been done on so-called "learned help­
lessness," both as a behavioral phenomenon of humans and infra-
humans (Hiroto, 1974; Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; Rodin, 1976) and as 
a model for human depression (Klein, Fencil-Morse, Seligman, 1976; 
Klein & Seligman, 1976; Seligman, 1975). Traditionally, the 
paradigm used to demonstrate the learned helplessness phenome­
non consists of exposing the organism to a situation in which 
it cannot control an aversive event (i.e., inescapable 
shock or noise) and subsequently "testing" the organism in a 
situation in which the organism can control the aversive event 
(i.e., escape the shock or turn off the noise). In the test 
situation, where control is possible, organisms usually do 
not learn to escape the aversive stimuli. In contrast, 
organisms who were never exposed to aversive stimuli, or were 
exposed to aversive stimuli which they could control, do learn 
to cope with the test situation. 
Seligman (1975) noted the similarity between the topog­
raphy of responses observed after exposure to the learned 
helplessness paradigm and that of responses in depression. 
For example, some of the features common to both helplessness 
and depression include passivity, weight loss, appetite loss, 
social and sexual deficits, and norepinephrine and dopamine 
depletion. Similarly, Seligman (1978) demonstrated that de­
pressed subjects and nondepressed subjects exposed to a 
learned helplessness paradigm exhibit the same deficits 
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relative-to normal controls. 
In this original theory, Seligman and his colleagues 
maintained that learning and expecting that events are un­
controllable result in motivational, cognitive, and emotional 
deficts. Seligman stressed that mere exposure to uncontrol­
lable events is not sufficient to result in helplessness. 
Instead Seligman argued that the lowered frequency of 
adaptive responding results from the "expectation" that events 
will be uncontrollable (the motivational deficit). Seligman 
also argues that the consequences of learning that events 
are uncontrollable involves difficulty in learning future 
responses which could result in lack of control (the cognitive 
deficit) and involve depressed affect (the emotional deficit). 
Abramson, Seligman,. and Teasdale (1978) (as well as 
Wortman & Dintzer, 1978) noted the inadequacies of the origi­
nal learned helplessness account, and Abramson and associates 
reformulated the theory. Abramson et al. (1978) argued that 
the original learned helplessness theory was not easily applied 
to humans. They identified the major inadequacies of the origi­
nal theory as (a) difficulty in distinguishing between events 
that are uncontrollable for all and those uncontrollable for 
some people (i.e., universal versus personal helplessness) and 
(b) difficulty specifying the conditions under which helpless­
ness is general or specific, and chronic or acute. The reformu­
lated theory emphasizes that the types of attributions that 
people make are causally related to the probability of depres­
sion. Within the "attributional reformulation" (Beach, Abramson, 
& Levine, 1981), depression is conceptualized as a set of 
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cognitive, affective-somatic, and self-esteem deficits. The 
authors asserted that the types of attributions that people 
make will influence whether their expectation of lack of 
control will generalize across time and situations or will 
affect their self-esteem. Seligman and associates maintained 
that the crucial dimensions on which attributions must be 
categorized are internal or external, stable or unstable, 
and global or specific. Seligman (19 81) and Abramson et al. 
listed the following "premises" of the revised model which specify 
conditions sufficient, but not necessary, for depression to occur: 
Premise 1 ("expected aversiveness"): The person expects 
highly aversive events to be probable and highly desirable 
events to be improbable. 
Premise 2 ("expected uncontrollability"): The person 
expects that his/her responses cannot influence the probability 
of desirable or aversive events. 
Premise 3 ("attributional style"): The person's "at-
tributional style" influences the generality and chronicity 
of depressive behavior, as well as its effect on self-esteem. 
Global attributions of helplessness produce general depressive 
deficts. Stable attributions of helplessness result in chronic 
depression. Internal attributions of helplessness produce 
lowered self-esteem. 
Premise 4 ("severity"): The severity of motivational and 
cognitive deficits depends on the "strength" of the individual's 
expectation' of aversive events and the "strength" of the 
individual's expectation of uncontrollable outcomes. The 
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importance that the individual gives to the uncontrollable 
outcome will influence the severity of affective and self-
esteem deficits. 
In summary, the attributional reformulation assumes that 
individuals become depressed when they expect unpleasant 
events to occur, believe that they can do nothing about 
those events, and think that their helplessness is caused 
by internal, global, and stable factors (Seligman, 1981). 
Controversy exists in the literature concerning the adequacy 
of learned helplessness as a model for depression (Costello, 
197 8). It is to Seligman's (19 81) credit that he acknowledges 
that learned helplessness may account for the deficits in 
only a subset of depressives (Huesmann, 1978). Although this 
hypothesis may be reasonable, currently no technology exists 
which assesses the response cluster(s) for which learned 
helplessness plays an important etiologic role. 
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, and Von Baeyer (1979), however, 
have recently developed the "Attributional Style Scale" which 
could represent an important step in that direction. Seligman 
and his coworkers developed the scale to test their hypothesis 
that attributions of helplessness produce depression. Half 
of the situations listed on the scale pertain to negative 
events, and half-pertain to positive events. Respondents are 
instructed to imagine each of the situations on the scale 
(e.g., "You have been looking for a job unsuccessfully for 
some time"). Then the respondents are instructed to describe 
the cause of the event and to rate the internality, stability, 
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and globality of the cause on a 7-point Likert scale. For 
negative events, Seligman and his coworkers found statistically 
significant correlations (£ ̂  .001) between depressed under­
graduates1 scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 1967) 
and internality (r = .4), stability (r = .34), and globality 
(r = .35). For positive events, "depression" was significantly 
negatively correlated with internality (r = -0.22, p <.01), 
instability (r = -.28; £ < .002), but'not with globality (r = -.04). 
Therefore, depression was correlated with externality and in­
stability and these correlations were not found with nandepressed 
college students. In addition, Seligman et al. (1979) found 
that the students who used stable, global attributions for 
failure were likely to become depressed when exposed to a 
failure situation (i.e., making a grade on a psychology mid­
term which they considered a failure). Allow, Abramson, 
Seligman, Tanebaum, Koslow, Peterson, Semmel, and Miller (1980, 
cited in Beach et al., 1981) replicated the correlation 
between depression and a "depressive attributional style" with 
depressed grade school children, and Raps, Reinhard, Seligman, 
and Abramson (1980, cited in Beach et al., 1981) repli­
cated this pattern with depressed patients in a Veteran's 
hospital. According to Seligman, Allow, Raps, and their 
associates, nondepressed college and grade school students 
show the same attributional style as hospitalized schizophrenics 
and medical patients. This style consists of making stable, 
internal, and global attributions for success and unstable, 
external, and specific attributions for failure. 
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Beach and associates mention that they are currently 
investigating the direction of the association between attri­
butional style and depression. They acknowledge the need 
for longitudinal research, and they note two unpublished 
studies which support the notion that depressive attributional 
styles precede depression. 
Until recently, the therapeutic strategies which paral­
lelled Seligman's model of depression were not specified. 
Generally, references to treatment were deduced from the 
theory in terms of innoculating people.against depression by 
exposing them to events they could control or by attempting 
to reduce their expectations of lack of control. Such de­
ductions were made without describing methods to accomplish 
these goals. The "attributional reformulation," however, 
appears to have prompted more discussion relevant to treat­
ment for depression. Still, much of Seligman and associates' 
discussion about treatment seeks to explain the effective­
ness of existing treatments from the perspective of 
learned helplessness rather than to design and to test new 
regimes. For example, Seligman (1981) proposed the following 
four methods of ameloriating depression: "environmental 
enrichment," "personal control training," "resignation train­
ing," and "attributional retraining." According to Seligman, 
the goal of environmental enrichment and personal control 
training is to change the depressive's tendency to view 
events as uncontrollable. Seligman suggested that this goal 
may be accomplished by actually reducing the frequency of 
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aversive events and by increasing the frequency of positive 
events through environmental manipulation (e.g., financial 
assistance, new job). Examples of treatments which Seligman 
categorized as "personal control training" include social 
skills training, graded task assignment, parent training, and 
assertiveness training. The purpose of resignation training 
is to reduce the desirability of preferred, but unattainable, 
events and to reduce the aversiveness of ongoing negative 
events. Seligman suggested that these goals can be met by 
encouraging the depressive to set more realistic standards 
and by challenging the depressive's assumptions regarding the 
importance of positive and negative events. Seligman argued 
that many of the strategies of Ellis (1962) and Beck (1976) 
fall within this category. Finally, Seligman suggested that 
the purpose of attribution retraining is to change unmerited 
attributions that depressives make for failure (i.e., internal, 
global, stable) and for success (i.e., external, specific, 
and unstable). Seligman argued that the basic techniques of 
cognitive therapy are subsumed here. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that Seligman (1981) has 
asserted that the learned helplessness model would predict 
that several treatment strategies commonly used with depression 
would result in no change. Although Seligman cited little 
research to support his opinion, the condemned treatments 
include restricting the emission of depressive speech, in­
ducing positive self-statements, self-reinforcement, coverant 
control therapy, desensitization, and flooding. 
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Beck's Cognitive Model of Depression 
Beck's (1967, 1972 , 1976) general thesis is that depres­
sion results from negative cognitions. These negative cog­
nitions are automatic, involuntary, plausible, and persistent 
(Beck, 1963) and often contain a theme of loss. Beck (1976) 
noted that the depressed individual "regards himself as lack­
ing some element or attribute that he considers essential for 
his happiness." Beck distinguished between public meanings 
of loss or of events (i.e., socially accepted or objective 
definitions) and private meanings of loss or of events (i.e., 
the significance of the event to the individual) and stressed 
that it is the private interpretation of loss which is critical 
in the sad, emotional responses following these thoughts. 
Beck maintained that during depression the theme of loss dis­
torts the individual's conceptualization of the self, the 
world, and the future. These distortions make up Beck's 
well-publicized "cognitive triad" and occur despite discon-
firming evidence when the individual commits logical errors 
such as (a) arbitrary inference—the person draws conclusions 
which cannot be supported by environmental data; (b) selective 
abstraction—the person emphasizes some details and ignores 
others; (c) overgeneralization—the person draws conclusions 
about his or her ability, performance, or worth on the basis 
of a single incident; (d) magnification/minimization—the 
individual exaggerates or slights the importance of events; 
and (e) all-or-none-thinking—the person thinks in absolute 
terms. 
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Beck (1976) asserted that some individuals develop a 
vulnerability, predisposition, or sensitivity to depression 
by exposure to an "unfavorable life situation" (e.g., the loss 
of a parent or chronic rejection by peers). Following this 
exposure, a "schema" (a negative image), "depressogenic 
assumptions," or "rules" develop. The individual then 
tends to overreact to losses. Later when the individual 
is exposed to a situation analogous to the original "unfavora­
ble life situation," he or she interprets events negatively and 
thinks negatively. The typical emotional, motivational, be­
havioral, and vegetative depressive symptoms (e.g. , hope­
lessness, apathy, agitations, and sleep disturbance) follow 
these negative, automatic thoughts. A positive correlation 
exists between these depressive symptoms and the individual's 
negative thoughts (i.e., as depressive symptoms increase, 
negative thoughts increase and vice versa). Beck termed the 
relationship between depressive symptoms and thoughts a 
"vicious circle," "a circular feedback model," and the "down­
ward spiral of depression." 
Hollon and Beck (1979) concisely summarized the evidence 
used to support the cognitive theory of depression. In 
short, they maintained that these data suggest that depressives 
differ from nondepressives not only in what they think, but 
also in the way they think. 
First, Hollon and Beck cited a series of studies which 
support the assertion that a correlation exists between de­
pression and dysfunctional thoughts and that no such correlation 
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exists in the absence of depression. Examples of "dysfunc­
tional thoughts" or "negative cognitive schemas" include 
dreams with themes of loss or failure (Beck & Ward, 1961), 
distortion of hypothetical situations (Hammen & Krantz, 1976), 
and high scores on the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (Nelson, 
1977) . 
Similarly, Hollon and Beck (1979) reviewed a series of 
studies to support the notion that depressives differ from 
nondepressives in how they process information. Examples of 
depressive characteristics included attributing their failure 
to personal incompetence (Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 
1976), underestimating the control they have over outcomes 
(Alloy & Abramson,. 1979), and an increased likelihood to recall . 
negative events (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975). 
Experimental research from the information processing 
paradigm has indicated that depressives have deficits in 
abstracting ability on the Halstead Categories Test (Post, 
cited in Teuting et al., 1981), in associative memory 
(Weingartner, cited in Teuting et al., 1981), and in 
short-term memory (Oltmanns, 1978). Research has suggested 
that although the amount of information that can be processed 
during depression is reduced, such deficits can be ameloriated 
by improvements in mood (through antidepressants and/or 
success experiences) (Glass, Uhlenhuth, Weinrub, Fischman, 
& Teuch, 1978; Henry, Weingartner, & Murphy, 1973). 
It is noteworthy that in his review of the literature 
on psychological and'performance deficits in depression, 
24 
Miller (1975) attributed the deficits seen in depressives com­
pared with nondepressives to cognitive factors (e.g., low ex­
pectations) or to motivational factors (e.g., indifference to 
the task). Such a conclusion parallels Beck and Seligman's 
assumption that cognitive factors influence behavior and motiva­
tion. Relevant are the studies suggesting that increases in 
expectations after successful performance were related to sub­
sequent improved performance (Klein &'Seligman, 1976; Loeb, 
Beck, & Diggory, 1971). 
The preceding evidence does document the relationship 
that Beck noted between dysfunctional cognitive processes 
and depression; however, again, these data do not demonstrate 
causality. Sensitive to this difficulty, Hollon and Beck 
(1979) have appealed to studies employing induction procedures 
that create depressed moods (Strickland, Hale, & Anderson, 
1975; Velten, 1968) and correlate with physiological con-
commitants of clinical depression (Teasdale & Bancroft, 1977). 
Hollon and Beck emphasized that these correlations may be 
found only when the subject actually believes that statements are 
used to induce the mood or the physiological change (Rogers 
& Craighead, 1977). Appealing to the mood induction procedures 
for assistance in demonstrating causality seems fruitless 
for two reasons, however. First, exposing subjects to nega­
tive statements, used to induce dysphoric mood, can be viewed 
as an environmental manipulation rather than a purely cognitive 
process. Second, the external validity of induced mood, can 
be questioned when one wishes to generalize to clinical 
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depression. In short, it appears that these mood induction 
procedures have demonstrated only that induced mood (which 
may or may not be similar to depression) and physiological 
changes covary, after subjects have been instructed to read 
negative statements. 
Researchers have also raised basic problems for Beck's 
model by demonstrating that nondepressed people also display 
cognitive biases. For example, nondepressed students over­
estimated the control they had over objectively uncontrollable 
events when the events occurred frequently or when a high 
degree of control was desirable. Depressives underestimated 
the control they had over controllable but undesirable events; 
however, they accurately estimated the controi they had over 
controllable, neutral outcomes (Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Golin, 
Terrell, Weitz, and Drost (1979) replicated the nondepressed1s 
"illusion of control" with nondepressed schizophrenic inpatients 
(and compared them to depressed inpatients). DeMonbreum 
and Craighead (197 7) found that nondepressed students under­
estimated the frequency of negative feedback that they re­
ceived on a laboratory test. Lewinsohn et al. (19 80) showed 
that depressives' ratings of their social competence were 
likely to match objective observers' ratings of the depres­
sives1 competence. In contrast, psychiatric and normal con­
trols were likely to rate themselves more positively than the 
observers did. This combination of data presents difficulty 
for Beck's blanket assertion that depressives are more likely 
to distort information than the nondepressed. 
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In spite of the fact that Beck's model of depression 
(like Lewinsohn's and Seligman's models) cannot be accepted 
as an adequate explanation of the development and maintenance 
of depression, the model has fostered the design of a promising 
therapy for depression. Beck et al. (1979) comprehensively 
described the strategies and rationale that Beck uses with 
depressed clients in Cognitive Therapy of Depression. Beck's 
intervention is categorized best as "cognitive-behavioral," 
since both types of techniques are employed. Examples 
of so-called "cognitive" techniques include self-monitoring of 
dysfunctional thoughts, evaluating the contents of thoughts, 
replacing dysfunctional thoughts with alternative thoughts, 
and reattributing negative consequences to impersonal factors. 
Examples of so-called "behavioral" techniques include schedul­
ing activities, rating activities in terms of their mastery 
and pleasure, and graded task assignments. (See Beck et al., 
1979; Coleman & Beck, 1981; Hollon & Beck, 1979 for descriptions 
of each of these techniques.) 
Beck's general strategy includes (a) teaching the client 
that a relationship exists between thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior; (b) teaching the client to monitor his or her auto­
matic thoughts and to deduce the underlying depressogenic 
assumptions or rules; (c) teaching the client to state the 
thought or assumption in the form of a hypothesis, to test 
the hypothesis, and to examine the evidence which supports 
or refutes the hypothesis; and (d) teaching the client to 
replace his or her dysfunctional thoughts or assumptions with 
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thoughts or assumptions which more closely match the evidence. 
to persuade the client to use adaptive thoughts, rather than 
teaching the client to become sensitive to the empirical in­
validation of the negative thoughts. In so doing, the "be­
havioral" techniques (often given as "homework" assignments) 
are used as exercises to test the depressive's belief. The 
"cognitive" techniques are used often to increase the proba­
bility that the client will actually implement the behavioral 
technique in his^ier natural environment. 
When examining the outcome literature comparing treat­
ments for depression, several reviewers have concluded that 
behavioral and cognitive-behavioral techniques are effective 
with some populations of depressives (Blaney, 1977; Hollon 
& Beck, 1979; Rehm & Kornblith, 1979). When cognitive-
behavioral procedures are compared to strictly cognitive 
procedures (Taylor & Marshall, 1977), strictly 
behavioral procedures (Shaw, 1977; Taylor & Marshall, 1977) , 
strictly pharmacological intervention (McLean & Hakstian, 
1979; Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon, 1977), and nonspecific 
and/or dynamic procedures, there is a trend for cognitive-
behavioral to be significantly more effective. At the same 
time, occasional contradictory findings have appeared in com­
paring cognitive-behavioral and behavioral therapies. For 
example, Besyner (1979), in his doctoral dissertation, reported a 
Lewinsohnian behavioral treatment to be more effective than 
"collaborative empiricism" 
between the therapist and client, and warns against attempting 
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cognitive-behavioral therapy and nonspecific and waiting list 
control groups. Similarly, Comas-Diaz (19 81) found that cog­
nitive-behavioral therapy and behavioral therapy were equally 
more likely to reduce Puerto Rican women's reported depres­
sion than a waiting-list control procedure. At a 
five-week follow-up, the behavioral group was rated as less 
depressed than the cognitive therapy group. In addition, 
Zeiss, Lewinsohn, and Munoz (1979) found no differences among 
social skills training, cognitive training, and increasing 
pleasant events. Such discrepant findings may be due, however, 
to differences in the populations utilized or in the way in 
which treatment was provided. 
It is worth highlighting some of the most convincing 
(and well-publicized) support for the efficacy of cognitive-
behavioral therapy, which is reported by Rush et al. (1977) . 
Forty-one depressed outpatients received either cognitive-
behavioral or imipramine hydrochloride therapy. Although the 
study was biased against psychotherapy in that the unipolar 
depressives receiving cognitive therapy showed not only a 
greater degree of psychopathology, but also a poorer past 
responsiveness to otherpsychotherapies the subjects receiving cog-
nitive-behavioral therapy showed significantly greater improvement 
(48.9%) than the subjects receiving imipramine (20%). Although 
both groups were significantly improved after therapy, the 
cognitive-behavioral group both maintained its gains 
at a three-month follow-up when compared to the imipramine 
group. Although not statistically significant at a six-month 
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follow-up, this trend continued (-X = .10). Kovacs, Beck, 
Rush, and Hollon (cited in Hollon & Beck, 1979) reported 
that the difference between their groups was also apparent 
at a one-year follow-up. 
Similarly, Beck et al. (1979) reported a study in which 
cognitive-behavioral therapy alone (i.e., without antide­
pressants) was effective in treating hospitalized depressives. 
They cited another study in which the addition of amitriptyline 
to cognitive-behavioral therapy did not produce any greater 
improvement than cognitive-behavioral therapy alone. At 
the same time Beck et al. (1979) were skeptical about generaliz­
ing this finding to particular individuals and 
anti-depressants sometimes provide an useful adjunct to 
cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
It is also noteworthy that although individual ses­
sions have been cognitive-behavioral's typical modality, 
Hollon and Shaw (1979) reported that group cognitive therapy 
is both workable and effective. Similarly, some evidence 
exists that the frequency of sessions, instead of the length 
of treatment, is significant. In particular, in his doctoral 
dissertation, Morris (1975; cited in Hollon & Beck, 1979) reported 
finding no differences in the improvement of clients treated 
with six sessions spread over a three- versus a six-week period. 
Rush, Beck, Kovacs, Khatami, Fitzgibbons, and Wolman (1975; 
referenced in Hollon & Beck, 1979) found no differences between 
clients treated weekly for 20 sessions and clients treated approxi­
mately twice a week (not exceeding 20 sessions) for 12 weeks.. 
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In conclusion, it appears that the preceding data refute 
and can be contrasted with the following, well-publicized 
statement by Akiskal and McKinney (1975): 
It would appear that no matter what interpersonal 
factors mobilize depressive behaviors, once the 
latter reach the melancholic stage, they become 
biologically autonomous and become relatively 
refractory to psychotherapeutic intervention. 
(P. 293) 
Treatment Validity: The Contribution which 
Assessment Makes to Treatment Effectiveness 
and the Relevance of Treatment 
Validity to Depression 
One assertion made in this dissertation is that if re­
searchers are to identify the mechanisms through which treat­
ments have their effects, then they must attend to the rela­
tionship between assessment and treatment. That is, clinical 
researchers must be committed to specifying the conditions 
under which a distinct therapy is effective for an identified 
client with a particular set of problems. Such a commitment 
is reflected in the goals of behavioral assessment, to identify 
"meaningful response units and their controlling variables for 
the purpose of understanding and altering behavior" (Nelson 
& Hayes, 1979). 
Recently, within behavioral assessment an approach 
termed "treatment validity," which is used to evaluate the 
quality of the data generated, has been investigated. Because 
the concept and the study of treatment validity essentially 
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pertains to the contribution which the results of assessment 
make to treatment effectiveness, treatment validity issues 
were relevant in this dissertation. In particular, this dis­
sertation not only asked what components of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy were the most essential for achieving change in de­
pression, but it also examined the responses within the 
depressive cluster that were influenced by cognitive-behavioral 
therapy. In this study, the contribution which identi­
fying clients with high and low frequencies of dysfunctional 
thoughts made to the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy was examined. It was predicted the cognitive-
behavioral therapy would be more effective for subjects with 
a high frequency of dysfunctional thoughts than it is for 
subjects with a low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. 
First, a brief overview of treatment validity will be given. 
Second, the relevance of treatment validity to the study of 
depression will be described. 
Treatment Validity: An Overview 
The impetus for the use of treatment validity as an index 
for evaluating behavioral assessment came from behaviorists1 
basic dissatisfaction with alternative criteria (Nelson & 
Hayes, 1979). Treatment validity or the contribution that 
assessment makes to treatment effectiveness can be contrasted 
with other criteria used to evaluate behavioral assessment— 
psychometrics and generalizability theory. 
Those who propose the application of psychometrics 
to behavioral assessment are concerned typically with 
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the reliability and validity of data. Reliability involves 
the consistency of the measure (Robb, Bernardoni, & Johnson, 
1972) or the agreement between two "maximally similar" measures 
of the same dependent variable (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). 
Reliability coefficients are interpreted as measuring the 
"accuracy" of the assessment device. For instance, test-
retest reliability indicates that results from the measure 
are stable over time. Split-half reliability suggests that 
results from one half of the test correlate with results from 
the other half. Parallel-forms reliability indicates that 
different forms of the same test are equivalent (Cronbach, 
1970) . 
Similarly, in classical psychometric terms "validity" is 
the extent to which a test measures what it "purports to 
measure" (Cronbach, 1970). Types of validity include con­
tent validity (the extent to which relevant samples of the 
criterion situation are represented in the "test" situation), 
construct validity (the extent to which the "test" results 
relate to theorizing), and criterion-related validity (the 
degree to which the "test" results correlate with an external 
measure assessing the same variable that the "test" purports 
to measure. Criterion-related validity is divided into two 
components: concurrent validity (the degree to which the 
test correlates with some other simultaneous measure of the 
same variable) and predictive validity (the extent to which 
test results correlate with some other measure administered 
at a future date). 
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The second alternative for evaluating behavioral assess­
ment is generalizability theory (Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & 
Rajaratnam, 1972). In generalizability theory, the psycho­
metric standards are relabeled as "universes of generalization" 
or "facets" and are placed in analyses of variance to deter­
mine the proportion of variance accounted for by each uni­
verse of generalization. Cone (1977) identified the following 
six universes of generalization and their parallels in psycho-
metrics: (a) score (parallel-forms reliability); (b) item 
(split-half reliability); (c) time (test-retest reliability); 
(d) setting (temporal consistency of external validity); 
(e) method (convergent validity); and (f) dimension (construct 
validity, concurrent validity, and discriminant validity). 
Although Nelson and Hayes (1981) acknowledged some spe­
cific uses for psychometric standards within behavioral 
assessment, they are opposed to using psychometrics as the 
major method for evaluating behavioral assessment. Nelson and 
Hayes (1981); Nelson (1983); and Nelson, Hay, and Hay (1977) 
argue that the theoretical assumptions underlying psycho­
metric theory and behavioral assessment conflict. Further­
more, Nelson (1983) has asserted recently that the 
application of psychometrics to behavioral assessment raises 
practical, conceptual, and philosophical problems. 
First, Nelson has argued that since behavioral assess­
ment is an approach rather than a technology, it is difficult 
to list the devices within it. (Even if such a task were 
appropriate conceptually, Nelson maintained, different 
34 
types of disorders, responses, and situations and their inter­
actions would all need to be described and evaluated.) 
Second, Nelson asserted that the assumptions underlying 
psychometrics and those underlying assessment conflict concep­
tually. That is, (a) if behavior can be modified, it is not 
surprising that poor test-retest reliability occurs; (b) if be­
havior is situationallv specific, concurrent validity across 
different assessment situations is not predicted; and (c) if 
behavior varies across response systems, concurrent validity 
across methods of assessment is not expected. In generaly, 
Nelso argued that within behavioral assessment the lack of 
psychometric validation reflects the properties of behavior 
rather than faulty assessment devices. Similarly, Nelson 
pointed out that differing levels of analysis are deemed 
appropriate within behavioral assessment (i.e., the individual) 
and psychometrics (i.e., the group). 
Finally, Nelson stated that the philosophical basis of 
psychometrics and behavioral assessment are incompatible. 
Specifically, psychometric criteria rest on structuralism 
and stress "stable internal entities." In contrast, the 
philosophical foundation of behavioral assessment is func-
tionalism. 
Thus, the preceding concerns with psychometrics and 
generalizability theory led Nelson (19 83) to call for a 
functional evaluation of behavioral assessment. Such moti­
vation led Nelson and Hayes (1979) to offer treatment validity 
as a viable option for evaluating the quality- of behavioral 
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assessment. Questions which concern "the treatment validity 
of behavioral assessment" involve evaluating the contribution 
which assessment makes to treatment effectiveness. If be­
havioral assessment is viewed as a process, then the "treat­
ment validity" (or the contribution to treatment effective­
ness) of each step can be evaluated. Relevant "steps" within 
behavioral assessment include selecting target behaviors, 
performing a functional analysis, selecting a strategy for 
treatment, and evaluating the outcome of treatment. The 
question is: How much does each assessment step contribute 
to the effectiveness of treatment? 
The first demonstration of treatment validity compared 
the relative contribution which a functional and static 
analysis made to treatment effectiveness (Jarrett, 1980, 
unpublished master's thesis). Although null results were 
obtained in the previous study, treatment validity did warrant 
further study as a methodology for evaluating behavioral 
assessment (Jarrett, Nelson, & Hayes, 1981). Similarly, 
a study within the Nelson and Hayes laboratory compared a 
treatment matched to subjects' specific problems within inter­
personal relationships to a treatment which was not matched (i.e., 
yoked treatment). Preliminary analyses, although not significant 
at conventional levels (p = .10), indicated a trend for the 
matched subjects to improve more than the yoked subjects. 
Many studies within the current literature which were 
done for other purposes can be interpreted as treatment 
validity studies. For example, several studies demonstrate 
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the treatment validity of selecting particular target behaviors. 
McKnight, Nelson, Hayes, and Jarrett (submitted for publication) 
showed that depressed women improve more on global and spe­
cific measures of depression when treatment is matched (rather 
than not matched) to their problem areas. Similarly, Wahler 
and Fox (1980) found that contingency contracting for solitary 
play was a more effective procedure for reducing aggressive, 
oppositional behavioral than contingency contracting for social 
play. A study by Trower, Yardlev, Bryant, and Shaw (1978) sup­
ported the treatment validity of differentiating subjects with 
social-skills deficits from subjects with social anxiety excesses. 
That is, the subjects with social skills deficits improved 
more when given social skills training than when given systematic 
desensitization, while subjects with identified problems in 
anxiety excesses improved equally when given either social-
skills training or systematic desensitization. In a similar 
vein, Ost, Jerremalm, and Johansson (1981) showed that greater 
effects were achieved when the particular treatment of social 
phobia matched the subject's pattern of responses (i.e., 
when subjects with social-skills deficits received social 
skills training, and subjects with anxiety excesses received 
relaxation training). In addition, Kupke, Calhoun, and Hobbs 
(1979) showed that higher ratings of female attraction were 
obtained when the males were trained to demonstrate attention 
during a conversation with a female (i.e., the male used "you" 
statement when conversing with the female) than when the males 
were trained to encourage conversation (i.e., the male used 
phrases such as "go on"). 
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Studies demonstrating the treatment validity of identi­
fying specific subject characteristics are also available. 
For example, Borkovec, Grayson, O'Brien, and Weerts (1979) 
demonstrated that subjects identified as idiopathic insomniacs 
(by electroencephalograph) improved more on objective sleep 
measures.when treated with a tension-release mode of relaxation 
than subjects classified as pseudoinsominacs. In addition, 
Altmaier, Ross, Leary, and Thornbrough (1982) have demon­
strated differential treatment outcomes when treatment com­
ponents are matched to the client's "anxiety mode" (i.e., 
cognitive or somatic). Similarly, Elder, Edelstein, and 
Fremouw (1981) showed that socially anxious freshmen who had 
high scores on the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale were 
more likely to improve when they were exposed to cognitive 
restructuring than when given social skills training. In 
addition, Shaher and Merbaum (1981) demonstrated the treat­
ment validity of distinguishing between the following two 
subtypes of socially anxious individuals: (a) subjects with 
strong physiological reactions (when exposed to social stress) 
and strong "autonomic perception" (as assessed by a question­
naire) and (b) subjects with strong physiological reactions 
and weak autonomic perception. They found that systematic 
desensitization was more effective than rational restructuring 
for the fiirst subtype than for the second subtype.. For the 
second subtype, they found that rational restructuring pro­
duced greater gains than systematic desensitization. Cur­
rently, Amodei, Nelson, and Jarrett are "conducting a similar 
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investigation which examines the differential response of 
subjects reporting congestive or spasmodic dysmenorrhea to 
various components of a treatment package. 
In summary, although examples are available which sug­
gest that some types of treatment are effective independently 
of the subjects' target behaviors (Zeiss et al., 1979) or subjects' 
characteristics (Akins, Hollandsworth> & O'Connell, 1982), the 
majority of the relevant research seems to support a treatment 
validity notion. That is, it is clinically valuable to identify 
specifically a client's problematic response(s) or characteristics 
before selecting a treatment strategy. Future treatment 
validity studies could evaluate assessment's contribution 
to treatment effectiveness by the use of a single 
subject design(s), the use of multiple assessment devices, 
and the continual use of dependent measures during ongoing 
treatment. 
Treatment Validity; Its Relevance for Depression 
Treatment validity, or the contribution which the results 
of assessment make to treatment effectiveness, is relevant to 
depression when one attempts to match the depressive's 
"characteristics" or problematic target behaviors to specific 
types of treatment for depression. Although the results of 
factor analytic studies have identified clusters of responses 
which many people who report feeling depressed share (Grinker, 
Miller, Sabshin, Nunn, & Nunally, 1961), there is no one de­
fining feature which all depressed individuals share (Beck, 
196 7). For particular individuals depression appears to 
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involve different combinations of problematic responses. For 
example, Rapp and Fremouw (personal communication) submitted 
to cluster analysis the data of 100 depressed subjects on 
the following measures: the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood 
Related Subscale (PES; MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1971); the 
Unpleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale (UES; 
Lewinsohn & Talkington, 1979); the Dysfunctional Attitude 
Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978; see Beach et al., 1981); 
the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 
1980); the Attributional Style Questionnaire—Good Outcome 
Subscale (ASQ; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Von Baeyer, 
1979); and the Attributional Style Questionnaire—Bad Outcome 
Subscale (ASQ; Seligman et al., 1979). The cluster analysis 
suggested four distinct subtypes. Twenty-five percent of the 
subjects' scores on all variables were similar to those of 
nondepressed persons (i.e., the "low overall dysfunctional 
subtype"); 31% obtained high scores on the measure of un­
pleasant events (i.e., the "high unpleasant events" subtype); 
25% obtained high scores on all measures (i.e., the "high 
overall dysfunctional subtype"); and 19% obtained low scores 
on the measure of pleasant events and reported a maladaptive 
attributional style for pleasant outcomes (i.e., the "pleasure-
disrupted" subtype). These results would show "treatment 
validity" if identifying a particular subtype and matching 
that subtype to a corresponding treatment produced more 
improvement than would have occurred if no such matching had 
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been done; but this research has yet to be conducted. 
Prior to discussing the link between assessment and 
treatment in depression, it should be noted that the behavior 
of therapists actually does differ when providing various treat­
ments for depression. Contrary to a skeptical belief that 
all therapy is the same, therapists purporting to use dif­
ferent therapies for depression do, in fact, behave dif­
ferently. For example, DeRubeis, Hollon, Evans, and Bemis 
(1982) found that when therapists' behavior was rated accord­
ing to specific dimensions on a questionnaire, cognitive 
therapy and interpersonal therapy could be distinguished. 
Similarly, Greenwald, Kornblith, Hersen, Bellack, and 
Himmelhoch (1981) showed that ratings of audio-taped sessions 
suggested differences between "behavior therapists" (who 
were teaching social skills) and "psychotherapists" (using 
a dynamic orientation). Although both groups of therapists 
were treating depressives, ratings indicated that behavior 
therapists used more directive and nondirective statements, 
took more initiative, and appeared more supportive than their 
counterparts. 
Two such studies relevant to the relationship between 
treatment validity and depression have been done. One study 
by the present author (Jarrett, 1980) attempted to compare 
the contribution which a "functional analysis" (i.e., a con­
dition in which the treatments that subjects received were 
matched to their identified problems) to a "static" analysis 
(i.e., a condition in which subjects received a treatment which 
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was "yoked" to another depressive's problem areas and thus 
was not matched to their identified problems). Since the 
null results produced by this study were attributed primarily 
to methodological difficulties, McKnight, Nelson, Hayes, and 
Jarrett (submitted for publication, 1983; McKnight, 1982 Master's 
thesis) conducted a similar study to evaluate the treatment 
validity of matching different treatments to different 
"subtypes" of depressives (i.e., depressives with different 
problematic target behaviors). The three patterns of target be­
haviors in this study were (a) a high frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts, (b) social skill deficits, or (c) dysfunctional thoughts 
and social skills deficits, in combination. Results showed that 
not only the global measures of depression, but also the specific 
measures of each related target behavior (i.e., dysfunctional 
thoughts or social skills deficits) improved more when treat­
ment was matched to the target behavior than when it was not. 
Several "nonbehavioral" comparisons of client charac­
teristics and treatment outcome are relevant to treatment 
validity and depression. For example, Bielski and Friedel, 
in their 1976 review, found that higher social class, 
insidious onset, anorexia, weight loss, middle and late 
insomnia, and psychomotor disturbance were all positively 
related to a favorable response to tricyclic medication. 
In contrast, neurotic, hypochondriacal, and hysterical traits; 
multiple prior episodes ; and delusions predicted a poor re­
sponse to imipramine and amitriptyline. 
Likewise, several studies have.indicated that a particular 
type of treatment affects a particular response in depression. 
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For example, Friedman (1975) showed that antidepressants were 
more likely than marital therapy to reduce depressive symp­
toms; yet, marital therapy was more likely than anti-depres-
sants to improve marital relationships. Similarly, Klerman, 
DiMascio, Weissman, Prusoff, and Paykel (1974) found that 
antidepressants, psychotherapy, and their combination were 
equally effective in reducing depressive symptoms, but only 
psychotherapy improved the client's social adjustment and 
relationships. Finally, Paykel, Prusoff, Klerman, Haskell, 
and DiMascio (1973) performed a cluster analysis identifying 
four subtypes of depressive patients (i.e., psychotic depres-
sives, anxious depressives, hostile depressives, and young 
depressives with personality disorders) which predicted out­
come to tricyclics. Specifically, they found that psychotic 
depressives improved most, anxious depressives improved 
least, and the other two subtypes "showed intermediate 
improvement." 
Within the behavioral literature on depression, it is 
noteworthy that three chapters in Behavior Therapy for De­
pression; Present Status and Future Directions (Rehm, 1981) 
are devoted to matching particular types of treatment to 
depressed patients (see McLean, 1981, on outpatients; see 
Liberman, 1981, for a model; see Shaw, 1981, on inpatients). 
Shaw (1981) has suggested the following three methodologies 
for investigating the relationship between client "charac­
teristics" and treatment: (a) calculate correlations between 
client characteristics and outcome measures; (b) assign 
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different types of clients to the same treatment, and (c) as­
sign different types of clients to specific treatment com­
ponents within the treatment based on the client's needs. 
Independent of what methodology is used to investigate 
client-treatment interactions in depression, it appears that 
the logic of "strong inference" (Piatt, 1964) would suggest 
that this literature may advance further and faster if clients' 
responses rather than their demographic characteristics are 
assessed with reference to treatment efficacy. Although such 
an assertion stands in contrast to Shaw's (1981) recommendation 
to begin with demographic characteristics, Klerman and 
Weissman's finding (1976, cited by Shaw, 1981) supports the 
assertion. Klerman and Weissman found that age, race, 
social class, marital status, religion, number of previous 
depressions, number of suicide attempts, early deaths or 
separations as. a child, neurotic childhood traits, amount 
and type of stress six months before depression, severity of 
symptoms, and severity of social impairment did not predict 
treatment outcome. 
The suggestion that the client's problematic target 
behaviors be matched to treatment is what Liberman (19 81) has 
termed a "modular approach" to treating depression. The 
modular approach stands in contrast to a broad-spectrum ap­
proach, . which typically employs a package of techniques designed 
for a combination of assumed (rather than assessed) difficulties. 
It is the contrasting, modular approach which is related most 
to evaluating treatment validity in the behavioral assessment 
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of depression. 
Acknowledgment of Relevant Interpretational 
and Philosophical Issues 
While asserting that the relationship between assessment 
and treatment is important in identifying the mechanism(s) 
through which components of cognitive-behavioral treatment 
have their effects, it is important to acknowledge some 
inherent interpretational and philosophical issues. In so 
doing, the following section will distinguish between (a) treat­
ment efficacy and a disorder's etiology and maintenance; 
(b) treatment efficacy and its mechanism of change; and 
(c) mediational and nonmediational stances on depression. 
Treatment Efficacy Versus a Disorder's 
Etiology and Maintenance 
First, it must be acknowledged that the etiology, main­
tenance, and treatment of depression are separate issues. 
Although an etiological theory may be useful in stimulating 
and guiding treatment design (see Beach et al., 19 81, and 
Rush & Giles, 1982, for comments on the use of theories in 
clinical practice), the effectiveness of a particular treat­
ment does not validate its parent theory. Rimland (1964, 
cited by Davison, 1969) , for example, discussed the etiology 
and treatment of autism. He argued that although operant 
procedures remedy some developmental disabilities occurring in 
autism, the effectiveness of such procedures does not indicate 
that autism was operantly conditioned. Rimland further 
illustrated his point by analogy: Although it is true that • 
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aspirin effectively treats a headache, the medical profession 
does not assert that headaches result from aspirin deficiencies. 
In the present case, when cognitive-behavioral therapy or 
any of its elements is shown to alter dysfunctional thoughts 
and to ameliorate depression, this effect does not necessarily 
show that depression is caused by faulty thinking. 
Similarly, even when the variables which have precipitated 
depression or ameliorated depression can be identified con­
clusively, questions regarding maintenance can be raised. For 
instance, it is possible that a depression which developed 
following a series of unpleasant events is maintained cur­
rently by attention from a significant other. If the pre­
cipitating factors (i.e., the aversive events) are removed, 
yet the maintaining variable (i.e., attention) remains, it 
is likely that therapy which does not focus on both types of 
controlling variables will be ineffective. 
This dissertation avoids the preceding interpretational 
errors by acknowledging that the investigation does not 
address the etiology or maintenance of depression. At the 
same time, data from studies like the present one offer 
fruitful sources for hypotheses to be tested in later research. 
Treatment Efficacy Versus Its 
Mechanism of Change 
It must be acknowledged that often within depression 
research, theorists use demonstrations of treatment efficacy 
as evidence that change occurs through a particular process. 
For example, Beck et al. (1979) have argued that 
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cognitive-behavioral therapy produces its effect by altering 
faulty patterns of thinking. It goes without saying, however, 
that alternative hypotheses abound. 
The present author uses the following alternative to 
conceptualize the effects of cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
This therapy is viewed as an environmental manipulation which 
affects global measures of depression, as well as specific 
measures of responses within the depressive cluster. The 
author predicted that certain changes are unique to each 
therapeutic component (i.e., Component A, self-monitoring, 
and Component B, logical analysis, influence' global measures 
of depression and cognitive measures while Component C, 
hypothesis testing, influences global measures of depression 
and measures of dysfunctional thoughts, pleasant events, and 
interpersonal relationships). The process that the present 
author offers to explain such effects follows. Cognitive-
behavioral therapy may increase the probability that depressed 
people will approach situations that they would otherwise 
avoid. Such "approach" is significant in that many depres­
sive behaviors include behavioral deficits. Also, this 
approach is important in that exposure to natural, environ­
mental contingencies may reduce some of the behavioral 
excesses within the depressive disorder (e.g., dysfunctional 
thoughts). Such a process is analogous to the effects of 
exposure in anxiety-based disorders. Beck's treatment may 
be "capable" of achieving compliance with strategies that 
expose people to natural contingencies because the rationale 
offered has a high degree of "face validity" and initially 
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requires little effort on the part of the depressive. That 
is, depressives are always "in contact" with their dysfunctional 
thoughts and initially must do very little to self-monitor them 
since these thoughts typically occur with a high frequency. 
It is reasoned that Component A (self-monitoring), increased 
the probability that people would attempt the strategies sug­
gested in Components B (logical analysis) and C (hypothesis 
testing). It was hypothesized Component B would have a narrow 
effect and Component C would have a more general effect. Here 
it is argued that the generalized effect of Component C may 
occur since subjects learn problem-solving skills which are 
applicable to a variety of situations. 
While speculating on such mechanisms of change, it is 
important to avoid interpretational errors. To avoid typical 
interpretational errors and to increase the internal validity 
of process research, Kazdin (1980) suggested: (a) ascertaining that 
the independent variable was, in fact, implemented; (b) using 
a "dismantling" strategy (i.e., isolating treatment components 
and examining the necessary and/or sufficient conditions to 
produce behavior change), and (c) using a dependent variable 
that directly measures the process in question. 
This dissertation does not assume that the effective 
mechanism in Beck's therapy is the modification of dysfunctional 
thoughts. One purpose of the dissertation was to further the 
identification of therapeutic processes that contribute to 
the established effectiveness of Beck's cognitive-behavioral 
therapy of depression. Kazdin's suggestions were implemented 
in this dissertation by (a) using detailed treatment plans 
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for each session, (b) dismantling Beck's therapy into three 
components; and (c) using several specific and global measures 
of depression, including specific measures thought to be re­
lated to the proposed efficacious processes. 
To conclude, it is noteworthy that this research and 
other similar studies which attempt to identify the processes 
essential for the efficacy of a therapy can never rule out 
every potential, contributing variable. Although such studies 
(and their replication) can increase the probability that 
the essential ingredients are identified, no single study 
can be expected to prove that component X produces the ef­
fectiveness of treatment Y. 
Mediational Versus Nonmediational 
Stances on Depression 
This dissertation must acknowledge that (a) the cognitive 
model of depression is embedded in the mediational-nonmedia-
tional controversy (Beck & Mahoney, 1979; Wolpe, 1978) and 
(b) Beck would favor a mediational interpretation of any 
results this dissertation would produce. Although this study 
does not attempt to support or to refute either a mediational 
or a nonmediational stance on behavior in general or on 
depression in particular, the author must acknowledge that 
she questions many of Beck's crucial assumptions. For example, 
she questions Beck's assumption that negative thoughts precede 
depressed affect and are thus causally related. First, one 
might question the methodology Beck used to obtain data 
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supportive of such an assumption. That is, Beck's reliance 
on the often retrospective self-report of his clients in out­
lining what thoughts occurred before which affective response 
is questionable. Pertinent theoretical questions include that 
of whether subjects in general, and depressives in particular,, 
can "accurately" remember and report their thoughts? Simi­
larly, are people "well-trained" enough that they label the 
same "affective" states with corresponding names? It is 
possible, for instance, that some of Beck's depressives "felt" 
what other people might label "anxiety"? Yet, the thoughts they 
reported were more typical of depression than of anxiety. The 
content of the thought thus may not always predict the emotion 
experienced. 
More important, however, than the method that Beck 
employs the underlying logic. Naturally, in conducting a 
causal analysis it is important in what temporal sequence 
variables are arranged. At the same time, by using thoughts 
to explain affect, Beck's brand of causal inference follows 
the principle of "post hoc, ergo propter hoc." As has been 
pointed out by Skinner (1974), events which preceded other 
events do not always cause them (e.g., flipping a light 
switch results in illumination; yet, the manual movement re­
quired to flip the light switch is not the essential event 
which results in lighting the room). Also, as pointed out 
earlier the efficacy of Beck's treatment neither demonstrates 
that dysfunctional thoughts cause depression nor that the 
therapy works by ameliorating dysfunctional thoughts. 
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The issues being raised are components of the radical 
behavioral/mediational controversy apparent in psychology 
currently. The controversy revolves around the issue of 
how completely the causal chain should be specified. 
Radical behaviorists (nonmediationalists) typically identify 
the precipitants of responses as environmental events, while 
mediational advocates include in their analysis 
other responses, which are often covert. It is the opinion 
of this author that these two types of analysis represent 
alternative philosophical positions and that their selection 
is a product of the psychologist's personal history (training) 
and of his or her assessment of which perspective serves as the 
most useful heuristic. While Beck has selected a mediational • 
viewpoint, this author finds its alternative to be more useful. 
A mediational viewpoint is viewed as the least useful alterna­
tive since it is more difficult to operationalize rigorously, 
and to study the effect of covert responses on other behaviors. 
Statement of Purpose 
In summary, although cognitive-behavioral therapy has 
been shown to ameliorate nonbipolar depression, its 
critical components have not been identified. In other 
words, researchers do not understand why encouraging a person 
to expose his or her negative thoughts or depressive assumptions 
to a logical or empirical test should decrease the 
probability of such cognitions and of other depressive symptoms. 
The basic purpose of this research was to examine the 
mechanism(s) through which a cognitive-behavioral treatment 
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had its effect and to identify the response classes which each 
therapy component influenced, for two distinct subtypes of 
depressives. 
Three major research questions were posed in this dis­
sertation: (a) What components within cognitive-behavioral 
therapy produce the greatest change in depression? , (b) What 
are some of the response classes within the depressive 
cluster which are influenced by each therapeutic component?/ 
and (c) Will subject classification produced by behavioral 
assessment help predict responsiveness to the different 
components of cognitive-behavioral therapy for depression? 
It was argued that not only the components of treatment, 
but also their relationship to assessment would be an important 
factor influencing the outcome of therapy. Specifically, 
the present investigation analyzed each therapeutic component 
in terms of its potential differential effectiveness for two 
subtypes of depressives, subjects with high and subjects 
with low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts, using several 
dependent measures. 
Although the present dissertation did not attempt to 
refute or to support any of the related philosophical or 
theoretical frameworks, this presentation is thought to be 
important because, to date, only limited research exists on 
process variables in the treatment of depression. The few 
examples are found primarily under the heading of "client-
treatment interactions" (McLean, 1981; McKnight, 
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1982; Shaw, 1981). Process research (i.e., research 
on the mechanisms through which treatments have their ef­
fects) on cognitive-behavioral therapy for depression does 
not, as yet, exist in a published form. It is noteworthy, 
however, that research by Robert Zettle (personal communi­
cation) is currently investigating the active ingredients 
in cognitive-behavioral therapy for depression. 
Analyzing each component of cognitive-behavioral therapy 
for its potential differential effectiveness in terms of 
several measures for two subtypes of depressives (i.e., 
those with high or low frequencies of dysfunctional thoughts) 
using several dependent measures is important for several 
reasons.. Such a component analysis of Beck's therapy should 
not only enhance the understanding of depression, but should 
also have practical implications. The practical implications 
might include encouraging the clinician to insure that 
cognitive-behavioral therapy is used with clients with 
appropriate problems and that clients who receive cognitive-
behavioral therapy learn the skills which most effectively-
ameliorate depression. Theoretically, data from this 
study may contribute to speculation regarding the relation­
ship among stimuli, cognition, and other behavior. 
Conceptually, these data may aid in the understanding of 
depression by examining the relationship(s) among responses, 
for particular subtypes of depression. Likewise, by 
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furthering research on treatment validity, this investigation 
may contribute to the study of evaluation strategies within 
the field of behavioral assessment. 
In so doing, given the topography of depression, it 
seems reasonable to use "specific" measures of the prob­
lematic responses within the depressive cluster, as well 
as to use "global" measures of depression. Here the global 
measures of depression included the Beck Depression Inventory, 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, and the.Depression Adjective Check List. The specific 
problems often implicated in depression included problematic 
cognitions, low activity level, and problematic interpersonal 
relationsips as assessed in this investigation through the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (frequency and belief scores), 
the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and 
the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria Subscale. 
The first process examined in this study was the set 
of components within a behavioral-cognitive therapy for 
depression which are integral to its success. The components 
isolated for analysis here included Component A: giving the 
subject a rationale for the relationship among thoughts, 
feelings, and behavior; and teaching the subject to dis­
criminate adaptive from dysfunctional thoughts (termed 
"self-monitoring"); Component B: teaching the subject to 
increase the frequency of adaptive thoughts and to decrease 
the frequency of dysfunctional thoughts by logically 
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analyzing the dysfunctional thoughts (termed "logical analysis"); 
and Component C: teaching the subject to state his/her 
dysfunctional thoughts in the form of a hypothesis and to 
put the hypothesis to an empirical test (termed "hypothesis 
testing"). 
The following predictions regarding overall treatment 
effectiveness and differential effectiveness of each 
therapeutic component in treating depression were made: 
1. It was predicted that the global measures of 
depression (i.e., the Beck Depression Inventory, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory—Depression Scale, and the 
Depression Adjective Check List) collected after subjects 
were exposed to any of the components of treatment (i.e., 
A, B, or C) would show significantly less depression than 
the measures collected before treatment began. Such a 
prediction was based on the assumption that all of the 
strategies would ameloriate depression to some degree. 
2. It was predicted that scores on the global measures 
of depression collected after exposure to Component B 
(logical analysis) or after exposure to Component C (hypothesis 
testing) would indicate significantly more adaptiveness 
than scores collected after exposure to Component A (self-
monitoring) . It was reasoned that self-monitoring is used 
typically for assessment rather .than for treatment, because 
it produces only weak reactive effects. By elimination, it 
was assumed that logical analysis and/or hypothesis testing 
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were, therefore, the probable active ingredients within 
cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
3. It was predicted that scores on the global measures 
of depression collected after subjects were exposed to 
Component C (hypothesis testing) would indicate significantly 
less depression than these scores collected after subjects 
were exposed to Component B (logical analysis). It was 
presumed that the differential effectiveness of Component C 
would result from its "broad" or "general" influence. That 
is, it was reasoned that if Component C influenced several 
of the response classes relevant to depression simultaneously, 
then this influence on a broad range of behavior would be 
reflected on the global measures of depression. 
A second issue raised in this dissertation was that of 
which problematic responses within the depressive cluster 
were affected by what components within a cognitive-behavioral 
therapy for depression. In addressing this question, the 
following predictions were made: 
1. It was predicted that Component C (hypothesis test­
ing) would be the essential ingredient within the package 
not only for producing adaptive changes on the global measures 
of depression but also for producing adaptive changes 
outside the "cognitive realm" (i.e., pleasant events as 
measured by the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related 
Subscale and interpersonal relationships as measured by 
the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale). 
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It was reasoned that Component C might produce "generalized 
improvement" (i.e., improvement on global measures of de­
pression and on all of the specific measures of depression) 
because, during Component C, depressives learn problem-
solving skills that could be applied across a wide range 
of problems or situations. 
2. It was predicted that exposure to only Component 
C would result in more adaptive scores on the Pleasant 
Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale and the Interpersonal 
Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale than preinter-
vention scores. This prediction was based on the assumption that 
hypothesis testing was the only component which "targeted" 
the areas of pleasant events and interpersonal relationships. 
3. It was predicted that after exposure to Component C 
improvement in the pleasant events and interpersonal 
relationships would be maintained across time, even when 
Component B was emphasized (i.e., when Component C is 
introduced before Component B, gains on the Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale and the Interpersonal Events 
Schedule—Dysphoria-Rleated Subscale would be maintained 
after Component C was no longer stressed in the sessions). 
4. It was predicted that Component C would be just 
as effective in decreasing the frequency and belief of 
dysfunctional thoughts (according to the frequency and 
belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire) 
as either Component A or B since, within Component C, 
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dysfunctional thoughts would prompt problem solving (i.e., 
dysfunctional thoughts were viewed as hypotheses to be 
tested empirically) . It was presumed that subjects' noting 
of the results from the experiments would decrease the proba­
bility of dysfunctional thoughts. 
5. It was predicted that Components B and C would 
reduce the frequency and belief of dysfunctional thoughts 
(according to the frequency and belief scores from the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire) more than Component A. 
At the same time, it was predicted that these scores collected 
after exposure to Component A would be more adaptive than 
these scores collected before treatment began. It was 
reasoned that Component A was a necessary element, practically 
and logically, of Components B and C. The basic skill 
learned in Component A was the self-monitoring of dysfunctional 
thoughts. If subjects did not learn to self-monitor, it 
would be difficult for them to master the strategies 
taught to cope with dysfunctional thoughts in Component B 
or C. It was predicted that Component A would decrease the 
frequency of dysfunctional thoughts since the literature 
suggests that self-monitoring responses with a negative 
valence decreases their probability (Nelson, 1977). At 
the same time it was reasoned that the "therapeutic" effect 
of self-monitoring would be less than either logical analysis 
or hypothesis testing. 
In short, it was reasoned that Component C would teach 
subjects a set of problem-solving skills which could be 
58 
applied to dysfunctional thoughts, lack of enjoyment, and 
interpersonal relationships. In contrast to Component C, 
it was reasoned that Component B would influence a more 
narrow range of behavior (i.e., only dysfunctional thoughts). 
Because the skills that subjects learn in Component B 
might apply to only specific problems, changes in other 
areas were not expected. For example, it may be ineffective 
to use "reattribution" when one needs to find a babysitter. 
It was presumed that the generalized influence of Component 
C compared to the narrow influence of Components A and B 
would be reflected on the global measures of depression and 
would indicate differential effectiveness of Component C 
over Components A and B. 
The third issue investigated was the necessity of 
matching treatment and identified response classes relevant 
to depression. It was hypothesized that matching treatment 
to relevant response classes may be one mechanism through 
which cognitive-behavioral therapy has its effect. A 
series of studies within Nelson's and Hayes' laboratories 
have evaluated treatment validity and suggest that the 
quality of the data generated by behavioral assessment 
may be evaluated by examining the contribution which 
assessment makes to treatment effectiveness. Depression 
is an ideal disorder for such studies since depression 
is a heterogeneous combination of measurable, specific, 
problematic responses. 
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In the present investigation, the specific treatment 
validity question which was examined was that of whether 
subject classification produced by behavioral assessment 
would help predict responsiveness to the different com­
ponents of cognitive-behavioral therapy. Generally, it 
was reasoned that matches between assessment and treatment 
may be essential when a very specific, discrete effect is 
desirable. When the clinician wants to influence 
several response classes simultaneously, specific matches 
between assessment and treatment may be less essential. 
The following predictions regarding the attempt to 
predict treatment outcome from subject classification were 
made: 
1. It was predicted that, after exposure to either 
Component A or B, subjects with a high frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts would have more adaptive scores 
on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (frequency and 
belief scores), on the Beck Depression Inventory, on the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, and on the Depression Adjective Check List than 
subjects with a low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. 
It was reasoned that Components A or B focused on dysfunc­
tional thoughts (a specific but narrow range of behavior) 
and the "high" subtype needed treatment within this area 
more than the "low" subtype. In other words, the high 
subtype and Components A and B were well matched in terms 
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of dysfunctional thoughts. It was reasoned that substantia­
tion of this prediction would suggest that the assessment 
distinction (between "high" and "low" subtypes) would be 
clinically relevant and show "treatment validity." 
2. In contrast to the prediction above, it was 
hypothesized that only Component C would produce gains 
on the Pleasant Events Schedule--Mood-Related Subscale and 
on the Interpersonal Events 'Schedule—Dysphoria-Related 
Subscale for both subtypes. It was predicted that there 
would be no difference between subjects with a high and 
low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts, since this dis­
tinction was irrelevant to the measures at hand (i.e., 
subscales of PES and IES). In other words, since Component 
C might influence a range of behavior broader than dys­
functional thoughts, classifying the subjects only in terms 
of their frequency of dysfunctional thoughts would probably 
not predict the subjects' responsiveness to Component C. 
3. It was predicted that for subjects with either a high 
or a low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts, either Component 
B or C would be equally effective in reducing dysfunctional 
thoughts. However, it is hypothesized that for both sub­
types Component C would produce more improvement in the 
global measures of depression than Component B. Again it 
was reasoned that the differential effectiveness of Component 
C would reflect its broad influence on several response 
classes relevant to depression. 
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In conclusion, the present study utilized a single sub­
ject design in which the components of therapy were presented 
in the two following sequences: (a) preintervention assess­
ment, Component A, Component B, and Component C; and (b) pre­
intervention assessment, Component A, Component C, and 
Component B. It should be noted that a no-treatment or 
placebo control group was omitted from the design used here 
for two reasons. First, as mentioned previously, past 
research has compared cognitive-behavioral therapy to no 
no-treatment and placebo controls, and researchers have 
concluded that cognitive-behavioral therapy is significantly 
more effective. Second, the goal of this research was not 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy, but was instead to compare the differential 
effects of Components A, AB, and AC. 
The global and specific measures of depression were 
collected before therapy began and after each component of 
therapy was provided(i.e., at the beginning of the first 
session of each component, before the session began). 
Sessions were conducted semi-weekly in small groups over 
a six-week period. Such a procedure produced four measure­
ment occasions. For each sequence, subjects were divided 
into those with a high frequency of dysfunctional thoughts 
and those with a low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts, 






Volunteer subjects were recruited through psychology-
classes, community organizations, university publications, 
area newspapers, and local radio and television announcements. 
Appendix A contains a descriptive flyer which illustrates 
how the project was presented to the community. 
No less than 205 people inquired about participating 
in the investigation. As these volunteer subjects telephoned, 
they were invited to participate in a screening session if 
they met the following criteria: (a) stated that they had 
been free from anti-depressant or tranquilizing medication 
for a minimum of two weeks; (b) reported that they were not 
receiving psychiatric or psychological treatment elsewhere; 
(c) stated that they had two blocks of time per week (for 
seven weeks) to come to group therapy meetings; and (d) stated 
that they did not have or did not want a significant other 
to participate in their treatment. Subjects who had or wanted 
a significant other involved in their treatment (approximately 
44 people) were referred for participation in another study 
on the treatment of depression. Subjects who did not 
qualify on the basis of the other criteria were referred 
to the sources listed in Appendix B. 
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Differential Diagnosis 
In order to obtain a sample of individuals whose primary 
problem was nonbipolar depression, the principal investigator 
used the following "two-step" screening procedure (i.e., a 
self-report measure plus a diagnostic interview recommended 
by Lewinsohn and Teri(1982). Lewinsohn and Teri's data sug­
gest that this procedure reduces the rate of "false positives." 
Screening sessions. The screening sessions were con­
ducted between February and April of 1983 with 1 to 18 people 
in attendance, depending on the interest at any given time. 
Ninety-nine subjects came to a screening session and completed 
the following questionnaires which are described in the 
section entitled "Dependent Measures." First, these potential 
siobjects completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 
Ward, Mendlesohn, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; see Appendix C). 
If the person's score on the Beck Depression Inventory was 20 
or greater, the person then completed the Minnesota Multi­
phasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale (MMPI-D) 
(Hathaway & McKinley, 1942; see Appendix D). If his raw 
score on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory— 
Depression Scale was 26 or greater or her raw score on the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale 
was 29 or greater (i.e., the T score for both males and females 
was 70 or greater), then he or she was scheduled for a diagnostic 
interview. 
Twenty-eight subjects did not qualify on the basis of 
their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory, and two subjects 
64 
did not qualify on the basis of their scores on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale. These 
subjects received explanations for their ineligibility and 
referrals for treatment elsewhere. One subject qualified on 
the basis of her questionnaire responses, but was excluded and 
referred because she took reserpine (a hypertensive medication 
with potential depressive side effects). Five other subjects 
qualified on the basis of their questionnaire responses, but 
either canceled or did not attend their diagnostic interviews. 
Diagnostic interviews. Sixty-three potential subjects 
(13 males and 50 females) were interviewed, using a portion of 
the questions from the Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia (SADS) (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978). This shortened 
version, suggested by Lewinsohn, Biglan, & Zeiss (1976) is out­
lined in Appendix E-l. On the basis of the interview data, 
48 subjects (10 males and 38 females) who later began treat­
ment in this study were diagnosed, according to the Research 
Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer, Endicott, & Robins, 1978; 
see Appendix E-2), as displaying major depressive disorders. 
Five subjects met the Research Diagnostic Criteria for 
depressive diagnoses, but chose to pursue treatment at a 
later time or in another setting. Seven subjects were 
excluded from the study on the basis of the interview because 
depression was not judged to be the primary clinical problem 
(e.g., one subject was depressed, but also met the criteria 
for pedophilia). Three subjects expressing strong suicidal 
tendencies were excluded from the sample for ethical reasons. 
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All subjects who were excluded from the study for any reason 
were given appropriate explanations and referrals. 
Description of the Resulting Sample 
The two-step screening described above produced 48 
subjects who agreed to participate in this investigation. 
Eleven subjects dropped out after treatment began. 
Descriptive data on the 37 subjects who completed the project 
are provided in Table 1 (Table 1 and all subsequent tables 
are contained in Appendix F). The eight men and 29 women 
had an average age of 37 years and an average of 14.5 years 
of education. The sample's "occupations" included managers, 
salespeople, students, unemployed, homemakers, health 
professionals, and retired. Every marital status was 
represented, and many of the subjects had children. Table 
1 also includes each subject's prorated raw scores from the 
Beck Depression Inventory and from the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory—Depression Scale which were collected 
before and after treatment. 
Experimental Design 
A 2 (subtypes) X 2 (sequences) X 4 or 5 (measurement 
occasions) experimental design was employed over a seven-week 
period. (See Table 2 for a sketch of the experimental design.) 
It should be noted that the number of measurement occasions 
varies with some dependent measures. 
The first factor, subtypes, was a between-subjects 
factor which refers to the "severity" of the subject's score 
on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. As is described in 
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detail in the section on "Independent Variables," a median 
split was used to divide the sample into two groups based 
on their prorated frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (collected before.Component A was provided). 
For convenience, these two subtypes will be labeled "highs" 
(N = 17) and "lows" (N = 20). In other words, the "high" 
subtypes1 prorated frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire were more dysfunctional than the "low" subtypes', 
prorated frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
The second factor, the sequence in which therapeutic 
components are provided, was a between-subjects factor. 
Groups of subjects were randomly assigned to the sequences 
in which the therapeutic components were administered. Each 
group contained four to eight subjects. Subjects with high 
and low scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire were 
present in each group. Subjects received either Component A 
first, Component B second, and Component C third, or 
Component A first, Component C second, and Component B 
third. Seventeen subjects received the sequence ABC, and 20 
subjects received the sequence ACB. Table 4 describes the six 
therapy groups. The purpose of this factor was to control for 
the possibility that the order in which treatment was provided 
influenced the outcome. It is noteworthy that Component A always 
preceded Components B and C since Component A was related to the 
other elements, conceptually and practically. Therefore, through­
out this dissertation, the words "logical analysis" (Component 
B) and "hypothesis testing" (Component C) are actually abbrevi­
ations for self-monitoring plus logical analysis (Components A, 
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B) and self-monitoring plus hypotheses testing (Component A, 
C), respectively. Such a plan allowed comparisons between 
AB and AC, under similar circumstances. 
The third factor, measurement occasions (a within subjects 
factor), refers to the times at which the dependent measures 
(listed below) were collected. With a few exceptions, the de­
pendent measures were collected at the research site at the 
beginning of the first treatment session (i.e., before Component 
A was provided), at the beginning of the fifth treatment session 
(i.e., after all sessions of Component A had been provided), 
at the beginning of the ninth treatment session (i.e., after all 
sessions of Component B or C had been provided), and at the 
post-intervention diagnostic interview (i.e., after all com­
ponents had been provided). This plan resulted in four measure­
ment occasions (i.e., before Component A, after Component A, 
after Component B, and after Component C). Treatment components 
were provided semi-weekly over a six-week period. 
The dependent measures which were collected more often than 
upon the four occasions described above were as follow. Scores 
on the Beck Depression Inventory and the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory—Depression Scale were collected at the 
screening sessions in addition to the four measurement occasions 
described above, thus resulting in five measurement occasions. 
Similarly, the Depression Adjective Check List was administered 
at the beginning of every treatment session, before the post-
intervention diagnostic interview, and at the debriefing session. 
The Depression Adjective Chek List's initial scores, the means 
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corresponding to each therapeutic component (i.e., average 
scores from sessions consisting of Components A, B, and C), and 
the score at the debriefing session were used in one analysis, 
producing five measurement occasions. 
Diagnoses using the Research Diagnostic Criteria were 
made at the diagnostic interviews held before and after 
treatment, thus resulting in only two measurement occasions. 
(See Table 3 to aid in conceptualizing measurement occasions 
for each dependent variable.) 
Independent Variables 
One goal of the research presented here was to 
examine the relationship between assessment and treatment, 
in an effort to discern the process through which cognitive-
behavioral therapy has its effect and to determine the target 
behaviors that it influences. In so doing, assessment, treat­
ment, and their relationship were conceptualized in terms of 
two independent variables. The first independent variable 
was the set of components within cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
The following three therapeutic components were examined: 
Component A-.-teaching subjects to detect and to monitor 
dysfunctional thoughts; Component B--teaching subjects to 
evaluate and correct dysfunctional thoughts through a 
logical means; and Component C—teaching subjects to evaluate 
and to correct dysfunctional thoughts through an empirical 
means. The second independent variable (a grouping factor) 
was the division of subjects on the basis of the severity 
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of one problematic target behavior—dysfunctional thoughts. 
It was hypothesized that this division is important when 
one examines the contribution which assessment makes to 
treatment effectiveness (i.e., its treatment validity) and 
when one attempts to predict what problematic target behaviors 
each element of cognitive-behavioral therapy affects. 
Components of Treatment 
The treatment offered in this study was modeled after 
cognitive-behavioral treatment detailed in Cognitive Therapy 
of Depression by Beck and his associates (1979) . In this 
investigation, treatment was divided into three components. 
Each therapeutic component involved four sessions, and these 
sessions are described in detail in Appendix G. (The treat­
ment plans draw heavily on Beck et al., 1979; Hollon & Beck, 
1979; and Rush & Watkins, 1981.) Because the treatment 
plans are so described, only a general overview of the 
conceptual and operational similarities and differences among 
the components will be provided here. 
Component A. Component A, labeled "monitoring" for 
convenience, involved teaching subjects to detect and to 
monitor their dysfunctional thoughts (i.e., "negative 
automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions"). Negative 
automatic thoughts, according to Beck (1976), are idiosyncratic 
to particular subjects, yet share the following common 
characteristics: (a) they are specific and discrete; 
(b) they are spontaneous; (c) they seem reasonable to the 
subject; (d) although they vary across situations, they often 
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share a common theme (e.g., "loss"); and (e) they are not 
typically supported by the evidence. Depressive assumptions 
(Beck et al., 1979, use the term "depressogenic assumptions") 
are faulty assumptions usually learned when a child is exposed 
to an "unfavorable life situation." Beck argues that the 
depressive assumptions predispose the individual to develop 
a depressive disorder in later life. (In this study, the 
term "dysfunctional thoughts" was used to refer to both 
"negative automatic thoughts" and "depressogenic assumptions.") 
The basic purposes of Component A were (a) to provide the 
subject with a rationale for and description of cognitive-
behavioral therapy; (b) to describe the general guidelines 
for participating in the group therapy and the' research 
project; (c) to teach the subject to detect and to self-
monitor "automatic thoughts" and "depressive assumptions"; 
and (d) to establish rapport among the group members and thera­
pist. All subjects received Component A first in as much as the 
rationale that Beck et al. (197 9) give for treatment (i.e., 
the assertion that dysfunctional thoughts cause depression) 
makes Component A a logical part and a practical part of the 
other components. That is, before subjects could learn skills 
to cope with dysfunctional thoughts and depression, they had 
to learn to self-monitor the dysfunctional thoughts. 
In short, Component A "socialized" subjects into the 
research project and into cognitive-behavioral therapy and 
taught them to self-monitor dysfunctional thoughts. It was 
71 
reasoned that these antecedent skills "set the conditions" 
for Component B and Component C to influence the depressive 
cluster. 
Component B. Component B, labeled "logical analysis" for 
convenience, involved teaching subjects to evaluate and to 
correct their dysfunctional thoughts through a logical means. 
The purpose of Component B was to teach subjects to evaluate 
the logical evidence for and against dysfunctional thoughts 
and to increase the frequency of adaptive thoughts. The 
strategies used in Component B included teaching subjects to 
(a) use alternative responses to dysfunctional thoughts; 
(b) distinguish between "thoughts" and "facts"; (c) examine 
the advantages and disadvantages of the short-term and long-
term consequences of dysfunctional thoughts (i.e., as evidence 
for abandoning the depressive assumption and substituting 
an alternative); and (d) recognize the processes which make 
dysfunctional thoughts illogical (e.g., overgeneralization, 
magnification), and to respond more appropriately. 
It was reasoned that these strategies taught -the sub­
jects to evaluate their dysfunctional thoughts through 
"other thoughts" or through a logical means. Subjects were 
not encouraged to evaluate their thoughts by "collecting 
empirical data" on their thoughts while they were exposed to 
Component B. 
Component C. Component C, labeled "hypothesis testing" 
for convenience, involved teaching subjects to evaluate and 
to correct their dysfunctional thoughts through the means of 
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designing experiments. The purpose (i.e., rationale that Beck 
gives) of Component C was the same as that for Component B, but 
the strategies differed. Component C encouraged subjects 
to conceptualize their thoughts as hypotheses to be tested 
empirically. Subjects were taught the general steps involved 
in testing hypotheses (i.e., deduce from a general assumption 
a specific hypothesis to test, state the hypothesis in a 
testable form, test it empirically, record the results from 
the experiment in an objective manner, compare the results 
with the prediction, and ask whether other experiments are 
necessary). 
In addition, subjects were taught specific methods of 
testing "typical" depressive thoughts. For example, subjects 
were taught to use graded task assignment to evaluate 
thoughts which concern the inability to solve problems. They 
were taught activity scheduling in order to test hypotheses 
relevant to doubts about accomplishing goals (both recreational 
and task-oriented). Finally subjects were taught to collect 
data on the "pleasure" and "mastery" (i.e., sense of 
accomplishment) they experienced when engaging in activities 
to test hypotheses relevant to the "quality" of their experiences. 
It was reasoned that although the rationale that Beck 
gives for Components C and B is the same, the technology 
differs; moreover, it was reasoned that the functions of 
Component C and Component B differed. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that Component B would teach subjects to cope 
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with a particular target behavior (i.e., dysfunctional 
thoughts). In contrast, it was hypothesized that Component 
C would teach subjects a problem-solving strategy applicable 
in a variety of situations or to many problematic target 
behaviors. It was predicted that when subjects learn this 
approach to solving problems (i.e., receive Component C), 
such skills may generalize to other target behaviors 
implicated in depression (i.e., the frequency of pleasant 
events, and interpersonal problems), in addition to decreasing 
the probability of dysfunctional thoughts. 
In summary, it was predicted that Component B would 
teach subjects a specific skill (i.e., increasing the 
frequency of adaptive thoughts and decreasing the frequency 
of dysfunctional thoughts), whereas Component C would teach 
subjects a strategy applicable to a number of problems 
relevant to depression. 
Assessing the Severity of Dysfunctional Thoughts 
The initial 48 prorated frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ-30; Hollon & Kendall, 19 80; see 
Appendix H) were divided into two groups, using a median 
split. These prorated frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire served as a "grouping factor." The 
half of the subjects scoring below the median (termed the "low" 
subtype) displayed a low frequency of dysfunctional thought 
(mean = 83.522? range = 55-97). The half of the subjects 
scoring above the median (termed the "high" subtype) displayed 
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a high frequency of dysfunctional thoughts (mean = 117.989; 
range = 100-139). 
At the first measurement occasion (i.e., before exposure 
to Component A), the 48 subjects who were classified as de­
pressed completed the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, a 
30-item questionnaire designed to assess the frequency with 
which negative automatic thoughts, assumed to covary with 
depression, occur. Examples of items from the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire included: "I can't stand this anymore," 
and "My future is bleak." In responding to the 30 items 
listed on this questionnaire, subjects were asked to use 
the time framework of the "last two weeks." (It should be 
noted that the typical time framework for the ATQ-30 is 
"last week.") Subjects were instructed to rate the "frequency" 
of the thought (i.e., 1, "not at all" through 5, "all the 
time") and the "believability" of the thought (i.e., 1, 
"not at all" through 5, "totally"). Therefore, high numbers 
for either the frequency or belief scores indicate dsyfunctional 
thoughts. Scores were prorated when subjects omitted items 
in order to facilitate valid comparisons. 
Only prorated frequency scores were used to divide 
the sample into the two subtypes. The median split was 
performed on all 48 subjects' data before the 11 drop-outs 
occurred. After the drop-outs occurred, there were 17 low 
subtypes and 20 high subtypes. Although subjects were not placed 
in groups according to their initial frequency scores' on the 
Automatic Thought Questionnaire, each therapy group contained 
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subjects with both high and low scores. (See Table 1 for a 
list of each subject's frequency score on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire.) 
Hollon and Beck (1980) reported that the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire was cross-validated and that it dis­
criminated depressed from nondepressed college students. 
These researchers report correlations between the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire and the Beck Depression Inventory or . 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale that range between .45 and ,70. Hollon and Beck stated 
that a factor analysis of this measure revealed the following 
four factors: (a) personal maladjustment and desire for 
change; (b) negative self-concept and negative expectations; 
(c) low self-esteem; and (d) giving up/helplessness. 
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire was selected here 
to distinguish between depressive subtypes because (a) the 
measure is related conceptually to Beck's therapy and theory, 
and (b) Hollon and Kendall (1980) and Dobson and Breiter (1983) 
have demonstrated that basic psychometric standards have 
been met. For example, Hollon and Kendall report a split-
half reliability coefficient, calculated on odd versus even 
items of .97, £ <.001# and a coefficient alpha of .96, £ <.001. 
Dependent Measures 
In this investigation, measures of the dependent variables 
were collected before intervention (i.e., before exposure to 
Component A) and after subjects had received each therapeutic 
component (i.e., after sessions 4, 8, and 12, or after 
Components A, B, and C). Such a plan allowed comparisons 
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to be made among measures collected after subjects had been 
exposed to Component A, Components A and B, or Components A 
and C (depending on sequence) and Components A, B, and C. In 
addition to administration on the occasions outlined above, the 
Depression Adjective Check List was collected at the beginning of 
every session and the Beck Depression Inventory and Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale were 
collected at the screening session. 
The diagnostic interview using portions of questions 
from the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia 
(SADS) (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978) was conducted before inter­
vention (i.e., at the preintervention diagnostic interview) 
and after the subjects had been exposed to all therapeutic 
components (i.e., after the fourth measurement occasion). 
The purpose of the final interview was to determine whether 
subjects continued to meet the criteria for minor or major 
depression after treatment has been provided and to determine 
whether they needed additional treatment. (See Table 3 to 
aid in conceptualizing measurement occasions.) 
The dependent measures were divided into three categories-
diagnoses made using the Research Diagnostic Criteria, global 
measures of depression (i.e., the Beck Depression Inventory, 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, and the Depression Adjective Checklist), and measures 
of specific response classes assumed to be associated with 
depression (i.e., the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire— 
Frequency and Belief Scores, the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood 
77 
Related Subscale and the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-
Related Subscale). These scores from dependent measures were 
collected in order to evaluate the effect of each therapeutic 
component on global depression, as well as on some of the 
specific response classes assumed to covary with depression. 
One specific response class, dysfunctional thoughts, 
as measured by the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, was 
tied theoretically by Beck to the treatment offered. The 
other two specific response classes, pleasant events and inter­
personal skills, were related more directly .to Lewinsohn's 
theoretical framework. Descriptions of the diagnoses, and 
the "global" and "specific measures of depression" follow. 
Diagnoses from the Research Diagnostic Criteria 
According to Lewinsohn and Lee (1981, p. 138), the 
Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer, Endicott, & 
Robins, 1978) "is the most elaborated and probably the best 
currently available diagnostic system for the affective 
disorders." The advantages of using the Research Diagnostic 
Criteria (see Appendix E-2) are that (a) it allows comparisons 
with past research, (b) it uses operational criteria in 
order to distinguish not only between affective disorders 
and any other psychiatric disorders, but also between the 
various subtypes of depression, and (c) it has generated 
data which suggest that such diagnoses can be made with 
reliability (i.e., kappa coefficients to assess inter-rater 
reliability are above chance levels, Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981). 
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In order to apply the Research Diagnostic Criteria, the 
principal investigator used a portion of questions from the 
Schedule for Affective Disorders (SADS) (Endicott & Spitzer, 
1978; shortened version suggested by Lewinsohn, Biglan, Zeiss, 
1976) to interview potential subjects before treatment (see 
Appendix E-l) and after treatment. Diagnoses from the RDC 
were based on these data. Reliability of diagnoses was 
assessed and is reported in the Results section. 
Global Measures of Depression 
The three following global measures of depression were 
selected because they are mentioned frequently within the 
depression literature. Such commonality permits comparisons 
to be made across studies. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). According to Hammen 
(1981, p. 262), the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 
1961) "is probably the most satisfactory of the multisymptom 
self-rating scales" and is often used not only as a pre- and 
posttreatment measure but also as a periodic measure in 
depression research. The Beck Depression Inventory (Appendix 
C) is used best in evaluating the severity of depression. 
Subjects were instructed to endorse one answer within each 
of the 21 items, and the time frame was "the way you feel 
today, that is, right now." The inventory was scored by 
simply summing the highest numbers for each item that 
subjects endorse. (Therefore, high scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory were more indicative of depression than 
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low scores. Scores were prorated when subjects omitted items, 
in order to facilitate valid comparisons.) 
Although this measure is not without flaws (particularly 
when it is used to diagnose depression) (Hammen, 19 81), the 
Beck Depression Inventory correlates highly with clinical 
ratings of severity of depression (Beck et al., 1961), with 
behavioral ratings of depression (Williams, Barlow, & Agras, 
1972), and with other self-report measures of depression 
(Hammen, 1981). 
Scores on the Beck Depression Inventory can range from 
0 to 63. To be included in this study, subjects reported 
moderate to severe levels of depression (i.e., a prorated 
score of 20 or greater, the same criterion used by Beck and 
his associates). 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—-Depression 
Scale (MMPI-D). The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory—Depression Scale (see Appendix D) was developed 
originally to identify severely depressed patients using the 
"group contrast" method of test construction. The Depression 
Scale is a subscale within the Minnes-ota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1942) and is used widely in 
depression research and in clinical settings. The Depression 
Scale consists of 60 heterogeneous true-false items which can 
be grouped into five subscales (i.e., subjective depression, 
psychomotor retardation, somatic complaints, complaints about 
mental dullness, and brooding) (Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981). The 
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Depression Scale was scored using its corresponding grading 
template, and high scores on this scale signified depression 
(scores were prorated when subjects omitted items in order to 
familitate valid comparisons). To be included in this study, 
female subjects had to have a raw score of 29 or greater and 
male subjects had to have a prorated raw score of 26 or greater 
(i.e., both males' and females' scores were at least two 
standard deviations above the mean; T score of 70 or greater). 
Depression Adjective Check List. The Depression Adjective 
Check List (DACL) (Lubin & Himelstein, 1976) was developed to 
assess "state depression" or an individual's mood at a given 
moment. The Depression Adjective Check List (see Appendix I) 
consists of seven parallel forms which instruct the subject to 
"Check the words which describe How You Feel Now-Today." The 
advantages of using the DACL include (a) its brevity and 
(b) its psychometric properties (e.g., high split 
half, alternative form, and internal consistency reliabilities) 
(Lewinsohn & Lee, 1981). 
Specific Measures of Response Classes 
Relevant to Depression 
The three following specific measures were selected 
because there is evidence that dysfunctional thoughts, 
infrequent pleasant events, and problematic relationship 
covary with depression. 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. The Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ-30) (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) was described 
previously and was used to assess the "frequency" and 
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"believability" of negative thoughts assumed to covary with 
depression. Here the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (see 
Appendix H) was not only used to operationalize depressive 
subtypes but was also used as a dependent measure. 
Again the measure was selected because dysfunctional 
thoughts are assumed to be part of the depressive cluster, 
and Hollon and Kendall (1980) and Dobson and Brieter (1983) 
indicated that the psychometric standards of the measure 
are acceptable. Frequency scores and belief scores were 
considered separately. In order to facilitate comparisons, 
scores were prorated When subjects omitted items. High 
scores were indicative of dysfunction. 
Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale. The 
Pleasant Events Schedule (PES) (MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1971) 
consists of a list of 320 events which Lewinsohn and 
MacPhillamy's sample rated as pleasurable. In this study, 
only the "mood-related subscale" (i.e., the activities which 
were correlated with improved mood) was used in order to 
economize on the effort required by the subjects. 
The modified directions printed on the question­
naire instructed subjects to reflect upon the past two 
weeks (the original Pleasant Events Schedule specified 
a month) and to respond to every listed event, rating 
the event's "frequency" (0, has not happened in the past 
14 days, through 2, has happened often in the past 14 days), 
and the event's "impact" (0, was neutral or unpleasant, 
through 2, was extremely pleasant). (The subscale and its 
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sample items taken from the Pleasant Events Schedule can 
be found in Appendix J.) 
"Average cross-product" scores were calculated by 
multiplying the frequency and impact ratings for each event, 
summing across all events, and dividing by the number of 
events that the subject rated. Average cross-product scores 
could range between 0 (least adaptive) and 4 (most adaptive) 
and were assumed to reflect the amount of "response contingent 
positive reinforcement" that an individual has experienced 
during the past two weeks. 
Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale. 
The Interpersonal Events Schedule (IES) (Youngren, Zeiss, 
& Lewinsohn, 1975) consists of 160 items which involve activities 
and conditions concerning interpersonal events. Again, in 
this study only the "dysphoria-related subscale" (i.e., the 
activities which were correlated with fluctuations in mood) 
was used. 
The modified directions printed on the questionnaire 
instructed the subject to reflect upon the past two weeks 
(the original Interpersonal Events Schedule specifies 
a month) and to respond to every event, rating the event's 
"frequency" (0, has not happened in the past 14 days, through 
2, has happened often in the past 14 days) and the event's 
"impact" (-2, felt very upset, through 2, felt very com­
fortable) . (The Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-
Related Subscale and its corresponding directions are 
included in Appendix K.) 
83 
"Average cross-product" scores were calculated by 
multiplying the frequency and impact ratings for each event, 
summing across all events, and dividing by the number of 
events that the subject rated. Average cross-product scores 
could range between -4 (least adaptive) and 4 (most adaptive). 
These scores were interpreted as reflecting the "response-
contingent positive social reinforcement" or "interpersonal 
aversiveness" the subject has received during the past "two 
weeks." 
Participants 
The participants in this study included the principal 
investigator, two raters, and six assistants. The principal 
investigator served as diagnostician and therapist in this 
study. Two raters listened to portions of the audiotaped 
interviews or sessions for the following pruposes: (a) to 
demonstrate adequate diagnostic reliability in using the 
Research Diagnostic Criteria; and (b) to demonstrate that 
the three therapeutic components could be discriminated. Five 
psychology graduate students and one psychology undergraduate. 
assisted in scoring the questionnaires. All questionnaires 
were scored at least twice in order to facilitate accuracy. 
Procedure 
Screening Sessions 
Potential subjects who contacted the principal investi­
gator expressing an interest in the research project and who 
met the criteria specified in the section entitled "Recruiting 
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Subjects" were scheduled for a screening session. The screen­
ing sessions were conducted with 1 to 18 people in attendance 
depending on the current level of interest. 
First, the principal investigator described the pro­
cedures to be followed during that session and obtained 
subjects1 informed consent for participation (see Appendix 
L for Consent Form I). In addition, the investigator 
described the'details of the treatment contract (see Appendix 
M for Consent Form II), but emphasized that at the time the 
subjects were participating only in a screening session. In 
describing the research project and "treatment contract," the 
investigator emphasized that the primary motivation for 
this project was research on the assessment and 
treatment of depression and mentioned that other, alternative 
forms of treatment were available (i.e., a list of referrals 
was available to the potential subjects; see Appendix B). 
All interested subjects completed the Beck Depression 
Inventory (see Appendix C), and if their scores were 20 or 
greater they completed the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory—Depression Scale (see Appendix D). The question­
naires were scored at the screening session, and subjects 
whose scores fell within the depressed range were scheduled 
for a diagnostic interview. Subjects who did not meet the 
criteria outlined previously were given an explanation for 
their exclusion and appropriate referrals (see Appendix B). 
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Preintervention Diagnostic Interview 
The potential subjects scheduled for a diagnostic 
interview were asked questions from a portion of the Schedule 
for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (see Appendix 
E-l). Subjects who did not express strong suicidal tendencies 
but who received a diagnosis of major depressive disorder 
were included in the sample. Again, inappropriate subjects 
were given explanations and a list of referrals (see Appendix 
B) . 
The principal investigator reviewed the treatment con­
tract which described the procedures, and eligible subjects 
provided informed consent (see Appendix M for Consent Form II). 
Subjects who were still interested in participating were 
given either an appointment for their first session or a 
date on which the principal investigator would telephone 
them to arrange the time for the first therapy session. 
Periodic Assessment 
Assessment packet. At the beginning of the first, fifth, 
and ninth treatment sessions and before the postintervention 
diagnostic interview (i.e., before exposure to Component A, 
before exposure to Components B and C, and after exposure 
to all components) the subjects completed an "assessment 
packet." This packet contained the Beck Depression Inventory, 
the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, the Depression Adjective Check List, the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaires, the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-
Related Subscale, and the Interpersonal Events Schedule-
Dysphoria-Related Subscale (see Appendices C, D, I, H, J, and K). 
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A measure of suicidal tendencies. At each therapy ses­
sion, subjects were asked to rate the following statement on 
a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 1, not at all,, through 5, often). 
"I have been bothered by suicidal thoughts since our last 
session." The principal investigator interviewed subjects 
whose scores were greater than 1 in order to determine whether 
they continued to be appropriate subjects for a research 
project. No subject had to withdraw from this investigation 
because of suicide risk. 
Therapy Groups 
After screening sessions and diagnostic interviews were 
completed, the first group therapy session began. Six groups 
of subjects were formed as subjects became available. 
Groups 1 and 2 began in mid-March of 1983. Group 3 began in 
mid-April of 1983, and Groups 4-6 began in early May 1983. 
Groups 1, 4, and 6 received the treatment components 
* 
in the following sequence: Component A, Component B, and 
Component C. Groups 2, 3, and 5 received the treatment 
components in the following order: Component A, Component C, 
and Component B. The groups were randomly assigned to each 
sequence with the following constraints. Attempts were 
made to maintain equal numbers of subjects within each 
sequence, and both sequences were distributed over the time 
period in which the study was conducted. (See Table 4 for 
a description of the six therapy groups.) 
Group 1 included four subjects (two "low" subtypes 
and two "high"subtypes). Group 2 contained five subjects 
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(two "low" subtypes and three "high" subtypes). Group 3 
included seven subjects (four "low" subtypes and three "high" 
subtypes). Group 4 had six subjects (two "low" subtypes and 
four "high" subtypes), and Group 5 had eight subjects (four 
"low" subtypes and four "high" subtypes). Group 6 included 
seven subjects (three "low" subtypes and four "high" subtypes). 
Groups 1, 2, 5, and 6 contained at least one male. Groups 3 
and 4 contained only females. (See Table 1 for breakdown 
of groups by subjects' sex.) 
Treatment Sessions 
All 37 subjects participated in 12 treatment sessions. 
If a subject was absent from a session, he or she had to make 
the session up by listening to an audiotape of the session missed. 
(Twenty-nine make-up sessions were held.) The session had to 
be made up before the subject could progress to the next 
session. The sessions lasted approximately 120 minutes each. 
(These 12 sessions are described in Appendix G.) The sessions 
occurred twice a week for six weeks. At.the beginning of 
every session, the subjects completed the Depression Adjective 
Check List and the measure of suicidal tendencies. At the . 
beginning of sessions 1, 5, 9, and before the postintervention 
diagnostic interview (i.e., after exposure to each component), 
subjects completed the assessment packet described above. 
All subjects received Component A (i.e., detecting and 
monitoring dysfunctional thoughts) first. The subjects then 
received either Component B (i.e., evaluating and correcting 
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dysfunctional thoughts through a logical means) second or 
third and received Component C (i.e., evaluating and correct­
ing dysfunctional thoughts through an empirical means) second 
or third. 
Postintervention Diagnostic Interview 
At the 12th treatment session, subjects were reminded 
of their postintervention diagnostic interview. Before the 
interview, subjects completed the assessment packet. The 
interview repeated questions from a portion of the Schedule 
for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (see Appendix E-l). 
Referrals were made if subjects continued to meet the criteria 
for a depressive diagnosis or if they requested a referral. 
Debriefing Session 
After the subjects had been exposed to all therapeutic 
components and had completed the assessment packet and post-
intervention diagnostic interview, they attended a debriefing 
session (see Appendix N). The purposes of this session were 
to (a) provide appropriate termination to the group therapy; 
(b) debrief subjects regarding the nature of the research 
hypotheses; and (c) provide referrals for potential future 
or further treatment. 
During the debriefing session, subjects completed the 
Depression Adjective Check List and a questionnaire which 
was designed to assess their evaluation of the research 
project (see Appendix 0). All subjects indicated that they 
would recommend the project to a friend who was depressed. 
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The sample's average rating of amount of improvement during 
the study was 6.688 (possible range 0, no improvement, 
through 9, complete improvement; actual range of 5-9). 
Follow-up Telephone Call 
One to two months after treatment, 34 of the 37 sub­
jects (three subjects were unavailable) received a follow-up 
telephone call in order to (a) assess whether the subject 
wanted additional assistance locating other psychological 
services and (b) to provide appropriate closure to this 
investigation. (The questions the principal investigator 
asked and the form she completed during the telephone con­
versation can be found in Appendix P). This follow-up 
telephone call indicated that three subjects described 
themselves as "very depressed," 13 subjects described them­
selves as "mildly depressed," and 18 subjects described 
themselves as "not depressed at all." Seven subjects were 
continuing psychological treatment (not always for 





Checks on Manipulations 
Different Therapeutic Components 
A judge was used to determine whether the three different 
therapeutic components (A, B, and C) were discriminable 
s 
from each other and were adequately implemented. The judge 
listened to audiotapes of 12 therapy sessions. The audio­
tapes were randomly selected within the following constraints: 
two different components were selected for each therapy group, 
and each component was represented at least twice across the 
six groups. These constraints resulted in the following 
audiotapes being selected: Component A (fourth session for 
Group 2, 3, and 5; first session for Group 6), Component 
B (fourth session for Group 1 and second session for Group 4), 
and Component C (first session for Group 1 and 6; second 
session for Group 4; third session for Groups 2 and 5; and 
fourth session for Group 3). The judge, a psychology 
graduate student entering her second year of clinical train­
ing, correctly identified each component from the 12 audio-
taped sessions (see Appendix Q for the rating sheet used). 
With the exception of one minute on one audiotape, the judge 
maintained that the subjects talked about the component being 
taught (rather than a different component). The judge rated 
the subjects' average understanding of the skills and 
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concepts taught as 5.667 (1, no understanding, through 7, 
complete understanding), and rated the therapist's average 
demonstration of clinical skill as 6.833 (1, skills poorly 
demonstrated, through 7, skills clearly demonstrated). 
Differential Severity of Dysfunctional Thoughts 
Analyses of variance performed on prorated frequency and 
belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire sug­
gested that there were in fact two distinct subtypes of 
depressives in the study. (Prorating on these measures, 
as well as all other prorated measures, was conducted by 
forming a proportion in the following manner: the subject's 
score on the items answered was multiplied by the total 
number of items on the questionnaire, and this result was 
divided by the number of items answered.) The two subtypes 
consisted of subjects with a high frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts (termed "highs") and of subjects with a low frequency 
of dysfunctional thoughts (termed "lows"). The mean of the 
subjects with high prorated frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (Mean = 103.424) differed significantly 
from the mean of the subjects with low prorated frequency 
scores (Mean = 74.108), F(l, 33) = 21.80, p < .0001. 
Similarly, the mean of the subjects with high prorated 
belief scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(Mean = 102.453) differed significantly from the mean of 
the subjects with low prorated belief scores (Mean = 75.290), 
F(1, 33) = 15.32, p < .0004. Each subject's initial 
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prorated frequency score from the Automatic Thoughts Question­
naire can be found in Table 1 (Appendix F). 
Interobserver Agreement for the Diagnoses from 
the Research Diagnostic Criteria 
A rater was used to determine whether the diagnoses made 
from the Research Diagnostic Criteria were reliable in this 
investigation. A rater listened to 25% of the audiotaped 
diagnostic interviews (see Appendix E-2 for the Schedule of 
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia Outline: Shortened 
Version) conducted before treatment began (15 audiotapes) 
and 25% of the interviews—-conducted after treatment began 
(9 audiotapes). In selecting the pretreatment audiotapes, 
all of the subjects who were excluded from the study 
because depression was "secondary" to another psychological 
disorder were included (seven audiotapes). The other eight 
audiotapes were randomly selected from all diagnostic 
interviews completed before treatment began. The nine 
post-treatment audiotapes were randomly selected from the 
diagnostic interviews conducted with the 37 subjects comp-
pleting .the study. The rater, a psychology graduate student 
entering his fourth year of clinical training, was blind to 
(a) the "pre" or "post" status of each tape, and (b) the 
experimental condition or diagnostic category of each 
subject (primary depression, secondary depression, or not 
depressed). The rater completed the questionnaire in 
Appendix R to facilitate his ratings. Interobserver 
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agreement on the diagnostic categories selected for each 
subject by the principal investigator and the rater was 
calculated using the following formula: agreements divided 
by agreements plus disagreements. Agreements were defined 
as both diagnosticians agreeing on the diagnosis: (a) the 
subject met the criteria for a major or minor depressive 
disorder; (b) the subject met the criteria for a depressive 
disorder, but depression was secondary to another psychological 
disturbances; or (c) the subject did not meet the criteria 
for either a minor or major depressive disorder. Disagree­
ments were defined as the diagnosticians selecting different 
combinations of the diagnostic categories listed above 
for the same subject. Thus, calculated interobserver agreement 
equaled .75. 
Overall Treatment Effectiveness and Differential 
Effectiveness of Therapeutic Components 
in Treating Depression 
Overview of the Results 
All analyses from this study supported the prediction that 
scores collected after subjects were exposed to cognitive-behavioral 
therapy would indicate significantly less depression than 
the scores collected before treatment began. The therapeutic 
components were differentially effective in treating depres­
sion. In particular, teaching subjects to evaluate and to 
correct their thoughts through "logical analysis" (Component B) 
or by "hypothesis testing" (Component C) had a more positive 
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effect than teaching subjects to detect and to monitor their 
dysfunctional thoughts (Component A). For some measures, 
the component received last (B or C) produced the greatest 
effect. Generally, the pattern of results suggested that 
the combination of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and 
hypothesis testing more effectively reduces depression 
than any of the components used alone. 
The statistical analyses used to address the questions 
of overall treatment effectiveness and of differential 
effectiveness of the therapeutic components in ameliorating 
depression included the binominal test on the diagnoses 
from the Research Diagnostic Criteria and multivariate and 
univariate analyses of variance on the global measures of 
depression (i.e., the Beck Depression Inventory, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, and the Depression Adjective Check List). Following 
multivariate and univariate analyses of variance, post 
hoc tests were performed. 
Diagnoses from the Research Diagnostic Criteria 
Before treatment began, all of the 37 subjects were 
diagnosed by the principal investigator as meeting the 
Research Diagnostic Criteria for a major depressive disorder. 
After receiving cognitive-behavioral therapy, only 7 subjects 
continued to meet the criteria for a major depressive dis­
order, according to the principal investigator's diagnoses. 
The binominal test compares the values obtained to the 
binominal sampling distribution, "a sampling distribution of 
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the proportions we might observe in random samples drawn from 
a two-class population" (Siegel, 1956, p. 36) . Here the proba-. 
bility of obtaining seven depressive diagnoses after treatment 
was compared to the expected probability of .50. According to 
Table A (Siegel, 1956), containing probabilities associated 
with the binominal test, this test demonstrated that the proba­
bility of obtaining 37 depressive diagnoses before treatment 
(N = 37) and of obtaining seven depressive diagnoses after 
treatment (x = 7) by chance was < .0002, where z = -.362. 
This statistically significant result supported the predic­
tion that subjects would not be depressed after treatment. 
Global Measures of Depression 
Multivariate analyses. A multivariate analysis of 
variance done on the global measures of depression supported 
the prediction that overall cognitive-behavioral therapy 
produced positive change in the subjects' depression. The 
global measures of depression, collected before treatment 
began and after each therapeutic component was administered, 
included prorated raw scores from the Beck Depression Inventory, 
prorated raw scores from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory—Depression Scale, and raw scores from the 
Depression Adjective Check List. 
The multivariate analysis of variance on the weighted 
combination of global measures of depression (Table 5) 
revealed a significant main effect for measurement occasions 
with a Wilks' lambda of .340, which is equivalent to 
F(9, 236) = 14.63, p < .0001, and a significant sequence X 
measurement occasion interaction with a Wilks' lambda of .785 
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which is equivalent to F(9, 236) = 2.75, p < .005). No 
other main effects or interactions were statistically sig­
nificant. 
Within the significant effect for measurement occasions 
the Depression Adjective Check List was weighted most, the 
Beck Depression Inventory received the next highest weight, 
and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-
Depression Scale received the smallest weight. For the 
significant sequence X measurement occasion interaction, the 
variables were weighted in the following order: Beck 
Depression Inventory (most), the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory—Depression Scale, and the Depression 
Adjective Check List (least). 
The Scheffe post hoc test (Gaebelein, n.d.) comparing 
the means of the weighted combinations of the global measures 
of depression comprising the significant sequence X measure­
ment occasion interaction (Table 6 and Figure 1) supported the 
prediction that at Sequence ABC scores collected after hypothesis 
testing (Component C Canonical Mean = .455), logical analysis 
(Component B Canonical Mean = .460), and self-monitoring 
dysfunctional thoughts (Component A Canonical Mean = .668) 
would show significantly less depression than scores collected 
before treatment began (Before A Canonical Mean = .829). 
(Lower scores indicated less depression.) A similar pattern 
was found at Sequence ACB, where scores collected after logical 
analysis (Component B Canonical Mean = .506) and after 
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hypothesis testing (Component C Canonical Mean = .630) 
indicated less depression than the scores collected before 
treatment began (Before A Canonical Mean = .955). In con­
trast to the predicted effectiveness of Component A, however, 
and in contrast to the results for Sequence ABC, scores 
collected after Component A, at Sequence ACB, (Component A 
Canonical Mean = .851) did not show significantly less 
depression than scores collected before treatment began. 
With reference to the differential effectiveness of 
therapeutic components, the following results were obtained. 
As predicted for either sequence, both logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing produced greater improvement in depression 
than self-monitoring. In contrast to the predicted superiority 
of hypothesis testing over logical analysis, there was no 
statistically significant difference between the two com­
ponents, for either sequence. At the same time, the most 
adaptive scores for either sequence were found at the 
component that subjects received last (although scores after 
Components B and C did not statistically differ). That is, 
for Sequence ABC, Component C (hypothesis testing) produced 
the most adaptive scores; and for Sequence ACB, Component B 
(logical analysis) produced the most adaptive scores. 
Scheffe''s post hoc test (Table 7) also demonstrated 
that, before treatment began, subjects who received the 
sequence of treatment ABC (Canonical Means = .829) were 
significantly less depressed than subjects who received 
the sequence of treatment ACB (Canonical Mean = .955). 
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Similarly/ after exposure to Components A and C, the subjects 
in the sequence ABC (after A Canonical Mean = .668; after 
C mean = .455) were significantly less depressed than sub­
jects in the sequence ACB (After A Canonical Mean = .851, 
after C Canonical Mean = .630). After exposure to Component 
B, subjects' scores in the two sequences did not differ 
significantly. These results suggested that after exposure 
to Component A* the differences between the two sequences, 
apparent before treatment began, were maintained. However, 
the difference between the two sequences after subjects 
were exposed to Component C reflected the different combina­
tions of treatment to which subjects had been exposed. That 
is, the subjects in sequence ABC had been exposed to Com­
ponents A, B, and C when the scores after C were collected. 
Yet subjects in the Sequence ACB had been exposed only to 
Components A and C. Although it could be argued that the 
differences between the two sequences reflect pretreatment 
differences, this is unlikely, since comparable differences 
were not found after subjects were exposed to Component B. 
Instead, these results suggest that after Component C, the 
combination of Components A, B, and C more effectively 
ameliorated depression according to the combined and weighted 
global measures, than just the Components A and C. It is also 
possible, however, that these results reflect the superiority 
of the component received last. 
Beck Depression Inventory. An analysis of variance on 
the prorated raw scores from the Beck Depression Inventory 
supported the prediction that therapy would be effective in 
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ameliorating depression. This analysis of variance was per­
formed on prorated raw scores collected at screening, before 
treatment, and after each therapeutic component was adminis­
tered. This analysis (Table 8) indicated a significant main 
effect for measurement occasion F(4, 132) = 53.80; £ ̂  .0001. 
The means comprising this main effect were 31.865 (screening), 
29.28 (before A), 25.9 (after A), 17.149 (after B), and 17.676 
(after C). The analysis also showed a significant effect 
for sequence X measurement occasion, F(4, 132) = 3.74, 
£ < .01. All ofther effects were nonsignificant. 
The Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons among the means 
comprising the significant sequence X measurement occasion 
interaction (Table 9 and Figure 2) did not completely support 
the prediction that, for both sequences, the scores collected 
after exposure to each therapeutic component would show 
significantly less depression than either the scores collected 
at the screening sessions or the scores collected before 
treatment began. In contrast to the predicted effectiveness 
of Component A, for both sequences scores collected after 
Component A (ABC Mean = 27.312; ACB Mean = 24.7) did not show 
significantly less depression than scores collected before 
treatment (ABC Mean = 30.882; ACB Mean = 27.912). However, 
when the scores collected after Component A for either 
sequence are compared to the scores collected at the screening 
session (ABC Mean = 34.059; ACB Mean = 30.0), the scores 
collected after Component A show significantly less depression. 
(Lower scores indicated less depression.) As would be 
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expected (since no treatment occurred), the scores collected 
at the screening session did not differ significantly from 
the scores collected before Component A, for either sequence. 
In support of the predicted effectiveness of all components, 
at Sequence ABC, scores collected after logical analysis 
(Component B Mean = 21.706) and after hypothesis testing 
(Component C Mean = 17.0) indicated significantly less 
depression than scores collected before Component A or at 
the screening session. The same pattern of results occurred 
within Sequence ACB, where scores collected after hypothesis 
testing (Component C Mean = 18.250) and after logical analysis 
(Component B Mean = 13.275) showed significantly less depres­
sion than scores collected before Component A or at the 
screening session. 
With reference to the differential effectiveness of 
therapeutic, components, the following results were obtained. 
As predicted for both sequences, logical analysis and hypothesis 
testing produced significantly less depression than self-
monitoring. Results comparing the effectiveness of hypothesis 
testing and logical analysis were influenced by the sequence 
in which subjects received treatment. For Sequence ABC, 
exposure to hypothesis testing (Component C) produced 
significantly less depression than exposure to logical 
analysis (Component B). The treatment received last 
(Component C) produced the least depressed scores. For 
sequence ACB, exposure to logical analysis (Component B) 
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produced significantly less depression than exposure to 
hypothesis testing. For either sequence, the treatment 
received last resulted in the most adaptive scores. 
Newman-Keuls post hoc test (Table 10) also demonstrated 
that at the screening session, subjects who received the 
sequence of treatment ACB (Mean = 30.0) were significantly 
less depressed than subjects who received the sequence of 
treatment ABC (Mean = 34.058).3 After receiving Component B, 
subjects in treatment sequence ACB (Mean = 13.275) were 
significantly less depressed than subjects in the treatment 
sequence ABC (Mean = 21.706). The difference between the 
two sequences reflected the different combinations of 
treatment to which subjects had been exposed. The subjects 
in sequence ABC had been exposed only to Components A and B 
when scores "after B" were collected. However, the subjects 
in sequence ACB had been exposed to Components A, B, and C 
when the scores "after B" were collected. The statistically 
significant differences between the two sequences suggests 
that for logical analysis, the combination of Components A, 
B, and C more effectively reduces depression than just the 
Components A and B. It is also possible that these results 
reflect the superiority of the component received last. When 
the combination of Components A, B, and C is compared to only 
Components A and C for hypothesis testing, no significant 
differences were revealed. 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—-Depression 
Scale. An analysis of variance on the prorated raw scores from 
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the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale upheld the predicted effectiveness of treatment. This 
analysis of variance was performed on the prorated raw scores 
collected at screening, before treatment, and after each thera­
peutic component had been completed. This analysis (Table 
11) showed a significant main effect for measurement 
occasion, F(4, 132) = 17.45, p <. .0001. All other main 
effects and interactions were not significant. 
. The Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons among the means 
producing the significant measurement occasions effect 
(Table 12) did not completely support the prediction that 
the scores collected after subjects were exposed to each 
therapeutic component would show significantly less depression 
than the scores collected at the screening session or the 
scores collected before treatment began. In contrast to 
the predicted effectiveness of self-monitoring, the scores 
collected after Component A (Mean = 37.276) did not indicate 
significantly less depression than the scores collected either 
at the screening session (Mean = 37.269) or before exposure 
to Component A (Mean = 37.482). (Lower numbers indicated 
less depression.) In support of the predicted effectiveness 
of all components, scores- collected after exposure to 
logical analysis (Component B Mean = 31.408) and after 
exposure to hypothesis testing (Component C Mean = 32.207) 
showed significantly less depression than scores at the 
screening session or before exposure to Component A. 
The following results were obtained regarding the 
differential effectiveness of each therapeutic component. 
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As predicted, both logical analysis and hypothesis testing 
amelioriated depression more than self-monitoring. In 
contrast to the predicted superiority of hypothesis testing, 
there was no difference between logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing in reducing depression. 
Depression Adjective Check List. Two analyses of 
variance performed, on raw scores of the Depression Adjective 
Check List supported the prediction of treatment efficacy. 
The first analysis of variance was conducted on raw scores 
collected before treatment started and after each therapeutic 
component had been completed. This analysis (Table 13) 
revealed a significant effect for measurement occasion 
F(3, 99) = 40.55, p < .0001. No other main effects or 
interactions were statistically significant. 
The Newman-Keuls post hoc test of the means within 
the significant effect for measurement occasion (Table 14) 
supported the prediction that all components would effectively 
ameliorate depression. The results showed that after 
receiving Component A (Mean = 16.541), Component B (Mean = 
10.486) or Component C (Mean = 10..892), subjects reported 
less depression than before treatment (before A Mean = 20.405). 
(Lower scores indicated less depression.) 
The Newman-Keuls test produced the following results 
in relation to predictions concerning the differential 
effectiveness of components. As predicted, subjects reported 
significantly less depression after receiving Components B or C 
than after receiving Component A. In contrast to the predicted 
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superiority of Component C over B, there was no significant dif­
ference between the two components in ameliorating depression. 
The second analysis of variance was performed on the 
Depression Adjective Check List raw scores collected at the 
beginning of the first treatment session, on three different 
means of the scores collected at the beginning of the four ses­
sions corresponding to Components A, B, and C, and on raw 
scores collected at the debriefing session (i.e., score at 
first session, MeanA, Mean^, Meanc, and score at debriefing 
session.2 The second analysis was performed in order to ana­
lyze the data collected at every session. This analysis 
(Table 15) indicated a significant main effect for measure­
ment occasion, F(4, 127) = 46.25, p < .0001. All other 
effects were nonsignificant. 
The pattern of results produced by the second analysis 
replicated those produced by the first analysis. The 
Newman-Keuls test of means comprising the significant effect 
for measurement occasions (Table 16) supported the prediction 
that all components would reduce depression. That is, after 
receiving Component A (Mean = 15.975), Component B (Mean = 
12.234), or Component C (Mean = 12.975) subjects were 
significantly less depressed than they were before treatment 
began (before A Mean = 20.405). Additional support for the 
predicted effectiveness of all components is the fact that 
at the debriefing session (Mean = 9.562), subjects' scores 
showed significantly less depression than did the scores 
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collected after A, B, or C and the scores collected before 
treatment began. 
Results pertaining to the differential treatment 
effectiveness of components follow. As predicted, after 
exposure to Component B or Component C, subjects were 
significantly less depressed than they were after exposure 
to Component A. In contrast to the predicted superiority 
of Component C, there was no significant difference between 
subjects1 scores on the Depression Adjective Check List 
after Component B and scores after Component C. 
Summary 
Both multivariate and univariate analyses supported the 
prediction that scores would indicate less depression after 
subjects were exposed to cognitive-behavioral therapy than 
before treatment began. All analyses on all dependent 
measures supported the predicted effectiveness of logical 
analysis (Component B) and hypothesis testing (Component 
C). The therapeutic effectiveness of self-monitoring 
(Component A) was supported only by the multivariate 
analysis of variance at Sequence ABC, the univariate 
analysis of variance on the Depression Adjective Check List, 
and the univariate analysis Of variance on the Beck 
Depression Inventory, and only when scores collected after 
Component A were compared to scores collected at screening. 
(Scores collected before A did not differ significantly 
from those collected after A.) The analyses of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
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Scale did not support the predicted effectiveness of self-
monitoring. 
All measures and their analyses supported the prediction 
that logical analysis and hypothesis testing would ameliorate 
depression more than self-monitoring. No measures supported 
the prediction that hypothesis testing, because of its 
generalized influence, would reduce global measures of 
depression more than logical analysis. Multivariate analyses 
of the global measures and univariate analyses of both the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory--Depression 
Scale and the Depression Adjective Check List revealed no 
significant difference between Components B and C. Multi­
variate analyses revealed that the component subjects re­
ceived last produced the most adaptive scores. Univariate 
analysis of the Beck Depression Inventory also suggested 
that the component received last ameliorated depression most. 
According to the Beck Depression Inventory logical analysis 
reduced depression significantly more than hypothesis test­
ing only, when hypothesis testing preceded logical analysis 
(at Sequence ACB). Conversely, when logical analysis 
preceded hypothesis testing, hypothesis testing reduced 
depression significantly more than logical analysis. 
Univariate analyses also showed that the therapeutic 
effect of logical analysis was significantly greater when 
used in combination with self-monitoring and hypothesis 
testing than when used only with self-monitoring. These analys 
demonstrated that the effect of hypothesis testing 
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was significantly greater when used in combination with self-
monitoring and logical analysis than when used only with self-
monitoring or reflected the superiority of the component 
received last. 
The Influence of Each Therapeutic Component 
on Specific Measures of Response Classes 
Relevant to Depression 
Overview of the Results 
The second research question addressed was—What are 
some of the response classes within the depressive cluster 
which are influenced by each therapeutic component? Exposure 
to Component A positively influenced scores on the Inter­
personal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale (rather 
than Component A influencing only measures of dysfunctional 
thoughts, as was predicted). Exposure to Component B or C 
positively influenced frequency and belief scores on the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, scores on the Pleasant 
Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and scores on the 
Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related. These 
results were in contrast to the predicted exclusive effect 
of Component C on the subscales of the Pleasant Events 
Schedule and Interpersonal Events Scale. Reasoning that 
both Components B and C target dysfunctional thoughts, it 
was predicted that both components would be equally effective 
in reducing dysfunctional thoughts. However, this prediction 
was not supported, as Component B reduced dysfunctional 
thoughts significantly more than Component C. (However, 
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it should be noted that, on the frequency scores from the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, this effect was influenced 
by sequence of treatment.) Reasoning that Component C 
would have a "broad" influence and Components A and B would 
have a "narrow" influence, it was predicted that only 
Component C would influence positively pleasant events 
and interpersonal relationships. This prediction was not 
supported. Instead, exposure to both logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing resulted in treatment gains. Surprisingly, 
after exposure to Component B, scores on the subscales of 
the Pleasant Events Schedule and the Interpersonal Events 
Schedule were significantly more adaptive than after 
exposure to Component C. 
Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance were 
used to address questions involving the influence of each 
therapeutic component on the specific measures of response 
classes relevant to depression and were followed by 
post hoc tests. The "specific measures" of response 
classes relevant to depression included the prorated frequency 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire., prorated 
belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, 
average cross-product scores from the Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and average cross-product 
scores from the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-
Related Subscale. All of these "specific measures" were 
collected before treatment began and after subjects were 
exposed to each therapeutic component. 
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Specific Measures of Response Classes 
Relevant to Depression 
Multivariate analyses. A multivariate analysis of 
variance conducted on the specific measures of response 
classes relevant to depression upheld the prediction of 
overall treatment efficacy. These measures included pro­
rated frequency scores from the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire, prorated belief scores from the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire, average cross-product scores from 
the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and 
average cross-product scores from the Interpersonal Events 
Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale. These measures were 
collected before treatment started and after the subjects 
were exposed to each component of therapy. 
The multivariate analysis of variance conducted on the 
weighted combinations of specific measures of response classes 
relevant to depression (Table 17) showed a significant main 
effect for subtype with a Wilks' lambda of .586, which is 
equivalent to F(4, 30) = 5.29, p < .002; and for measurement 
occasion with a Wilks' lambda of .438, which is equivalent 
to F (12, 254) = 7.75, £ 5 .0001. 
Within the significant effect for subtype, the univariate 
means on all specific measures for the high subtypes were 
less adaptive than the univariate means on all specific 
measures for the low subtypes. (Mean frequency scores, 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, highs = 103.424, lows = 
74.108; Mean belief scores—Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
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highs = 102.453, lows = 74.108; Mean subscale scores—Pleasant 
Events Schedule, highs = 1.399, lows = 1.770; and Mean sub-
scale scores Interpersonal Events Schedule, highs = -.5151, 
lows = -.2402). Within the significant main effect for sub­
type, the specific measures were weighted in the following 
order: subscale scores on the Pleasant Events Schedule (most), 
frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, belief 
scores on the Automatic Thoughts, Questionnaire, and subscale 
scores on the Interpersonal Events Schedule (least). 
Within the significant main effect for measurement 
occasions, the specific measures were weighted in the 
following order: belief scores on the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (most), frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire, subscale scores on the Pleasant 
Events Schedule, and subscale scores on the Interpersonal 
Events Schedule (least). Scheffe post hoc tests were 
performed to compare the weighted combinations of the 
specific measures of response classes which are relevant 
to depression and comprise the significant effect for 
measurement occasion (Table 18, Figure 3). This analysis 
demonstrated that the canonical means were significantly 
more adaptive after subjects were exposed to Component B 
(Canonical Mean = .199) or Component C (Canonical Mean = 
.264) than after subjects were exposed to Component A 
(Canonical Mean - .377) or before treatment (before A 
Canonical Mean = .394). (In all of these comparisons, 
the univariate means on all specific measures were more 
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adaptive for Components B or C than for Component A or 
before treatment.) The post hoc analysis also showed that 
the canonical means were not significantly more adaptive 
after exposure to Component A than before exposure to 
Component A. The combined and weighted combinations of 
specific measures collected after exposure to Component B 
did not differ significantly from those collected after 
exposure to Component C. 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency Scores. An 
analysis of variance performed on prorated frequency scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire demonstrated that 
the high subtype's frequency of dysfunctional thoughts was 
significantly greater than the lows and also supported the 
prediction that all subjects' frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts would be lower after treatment than before. This 
analysis (Table 19) revealed significant main effects for 
subtype, F(l, 33) = 21.80, £ _<.0001; and for measurement 
occasion, F (3, 99) = 27.38, p <. .01; and a significant 
sequence by measurement interaction F(3, 95) = 3.87, p < .01. 
The means comprising the main effect for subtype 
showed that the high subtype (Mean = 103.424) reported 
significantly more dysfunctional thoughts than the low 
subtype (Mean = 74.108). (Lower scores are more adaptive.) 
Newman-Keuls post hoc analysis of the means comprising 
the sequence X measurement occasion interaction (Table 20 
and Figure 4) did not support the hypothesis that exposure 
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to all therapeutic components would reduce the frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts over baseline. Comparisons at 
Sequence ABC showed that only Component B (Mean = 82.882) 
and Component C (Mean = 76.00) significantly reduced the 
frequency of dysfunctional thoughts when compared to the 
frequency of dysfunctional thoughts before treatment began 
(before A Mean = 103.817). At Sequence ABC, the frequency 
of dysfunctional thoughts reported after exposure to 
Component A (Mean = 102.91) did not differ significantly 
from the frequency before exposure to Component A. Simi­
larly, comparisons at Sequence ACB indicated that only 
Component B (Mean = 67.85) and Component C (Mean = 85.15) 
significantly reduced the frequency of dysfunctional thoughts 
when compared to pre-treatment levels (before A Mean = 
100.739). Comparisons of the frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts were not significantly less after exposure to 
Component A (Mean = 100.156) than before treatment began. 
As predicted, for both sequences exposure to Com­
ponents B and C reduced dysfunctional thoughts more than 
exposure to Component A. Reasoning that Components B and 
C both target dysfunctional thoughts, it was predicted that 
they would be equally effective in reducing dysfunctional 
thoughts. However, at Sequence ACB (when hypothesis testing 
preceded logical analysis), Component B reduced the frequency 
of dysfunctional thoughts significantly more than Component C. 
Since scores collected after exposure to Components B and C 
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did not differ significantly in Sequence ABC, thus the supe-
iority of logical analysis over hypothesis testing in reducing 
dysfunctional thoughts may only occur when subjects have 
been exposed first to hypothesis testing. For either 
sequence, the treatment received last resulted in the most 
adaptive scores (although Components B and C produced 
significantly different scores only for Sequences ACB). 
Newman-Keuls post hoc test (Table 21) also demonstrated 
that, after receiving Component B, subjects in the treatment 
sequence ACB (Mean = 67.85) reported significantly fewer 
dysfunctional thoughts than subjects in the treatment 
sequence ABC (Mean = 82.882). The difference between the 
two sequences reflects the different combinations of 
treatment. Subjects ABC had been exposed only to Com­
ponents A and B when scores "after B" were collected; 
however, the subjects in the sequence ACB had been exposed 
to Components A, B, and C when the scores "after B" were 
collected. Complementary findings occurred after subjects 
received Component C. That is, "after C" subjects in the 
treatment sequence ABC (Mean = 76.0) reported significantly 
fewer dysfunctional thoughts than subjects in the sequence 
ACB (Mean = 86.15). Such results suggest that for either 
logical analysis or hypothesis testing, the combination of 
Components A, B, and C more effectively reduces dysfunctional 
thoughts than either Component A and B or Components A and 
C. It is also possible, however, that these results reflect 
the superiority of the component received last. No significant 
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differences were found between the sequences before treat­
ment or after exposure to Component A. 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—-Belief Scores. An 
analysis of variance performed on the prorated belief scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire showed that the 
high subtypes' belief in dysfunctional thoughts was sig­
nificantly greater than the lows' and supported the pre­
diction that all subjects' belief in dysfunctional thoughts 
would be lower after treatment than before. This analysis 
(Table 22) produced a significant main effect for subtype, 
F (1, 33) = 15.32, p <• .0001 and for measurement occasions, 
F(3, 99) = 26.20, p < .0001. The other effects were not 
significant. 
The means comprising the main effect for subtype 
indicated the high subtype (Mean = 102.453) believed their 
dysfunctional thoughts significantly more than the low sub­
types (Mean = 75.290). 
The Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons of the means 
within the significant main effect for measurement occasion 
(Table 23) disconfirmed the hypothesis that all of the 
components would significantly reduce the credence that 
subjects placed in their dysfunctional thoughts. When 
compared to preintervention scores (before A Mean = 100.401), 
only Component B (Mean = 74.231) and Component C (Mean = 
33.809) significantly reduced subjects' "degree of belief" 
in dysfunctional thoughts. Subjects* scores after exposure 
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to Component A (Mean = 100.41) did not differ significantly 
from scores before treatment. Both Components B and C 
reduced credence in dysfunctional thoughts significantly 
more than Component A, as predicted. In contrast to the 
predicted equivalence between Components B and C (reasoning 
that both components targeted dysfunctional thoughts), post 
hoc comparisons showed that Component B reduced credence 
in dysfunctional thoughts significantly more than Component 
C. 
Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale. An 
analysis of variance conducted on average cross-product 
scores from the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related 
Subscale substantiated the prediction that exposure to 
treatment would increase the subjects' average frequency 
and enjoyability of pleasant events. The analysis of 
variance (Table 24) indicated that the *nain effect for 
measurement occasion was significant, F(3, 147) = 13.333, 
p .0001. The other effects in the analysis were not 
significant at conventional significance levels. However, 
it is noteworthy that the main effect for subtype, F(l, 33) =3.75, 
p = .06, tended to show that the high subtypes (Mean = 1.399) 
engaged in and enjoyed pleasant events less than the low 
subtypes (Mean = 1.77). (Higher scores were more adaptive.) 
The Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons of the means 
comprising the significant main effect for measurement 
occasion refuted the prediction that average cross-product 
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scores on the Pleasant Event Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale 
would increase (i.e., subjects would engage in and enjoy 
more pleasant events) only after exposure to hypothesis 
testing (Component C). Average cross-product scores increased 
significantly more after subjects were exposed to Component 
B (Mean = 1.85) and Component C (Mean = 1.66) than the 
average cross-product scores before treatment (before A 
Mean = 1.33) or after exposure to Component A (Mean = 
1.43). Average cross-product scores collected after 
exposure to Component A did not differ significantly from 
the scores collected before exposure to Component A. In 
contrast to the prediction, after exposure to Component B, 
subjects reported significantly greater numbers and enjoy­
ment of pleasant events than they did after exposure to 
Components C. 
It was predicted that subjects who received Component 
C first would maintain their gains on the Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale at the final measurement 
occasion. In contrast, it was predicted that subjects who 
received Component B first would gain on this measure only 
after they received Component C. Since there was no sig­
nificant sequence X measurement occasion interaction, this 
post hoc comparison was not performed. 
Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Sub-
scale. An analysis of variance conducted on average cross-
product scores from the Interpersonal Event Schedule— 
Dysphoria-Related Subscale supported the prediction that 
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after treatment subjects would report more positive inter­
actions. The analysis of variance (Table 26) produced 
significant results only for the main effect for measurement 
occasions, F(3, 99) = 17.48, p < .0001. All other effects 
were not significant at conventional levels. The main 
effect for subtype F(l, 33) = 3.19, p = .08, however, is 
noteworthy. It tended to show that the quality of inter­
personal relationships was worse for high subtype (Mean = 
-.515) than for low subtypes (Mean = -.240). (Higher scores 
were more adaptive.) 
The Newman-Keuls post hoc test comparing the means 
within the significant main effect for measurement occasion 
disconfirmed the hypothesis that average cross-product 
scores on the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-
Related Subscale would increase (i.e., subjects would report 
more frequent and positive interactions) only after exposure 
to Component C (Table 27). Instead post hoc comparisons 
showed that positive interpersonal events increased sig­
nificantly more after subjects were exposed to Component A 
(Mean = -.524), Component B (Mean = -.105) and Component C 
(Mean = -.284) than before treatment began (before A Mean = 
-.642). Average cross-product scores collected after both 
Components B and C were significantly greater than scores 
after A. In addition, exposure to Component B produced 
significantly greater scores than exposure to Component C. 
It was predicted that subjects who received Component 
C first would maintain their gains on the Interpersonal 
118 
Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale at the final 
measurement occasion. In contrast, it was predicted that 
subjects who received Component B first would gain on this 
measure only after they received Component C. Since there 
was no significant sequence X measurement occasion inter­
action this post hoc comparison was not performed. 
Summary 
It was predicted that self-monitoring (Component A) and 
logical analysis (Component B) would have a "narrow" influence, 
affecting only the measures of dysfunctional thoughts. In 
contrast to this prediction, the following results were 
obtained: Self-monitoring appeared to be ineffective in 
reducing either the frequency of or the belief in dysfunc­
tional thoughts (according to the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire), but did enhance the quality of interpersonal 
relationships (according to the subscale of the Interpersonal 
Event Schedule). Exposure to logical analysis resulted in 
adaptive scores on every specific measure of response 
class relevant to depression. 
It was reasoned that exposure to hypothesis testing 
would teach subjects a problem-solving strategy applicable 
to a wide range of problem areas. Thus it was predicted 
that hypothesis testing would positively influence every 
specific measure. Also, it was predicted that only 
hypothesis testing would influence pleasant events and 
interpersonal relationships (since the other two components 
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did not directly target these areas). As predicted, hypothesis 
testing did improve scores on all specific measures, et, as 
can be seen from the results outlined above it was not the 
only component to affect pleasant or interpersonal events. 
In contrast to predictions, Component C was not the most 
powerful influence on pleasant events or interpersonal 
relationships. Analyses of variance on both the Pleasant 
Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale and the Interpersonal 
Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale demonstrated that 
exposure to logical analysis resulted in more adaptive scores 
than exposure to hypothesis testing. 
It was predicted that hypothesis testing and logical 
analysis would be equally effective in reducing the frequency 
and belief of dysfunctional thoughts. Instead, the follow­
ing results were obtained. The analyses of the frequency 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire suggested 
that the component presented last produced the most improve­
ment. In addition it appeared that the combination of all 
components (A, B, and C) more effectively reduced dysfunc­
tional thoughts than either A and B or A and C. The analyses 
of the belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Question­
naire revealed that logical analysis more effectively 
reduced the subjects' belief in dysfunctional thoughts than 
hypothesis testing. 
Finally, it was predicted that both logical analysis 
and hypothesis testing would more effectively ameliorate 
dysfunctional thoughts than self-monitoring. Analyses of 
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the frequency and belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire supported this prediction. In addition, the 
superiority of logical analysis and hypothesis testing over 
self-monitoring was found on every specific measure of 
response classes relevant to depression. 
The Relationships Among the Dependent Measures 
To determine the relationships among the dependent measures, 
a Pearson Product Moment correlational analysis was performed on 
the global measures of depression and on the specific measures 
of response classes relevant to depression (Table 28). All 
subjects' scores on every dependent measure collected at the 
four measurement occasions were included in this analysis. 
A wide range of correlation coefficients resulted. 
The correlational analysis showed that the relationships 
among the global measures of depression (i.e., Beck Depression 
Inventory, Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory— 
Depression Scale, and the Depression Adjective Check List) were 
generally moderate (greater than .50), except for a weaker 
relationship between the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory-~Depression Scale and the Depression Adjective 
Check List (r = .413) . 
When the relationships among the global measures of 
depression and the specific measures of response classes 
relevant to depression (i.e., frequency and belief scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, the Pleasant 
Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and the Interpersonal 
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Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale) are examined, 
results varied with the measures. Correlation coefficients 
which were equal to or greater than .60 were obtained between 
the Beck Depression Inventory and frequency and belief 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire and between 
the Depression Adjective Check List and frequency scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. All other correla­
tion coefficients were modest (r less than .50). It is note­
worthy that, as expected, negative correlation coefficients are 
obtained when the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related 
Subscale and the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-
Related Subscale are combined with any other measure since 
high scores are "adaptive" on these two measures. However, 
low scores are "adaptive" on the other measures.) 
When the intercorrelations among specific measures of 
response classes relevant to depression were examined, the 
following pattern was noted. As expected the frequency and 
belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
were strongly correlated (r = .88). The intercorrelations 
among the frequency and belief scores and the other "spe­
cific measures" were negative and modest (r less than -.60). 
The correlation coefficient between the Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale and the Interpersonal Events 
Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale was positive and minimal 
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The Attempt to Predict Treatment Outcome 
from Subject Classification 
The third research question addressed was—Will subject 
classification produced by behavioral assessment help predict 
responsiveness to the different components of cognitive-
behavioral therapy for depression? In this investigation, 
subject classification (i.e., dividing the subjects into 
two subtypes—those with initial high versus low frequences of 
dysfunctional thoughts, according to the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire) did not show "treatment validity." That is, 
initial frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts Question­
naire did not predict the subjects' responsiveness to any 
of the therapeutic components. In contrast to these results, 
it was predicted that after exposure to logical analysis or 
to self-monitoring, the high subtype would improve sig­
nificantly more on the global measures of depression and 
the measures of dysfunctional thoughts than the low subtype. 
This prediction was based on the assumption that logical 
analysis and self-monitoring targeted dysfunctional thoughts 
and that therefore, subjects with a high frequency of dys­
functional thoughts would be better matched to these treatment 
components than subjects with a low frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts. This prediction was extended to the global 
measures of depression because it was assumed that the 
benefits of matching subjects to the appropriate treatment 
might influence depression in general. No difference was 
predicted between highs and lows on either the global or 
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specific measures of depression after exposure to hypothesis 
testing, it being assumed that this component would have 
a "broad" influence. It was assumed that the broad influence 
of hypothesis testing would make the match between a sub­
ject's identified problem area and a specific treatment 
less essential. 
The pattern of results outlined above was not obtained 
from either the multivariate and univariate analyses, either 
on the global measures of depression or on the specific 
measures of response classes relevant to depression. 
Global Measures of Depression 
Neither multivariate or univariate analyses of variance 
on the global measures of depression confirmed the prediction 
that the subtype with a high frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts would have lower scores on the global measures of 
depression after treatment than would the subtype with a 
low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. A multivariate 
analysis of variance on prorated raw scores from the Beck 
Depression Inventory, on prorated raw scores from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression 
Scale, and on raw scores from the Depression Adjective 
Check List (Table 5) produced nonsignificant effects for 
subtype, with a Wilks' lambda of .941, which is equivalent 
to F(3, 31) = .65, p>.10; for subtype X sequence 
Wilks1 lambda of .972, which is equivalent to F(3, 31) = 
.30, jd >.10; subtype X measurement occasion, with a Wilks' 
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lambda of .907, which is equivalent to F(9, 236) = 1.08, 
p > .10; and for subtype X sequence X measurement occasion, 
with a Wilks* lambda of .98, which is equivalent to F(9, 236) 
= .22, p > .10. 
The univariate analysis of variance produced a similar 
pattern of nonsignificant results. The analysis of variance 
performed on prorated raw scores from the Beck Depression 
Inventory (Table 8) resulted in nonsignificant effects for 
subtype, F(l., 33) = .95, p >.10; for subtype X sequence, 
F(l, 33) = .14, £ >.10; for subtype X measurement occasion, 
F(4, 132) = .22, £ .10; and for subtype X sequence X measure­
ment occasion, F(4, 132) = .22, £ y- .10. The analysis of 
variance conducted in the prorated raw scores from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory--Depression 
Scale (Table 11) showed nonsignificant results for subtype, 
F(1, 33) = .0, £ >.10; for subtype X sequence, F(l, 33) = 
.14, £ >• .10; for subtype X measurement occasion, F(4, 132) = 
1.82, £ > .10; and for subtype X sequence X measurement 
occasion, F(4, 132) = .20, £ .10. The analysis of 
variance on the Depression.Adjective Check List (Table 13) 
indicated that the following effects were nonsignificant-
subtype, F(l, 33) = 1.63, £ > .10; subtype X sequence, 
F(1, 33) = .75, £ >.10; subtype X measurement occasion, 
F(3, 99) = .12, £ >.10; and subtype X sequence X measure­
ment occasion, F(3, 99) = .26, p > .10. 
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Specific Measures of Response Classes 
Relevant to Depression 
Multivariate analyses. The multivariate analysis of 
variance on prorated frequency and belief scores from the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, on average cross-product 
scores from the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Sub-
scale, and on average cross-product scores from the 
Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale 
(Table 17) produced a significant effect for subtype, with 
a Wilks' lambda of .586, which is equal to F(4, 30) = 5.29, 
p .002. The canonical mean for the high subtype (.580) was 
significantly less adaptive than the canonical mean 
(.426) for the low subtype. All other effects involving 
subtype were nonsignificant, including subtype X sequence, 
with a Wilks' lambda of .892, which is equivalent to 
F(4, 30) = .91, p >.10; subtype X measurement occasion, 
with a Wilks.1 lambda of .848, which is equivalent to 
F(12, 254) = 1.36, p > .10; and subtype X sequence X 
measurement occasion, with a Wilks' lambda of .892, which 
is equivalent to F(12, 254) = .94, p > .10. 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency and Belief 
Scores. The analyses of variance on the frequency and belief 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire did not 
substantiate the prediction that subject classification would 
predict responsiveness to the overall treatment package. 
In particular, these analyses did not substantiate the 
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prediction that subject classification would predict respon­
siveness to the overall treatment package. In particular, 
these analyses did not substantiate the prediction that 
subtypes with an initial high frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts would have more adaptive scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire following treatment than subtypes 
with an initial low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. 
The analysis of variance conducted on prorated frequency 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Table 19) 
produced a significant effect for subtype F(l, 33) = 21.80, 
p < .0001, which supports the assertion that the sample 
in fact included two distinct subtypes. The high subtypes 
(Mean = 103.424) had significantly more dysfunctional 
thoughts than the low subtypes (Mean = 74.108). This 
analysis also produced the following nonsignificant effects : 
subtype X sequence, F(l, 33) = .35, p >.10, subtype X 
measurement occasion, F(3, 99) = .58, p > .10, and subtype 
X sequence X measurement occasion, F(3, 99) = .31, p >.10. 
In a like manner, the analysis of variance performed 
on the belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts Question­
naire (Table 22) produced a significant main effect for 
subtype, F(l, 33) = 15.32, p < .0001. The high subtypes 
(Mean = 102.453) believed their dysfunctional thoughts 
significantly more than the low subtypes (Mean = 75.29). 
All other effects were nonsignificant: subtype X 
sequence, F (1, 33) = .19, p >.10; subtype X measurement 
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occasion, F(3, 9 9) = .12, p >.10; and subtype X sequence X 
measurement occasion, F(3, 99) = .81, p 7 .10. 
The preceding results did not support the prediction 
that, after exposure to logical analysis or self-monitoring, 
the high subtypes would have significantly lower scores on 
the measures of dysfunctional thoughts than the low subtypes. 
(This prediction was based on the assumption that logical 
analysis and self-monitoring represented a better match 
between the highs' identified problem than might occur between 
these components and the problem of subjects with a low 
frequency of dysfunctional thoughts.) 
Because the interaction between subtype and measure­
ment occasion was not significant for any of the specific 
measures, post hoc analysis after exposure to Component C 
(hypothesis testing) were not conducted on any of the 
specific measures of responses classes relevant to depression. 
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' CHAPTER IV 
SYNOPSIS 
The research presented here examined the therapeutic 
components within Beck's cognitive-behavioral treatment in 
relation to changes they produced in global measures of 
depression and in specific measures of response classes 
relevant to depression. In addition, the dissertation noted 
which response classes were influenced by each therapeutic 
component and attempted to predict treatment outcome by subject 
classification on frequency of dysfunctional thoughts. 
In short, the results showed that all scores were sig­
nificantly more adaptive after subjects were exposed to the 
therapeutic components termed "logical analysis" or "hypothesis 
testing" than they were before treatment began. Moreover, 
on every dependent measure, logical analysis (Component B) 
and hypothesis testing (Component C) produced significantly 
more adaptive change than did self-monitoring (Component A). 
Logical analysis and hypothesis testing influenced positively 
every dependent measure while self-monitoring generally 
produced effects only on the Depression Adjective Check List 
and on the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Mood-Related 
Subscale. Classification of subjects into two subtypes, 
those with low and high frequencies of dysfunctional thoughts, 
did not predict subjects' responsiveness to components. In 
other words, independent of their'initial frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts, the depressives' scores on all measures 
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gathered after treatment were more adaptive than the scores 
gathered before treatment. 
On 3 of the 7 dependent measures (i.e., the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire—Belief Scores, Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and Interpersonal Events 
Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale), logical analysis 
resulted in significantly greater change than hypothesis 
testing. On the Beck Depression Inventory, the component 
presented last reduced depression the most. On the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency Scores, the superiority 
of logical analysis over hypothesis testing was apparent only 
when logical analysis was presented last (i.e., when hypothesis 
testing preceded logical analysis). In addition, post hoc 
analysis on the Beck Depression Inventory and the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency Scores showed that the com­
bination of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and hypothesis 
testing produced significantly more change than self-monitor-
ing and logical analysis alone. On the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire—Frequency Scores, the combination of components 
(A, B, C) produced significantly more change than self-
monitoring plus hypothesis testing. The superiority of the 
combination of components could reflect however, the supe­
riority of any component received last. 
The multivariate analyses of the global measures showed 
that the scores collected after exposure to logical analysis 
or to hypothesis testing were significantly more adaptive 
than the scores collected before treatment began or after 
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exposure to self-monitoring. This analysis suggested that self-
monitoring had no therapeutic effect on the combined and weighted 
global measures of depression. There was no statistically sig­
nificant difference between the effect of logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing. Although the difference between Components 
B and C was not statistically significant, there was a trend 
for the component presented last to produce the greater change. 
After exposure to hypothesis testing, the combination of self-
monitoring, logical analysis, and hypothesis testing produced 
change significantly greater than only self-monitoring and 
hypothesis testing. 
The. multivariate analyses of the specific measures again 
showed that the scores collected after exposure to logical analy­
sis or to hypothesis testing showed more adaptive change than 
the scores collected before treatment began or after exposure 
to self-monitoring. Again, self-monitoring did not appear to 
produce therapeutic changes. This analysis showed no signifi­
cant differences between the therapeutic changes produced by 
logical analysis and those produced by hypothesis testing. 
The preceding pattern of results raised the following 
questions: (a) Why was self-monitoring of dysfunctional 
thoughts generally ineffective in producing adaptive change?, 
(b) What mechanisms are involved in the superiority of 
logical analysis over hypothesis testing in reducing the 
credence of dysfunctional thoughts, increasing pleasant 
events, and improving interpersonal relationships?, (c) Why 
might the combination of therapeutic components produce 
greater change on some measures than subsets of the 
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components?, (d) Why did the frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts not predict the subjects' response to the various 
therapeutic components? As these questions are being discussed 
the research findings will be compared to initial predictions 
and past research. 
Predictions, Findings, and Speculation 
Overall Treatment Effectiveness and Differential 
Effectiveness of Therapeutic Components in 
Treating Depression 
The first set of predictions involved the effectiveness • 
of each component of cognitive-behavioral therapy as well as 
the differential effectivenss of each component on the global 
measures of depression. The most basic prediction made was 
that subjects would report less depression on the global 
measures after exposure to each therapeutic component than 
they reported at screening or before treatment began (i.e., 
before Component A). This prediction was based, first, on 
the demonstrated overall effectiveness of Beck's cognitive-
behavioral treatment package in treating depression and, 
second, on the demonstrated effectiveness of the various 
components which make up the package. 
Overall Effectiveness 
Cognitive-behavioral therapy as a package. Although the 
present study did not compare cognitive-behavioral therapy to 
a control group or to any other form of psychological inter­
vention, the present data are consistent with the demonstrated 
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effectiveness of the overall treatment package. That is, 
in the present investigation, scores (on every dependent 
measure) collected after subjects were exposed to all 
therapeutic components were significantly more adaptive 
than scores collected before treatment began. These data 
parallel past studies which showed that, as a package, 
cognitive-behavioral therapy is effective. For example, past 
research has shown that cognitive-behavioral therapy was 
more effective than "insight-oriented therapy," a waiting 
list control group (Morris, 1975 cited in Hollon, 1981), or 
antidepressant drugs (Rush et al., 1977), and was just as 
effective as cognitive-behavioral therapy plus psychopharma-
cological intervention (Beck et al., 1979). 
Component A. The present study did not support the 
prediction that scores on global measures of depression 
would be more adaptive after subjects were taught to self-
monitor dysfunctional thoughts than before. Most analysis 
of the global measures of depression suggested that self-
monitoring was generally ineffective in ameliorating depres­
sion. Exceptions included the following three analyses. 
First, the multivariate analyses of global measures showed 
less depressed scores after Component A than before treat­
ment for sequence ABC, but not for sequence ACB. Since 
the subjects in sequence ACB were significantly more 
depressed in terms of global measures than those in 
sequence ABC, the therapeutic effect of self-monitoring may 
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not have been strong enough to influence the more depressed 
subjects. Second, the analyses of the Beck Depression Inventory 
revealed that self-monitoring showed reduced depression 
only when the scores collected after self-monitoring are 
compared to those collected at screening (and not those 
collected before Component A). Again, these results suggest 
that self-monitoring dysfunctional thoughts was not a 
powerful treatment in reducing depression. Third, the 
analyses of the Depression Adjective Check List were the 
only analyses that demonstrated, without qualification, that 
self-monitoring could reduce depression. 
Incidental data suggested that self-monitoring was in­
effective in that several subjects stated that self-monitor­
ing was not helping them or made them feel worse. In 
a like manner, a few subjects impatiently questioned, "When 
will we go on to something else or when will we learn what 
to do with these dysfunctional thoughts?" It is also 
relevant that post hoc analyses of the frequency and belief 
scores showed that neither the frequency nor the believability 
of dysfunctional thoughts decreased after subjects were 
exposed to self-monitoring. 
The preceding results were in contrast to past research 
which showed that self-monitoring can sometimes effectively 
reduce negative cognition. Self-monitoring decreased 
ruminative thinking (Frederiksen, 1975), psychotic hallucina­
tions (Rutner & Bugle, 1969), and paranoid thoughts 
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(Williams, 1976). Similarly, Harmon et al. (1980) found that 
self-monitoring either of mood or pleasant events decreased 
depression (according to the Depression Adjective Check 
List). 
It is noteworthy that the present study produced results 
similar to the Harmon et al. study (i.e., elevation in mood 
following self-monitoring) when the changes in mood were 
measured by the Depression Adjective Check List (but not 
by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Depres­
sion—Depression Scale, nor by the Beck Depression Inventory). 
If it is assumed that the Depression Adjective Check List 
is a more sensitive measure than either the Beck Depression 
Inventory or the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory— 
Depression Scale, then these results are better understood. 
That is, the Depression Adjective Check List may assess the 
transient features of "mood," while the other two global 
measures may assess the more enduring features of "affect." 
Such an assumption was supported by the fact that the 
Depression Adjective Check List was the most heavily weighted 
global measure in the significant main effect for measurement 
occasion (produced by the multivariate analysis of variance). 
If the Depression Adjective Check List is a more sensitive 
measure than the other two global measures of depression, 
then it may have reflected subtle changes in mood produced 
by self-monitoring. 
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Even when the global measures of depression are assumed 
to reflect somewhat different features of depression, the 
therapeutic effect of self-monitoring dysfunctional thoughts 
remains, at best, weak and inconsistent in this study. Self-
monitoring of dysfunctional thoughts may not consistently 
reduce dysfunctional thoughts and correlated global measures 
of depression unless subjects can replace the dysfunctional 
thoughts with more adaptive ones. In this study, subjects 
self-monitored dysfunctional thoughts for two weeks before 
they were taught skills that might be used to increase the 
frequency of more adaptive thoughts. 
It is also noteworthy that since dysfunctional thoughts 
were the "starting point" in this treatment, subjects were 
not praised during sessions for reporting decreases in 
dysfunctional thoughts. That is, in implementing Beck's 
treatment, the therapist made the assumption that, if depres-
sives did not report dysfunctional thoughts, they were 
not using the recommended procedures (rather than assuming 
that they had no or few dysfunctional thoughts). Therefore, 
during the treatment sessions associated with self-monitoring, 
subjects were "encouraged" to report dysfunctional thoughts. 
Such "encouragement" may have minimized the chance that 
self-monitoring of dysfunctional thoughts would decrease 
their frequency or decrease correlated measures of depression. 
Components B and C. Analyses of all the global measures 
of depression supported the prediction that scores on these 
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measures would be more adaptive after exposure to logical analy­
sis or hypothesis testing than before treatment. In comparing 
this study to past research, it is evident that one of the 
contributions of the present study was that the procedures used 
within each treatment component were described in detail 
(see Appendix G) and could be discriminated by a naive judge 
(see section on Different Therapeutic Components). In 
contrast, many studies have used labels like "cognitive," 
"behavioral," or "combined" which leave the reader wondering 
what specific procedures were actually used. 
The procedures used here were taken directly from Beck's 
treatment package, which is a "combined" approach. Even 
when the therapeutic components were separated from the 
package, Beck's rationale continued to be used. For 
example, when subjects scheduled pleasant events (a procedure 
used by Lewinsohn and called "behavioral"), the activity 
scheduling was presented as a procedure useful in testing 
hypotheses regarding their "ability to have fun." This 
rationale is not the rationale that Lewinsohn typically 
uses. Although there were subtle differences, and possible 
important differences, it is useful to assume that the 
procedures used in logical analysis most closely matched 
what is often labeled "cognitive" treatment of depression and 
that the procedures used in hypothesis testing most closely 
matched what is often labeled "behavioral" treatment of 
depression. Such an assumption allows comparisons between 
this research and past studies. The finding here that 
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scores on global measures showed significantly less depres­
sion after subjects were exposed to logical analysis or 
hypothesis testing than did the scores collected before 
treatment paralleled the demonstrated superiority of both 
cognitive therapy and behavioral therapy over a waiting list 
control in treatment depression (Taylor & Marshall, 1977). 
Differential Effectiveness of 
Therapeutic Components 
Component A versus Components B or C. The finding that 
logical analysis and hypothesis testing significantly reduced 
depression, according to all the global measures, more than 
self-monitoring had been predicted. This prediction was 
based on the reasoning that self-rtionitoring has been used 
typically for assessment (rather than foy treatment) because 
the therapeutic effects of self-monitoring are transitory 
(Lipinski & Nelson, 1974). By process of elimination, it 
was assumed that logical analysis and hypothesis testing 
were likely to be the components within Beck's package 
producing the greatest amount of change. The preceding re­
sults add to the outcome literature on depression since they 
compare the therapeutic effect of self-monitoring to 
logical analysis and hypothesis testing. 
Component B versus Component C. The results did not 
support the predicted superiority of hypothesis testing 
over logical analysis in reducing global measures of 
depression. This prediction was based on the assumption 
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that hypothesis testing would have a "broad" effect (i.e., 
would influence all the specific measures) and that logical 
analysis would have a "narrow" effect (i.e., would influence 
only the measures of dysfunctional thoughts). In other words, it 
was assumed that hypothesis testing would reduce the global meas­
ures more (when compared to pretreatment) than logical analysis 
because it targeted more of the relevant response classes. 
Instead, the multivariate analyses on all global measures 
of depression, and the univariate analyses on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale and the 
Depression Adjective Check List did not show any significant 
differences, when the scores collected after hypothesis 
testing were compared to those collected after logical 
analysis. Although the multivariate analyses did not show 
significant differences between levels of depression after 
subjects received Component B or C, the component presented 
last within each sequence tended to produce the most 
adaptive changes (see Figure 1). Analyses of the Beck 
Depression Inventory showed that the component presented 
last reduced depression most (see Figure 2). The analyses 
of the Beck Depression Inventory showed that after subjects 
were exposed to logical analysis, the combination of self-
monitoring, logical analysis, and hypothesis testing was 
more effective than only self-monitoring plus logical analysis. 
The multivariate analyses of global measures produced similar 
results, suggesting that.after hypothesis testing, the 
combination of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and 
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hypothesis testing was more effective than only self-monitoring 
and logical analysis. 
One explanation of these results is that the closer 
subjects come to the end of a treatment program, the more 
likely they are to endorse adaptive items. Because the 
pattern of results found here is consistent with past find­
ings, this interpretation is not favored. That is, the 
preceding pattern of results is consistent with the varied 
results reported in the treatment of depression. These 
varied results have included: the effects of "cognitive" 
treatment equal those of "behavioral" treatment (Wilson, 1983), 
the effects of "cognitive" treatment exceed those of "behavioral" 
treatment (Shaw, 1977); the effects of "behavioral" treatment 
exceed those of "cognitive" treatment (Besyner, 1979) -
the combination of cognitive and behavioral treatment exceed 
the effects of either treatment alone (Taylor & Marshall, 
1977); and the effects of all of the above treatments exceed 
those of no treatment (see dissertation section entitled 
"Overall Effectiveness"; and Blaney, 1977; Hollon & Beck, 
1979; Rehm & Kornblith, 1979). 
In the present study, not every analysis of every global 
measure showed that the combination of components was more 
effective than either self-monitoring plus logical analysis 
or self-monitoring plus hypothesis testing. It is noteworthy 
that the superiority of the combination may reflect the 
superiority of the component received last. In speculating on 
the mechanisms through which logical analysis and hypothesis 
140 
testing influenced the global measures of depression, it is 
useful to examine exactly which response classes relevant 
to depression were influenced by each therapeutic component. . 
The Influence of Each Therapeutic Component on 
Specific Measures of Response Classes 
Relevant to Depression 
It was predicted that all of the therapeutic components 
in this investigation would positively influence the measures 
of dysfunctional thoughts, as all components were believed 
to target this response class. It was predicted that the 
influence of logical analysis and hypothesis testing on 
dysfunctional thoughts would be equal and that the influence 
of both of these components on dysfunctional thoughts would 
exceed that of self-monitoring. These predictions were 
based on the assumption that logical analysis and hypothesis 
testing were both more powerful treatments than self-monitoring. 
(Again, the therapeutic effects of self-monitoring are often 
short-lived.) 
In addition, it was predicted that therapeutic effects 
in the areas of pleasant events and interpersonal relationships 
would be seen only after subjects were exposed to hypothesis 
testing. This prediction was based on the assumption that 
only hypothesis testing directly targeted these two response 
classes. Because the results obtained were very different 
from the predictions, each component will be examined in 
terms of its influence on each specific measure, and then 
the components will be compared in terms of their differential 
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effectiveness for each specific measure. Interpretations 
follow brief comparisons between the results and predictions. 
Overall Effectiveness 
Cognitive-behavioral therapy as a package. The present 
findings supported the conclusion that cognitive-behavioral 
therapy as a package positively influenced all the specific 
measures of responses classes relevant to depression (e.g., 
dysfunctional thoughts, pleasant events, and interpersonal 
relationships). That is, scores on every dependent measure 
collected after subjects were exposed to all therapeutic 
components were significantly more adaptive than scores col­
lected before treatment began. This finding may be important, 
since past treatment studies have rarely measured the 
specific responses which covary with depression. 
Anecdotal data suggested that the treatment package 
(Components A, B, and C) was effective in increasing the . 
frequency and the enjoyment of pleasant events and was 
effective in improving the quality of interpersonal events. 
Without any organization on the part of the principal 
investigator, at least 4 out of the 6 therapy groups 
arranged social events for their therapy group after the 
study ended (e.g., going to lunch together, meeting at a 
bar, convening for a cook-out and pool party). These social 
events were notable, considering the social withdrawal 
and reduction in activity level typical of depressed 
individuals. 
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Component A. The multivariate analyses of the combined 
and weighted specific measures and the univariate analyses 
of the frequency and belief scores from the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire, and of the Pleasant Events Schedule--Mood-
Related Subscale suggested that self-monitoring had no 
therapeutic effect. Only the analyses of the Interpersonal 
Event Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale showed that the 
scores after self-monitoring were more adaptive than the 
scores before treatment began. Such results were in contrast 
to the prediction that self-monitoring would have a therapeutic 
effect only on dysfunctional thoughts. 
It has been argued previously here that self-monitoring 
may not have positively influenced dysfunctional thoughts 
because subjects were "encouraged" to report dysfunctional 
thoughts. 
It is possible that the improvement in interpersonal 
events, after exposure to self-monitoring, reflected the 
"care" given by significant others to the client once they 
learned that the client was "in treatment." In other words, 
since self-monitoring was the initial treatment component 
and since its effect was typically weak, the author is 
reluctant to conclude that self-monitoring of dysfunctional 
thoughts positively influenced interpersonal relationships. 
Instead, it is possible that this result was the product of 
a "third variable" or of the many statistical analyses. 
Components B and C. All multivariate and univariate 
analyses of the specific measures of response classes relevant 
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to depression suggested that logical analysis and hypothesis 
testing significantly "improved" (in comparison to pre-treat-
ment) not only measures of dysfunctional thoughts, but also 
measures of pleasant events and interpersonal relationships. 
These results were in contrast to the predicted exclusive 
effect of hypothesis testing on pleasant events and interper­
sonal relationships. Yet, the results supported the prediction 
'that both logical analysis and hypothesis testing would 
positively influence dysfunctional thoughts. These results 
are interpreted in a section which follows. 
Differential Effectiveness of 
Therapeutic Components 
Component A versus Components B or C. The therapeutic 
effectiveness of logical analysis and of hypothesis testing 
exceeded that of self-monitoring, according to both multi­
variate and univariate analyses of the specific measures. 
For the measure of dysfunctional thoughts, it was predicted 
that the effects of logical analyses and hypothesis testing 
would exceed those of self-monitoring because the effective­
ness of self-monitoring is short-lived. The superiority of 
logical analysis and hypothesis testing over self-monitoring 
on the subscale of the Pleasant Events Schedule and the 
Interpersonal Events Schedule was not predicted since 
Components B and C were not expected to influence these 
measures. However, given the short-lived effects of self-
monitoring and the effectiveness of logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing demonstrated here, it is not surprising 
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that the effects of self-monitoring were weaker. 
Component B versus Component C. Analyses of the belief 
scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, the 
Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale, and the 
Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale 
suggested that logical analysis produced more adaptive changes 
than hypothesis testing. Analyses of the frequency scores 
from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire suggested that 
the superior effects of logical analysis occurred only when 
logical analysis followed hypothesis testing (i.e., for 
sequence ACB). Generally, the component received last 
reduced the frequency of dysfunctional thoughts most (see 
Figure 4). In addition, logical analysis was more effective 
when used in combination with both self-monitoring and 
hypothesis testing than when used only with self-monitoring. 
Similarly, hypothesis testing more effectively reduced 
dysfunctional thoughts when used in combination with both 
self-monitoring and logical analysis than when used only 
with self-monitoring. 
The preceding pattern of results raised the following 
questions: Why did logical analysis influence pleasant 
events or interpersonal events at all? Why was logical 
analysis more effective than hypothesis testing in producing 
adaptive change in credence in dysfunctional thoughts, 
pleasant events, and interpersonal relationships? Why might 
the combination of components be more effective than their 
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subsets in reducing the frequency of dysfunctional thoughts? 
The mechanisms through which logical analysis influenced 
belief in dysfunctional thoughts, pleasant events, and 
interpersonal relationships could also be the mechanisms 
through which logical analysis influenced pleasant events 
and interpersonal relationships at all. Three possibilities 
will be offered here. 
Three possible explanations are offered for the first 
two questions. First, it is possible that the finding that 
logical analysis influenced dysfunctional thoughts, pleasant 
events, and interpersonal relationships may result from an 
interaction between the response mode assessed and the 
response mode treated. Generally, it may be that therapeutic 
changes are most likely to be noted when the response mode 
treated matches the response mode assessed. In particular, 
logical analysis directly targeted the verbal response mode 
(i.e., what people "said"), and only questionnaires were used 
as dependent measures. It is possible that because people 
were taught to replace their dysfunctional verbal responses, 
their responses to questionnaires changed without any 
corresponding, significant change in overt motor responses 
(outside the assessment setting). For example, consider 
the item, "having a frank and open conversation," from the 
Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale. Assuming 
that the frequency of frank and open conversations was constant 
across phases of treatment, it is possible that only what 
the subject reports changed across phases. Specifically, 
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after being exposed to logical analysis, the subjects may 
have re-evaluated their conversations and noticed at least 
some instances of "frankness and openness" which were ignored 
before treatment. 
Logical analysis may have produced greater changes on 
the questionnaires (i.e., ATQ-belief scores and the subscale 
of the PES and IES) than hypothesis testing because logical 
analysis directly targeted the verbal response mode. Hypothe­
sis testing, on the other hand, may target a wider range of 
behavior (i.e., what people actually do), not all of which 
match the response mode assessed here by questionnaires. 
These changes produced by hypothesis testing may not have 
been strongly reflected since only the verbal mode of respond­
ing was assessed. Changes in dysfunctional thoughts produced 
by hypothesis testing may not have been reflected as strongly 
as those produced by hypothesis testing since the mode of 
assessment does not match the response mode which hypothesis 
testing is most likely to influence. In order to assess 
(a) whether logical analysis influences verbal categories 
of behavior without concomitant change in overt behavior 
and (b) whether hypothesis testing produces changes in overt 
behavior not reflected by questionnaires, investigators 
would need to include direct observation of relevant, overt 
behavior. 
Even if the therapeutic effects and the superior effects 
of logical analysis were "only" a product of changing "what 
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depressives say," the finding remains important. What 
depressives report is central to a diagnosis of de­
pression; therefore, a therapeutic component which changes 
verbal responses is important. For example, if an individual 
does not report dysphoria or loss of interest or pleasure, 
but reports other symptoms of depression (e.g., somatic 
concerns), then he or she will not meet the criteria for a 
depressive diagnosis. Therefore, a finding that logical 
analysis "only" changes verbal responses without changing 
motoric responses would be important both practically and 
conceptually. The finding would be important practically 
since characteristic verbal responses are central in 
diagnosing and therefore in treating depression. The 
finding would be important conceptually since it would 
indicate that logical analysis only influences self-report. 
A second possibility is that the differential effective­
ness of logical analysis over hypothesis testing was not an 
artifact of assessing only the verbal response mode, but 
instead logical analysis actually improved the behavior 
in question (i.e., dysfunctional thoughts, engaging in 
pleasant events, and relating to others) more than hypothesis 
testing. In changing covert responses, overt responses 
may also change. Such a statement does not attribute 
causality to cognitions, but instead simply reflects the 
possibility that changes in thinking can occur simultaneously 
with changes in overt behavior and reflects the possibility 
that cognitions and overt behavior can occur in a chain. 
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In the study, teaching depressives to re-evaluate and 
to replace their dysfunctional thoughts decreased their 
belief in dysfunctional thoughts, increased their frequency 
and enjoyment of pleasant events, and improved their inter­
personal relationship more than teaching people to test 
their dysfunctional thoughts. It is possible that adaptive 
thoughts are antecedent to engaging in pleasant events or 
improving the relationship. For instance, although think­
ing, "I'll have fun at the party" may not actually produce 
the enjoyment, the thought may be one stimulus involved in 
setting the conditions for attendance. The natural environ­
mental contingencies (i.e., what happens at the party) may 
determine whether future party attendance ultimately increases 
or decreases; however, cognitive responses may serve as 
important discriminative stimuli. 
In other words, teaching depressives to re-evaluate and 
to replace their dysfunctional thoughts may increase the 
chance that depressives behave in ways that change their 
environment more than hypothesis testing does. Adaptive 
changes in depressives' behavior are noteworthy since as 
Coyne (1982, p. 10) noted: "Much of the persistance of 
depression may be the result of persons being in depressing 
situations that are in part maintained by their ineffective 
behavior." 
The superiority of logical analysis over hypothesis 
testing in producing adaptive behavior may reflect a third 
possibility, that subjects were more likely to comply 
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with the strategies suggested in Component B than Component 
C. Assuming that dysfunctional thoughts occur at a high 
frequency, it is much simpler to re-evaluate the thoughts 
than to design experimental strategies to test the thoughts. 
From the depressed subjects' perspective, logical analysis 
may simply represent a more practical approach to the problem. 
If logical analysis sets the conditions for putting the 
' depressive in touch with natural contingencies from which 
they may have withdrawn previously, then re-evaluating 
dysfunctional thoughts could in fact lead to changes in 
overt behavior. These hypotheses could be assessed by 
(a) assessing subjects' compliance with homework assigned 
during logical analysis compared to hypothesis testing, and 
(b) assessing whether dysfunctional thoughts are correlated 
with the lack of increases in adaptive overt behaviors and 
assessing whether adaptive thoughts are correlated with 
corresponding adaptive changes in overt behavior. 
In considering the process through which the combina­
tion of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and hypothesis 
testing exceeded the effectiveness of self-monitoring plus 
logical analysis (according to the Beck Depression Inventory 
and Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency Scores) or 
the effectiveness of self-monitoring plus hypothesis testing 
(according to the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency 
Scores and multivariate analyses of the global measures), 
the following possibilities exist. The superiority of the 
combination of Components A, B, and C over only Components A 
150 
plus B may reflect this process. If exposure to Component 
B (logical analysis) sets the conditions for the depressives 
to perform adaptive behavior, then it may be that exposure 
to hypothesis testing teaches the depressives what steps 
to perform. Obviously, the individuals will be better off 
if they know what steps to perform (a result of hypothesis 
testing) and are likely to perform the steps (a result of 
hypothesis testing). 
The superiority of the combination of Components A, B, 
and C over only Components A plus C may reflect instances in 
which the individual's attempts to solve problems are 
initially unsuccessful. The combination of learning to 
re-evaluate dysfunctional thoughts or to test the validity 
of dysfunctional thoughts may increase the chance that 
depressives continue to work on resolvable problems (even 
in the face of thwarted initial attempts at solutions) and 
to adjust to unfortunate circumstances (when repeated 
attempts at solutions fail). The combination of these two 
skills appeared to decrease subjects' reports of depression 
and dysfunctional thoughts more than their subjects. 
The Attempt to Predict Treatment Outcome 
from Subject Classification 
The third set of predictions involved' the necessity of 
matching treatment to identified response classes within 
depression. In this section, predictions and results are 
compared briefly, and interpretations follow. It was argued 
that matches between treatment and assessment are essential if 
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the treatment is to have a discrete, specific effect. However, 
if the treatment influences several response classes simul­
taneously, matches between treatment and the identified 
response class(es) may be less essential. It was argued 
that assessment strategies show "treatment validity" when 
they contribute to treatment effectivenss. That is, assess­
ment shows treatment validity when the results of assess­
ment add to the treatment effect more than what would have 
occurred in the absence of assessment. 
It was predicted that classifying subjects into two 
subtypes (those with a high and a low frequency of dysfunc­
tional thoughts) would predict subjects' responsiveness to 
the various therapeutic components. It.was predicted that 
dividing subjects into these two subtypes would show treat­
ment validity if one subtype responded to a component more 
than the other. These distinctions could then be used to 
enhance the effects of any other effective treatment by 
matching the appropriate subtype to the component that 
produced the most change in that subject's problem area 
(dysfunctional thoughts, in this study).. 
In particular, it was predicted that, following 
treatment, subjects with an initial high frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts ("highs") would report less depression 
(on the global measures of depression) and would report and 
believe fewer dysfunctional thoughts than subjects with an 
initial low frequency of dysfunctional thoughts ("lows"). 
This prediction was based on the assumption that these 
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components targeted dysfunctional thoughts and thus were 
used best with depressives with severe problems in this 
area. For both subtypes, it was predicted that exposure to 
hypothesis testing would be followed by fewer reports of 
depression on the global measures than exposure to logical 
analysis. This prediction was based on the predicted "broad" 
influence of hypothesis testing and the assumption that this 
influence would be reflected on the global measures. For 
both subtypes, it was predicted that logical analysis and 
hypothesis testing would be equal in their influence on the 
frequency and credence of dysfunctional thoughts. This 
prediction was based on the assumption that both components 
targeted and influenced dysfunctional thoughts. 
Neither the multivariate nor the univariate analyses 
of variance on any of the dependent measures supported the 
prediction that classifying subjects into two subtypes, 
according to their initial frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire, predicted subjects' responsiveness 
to the various therapeutic components. These null results 
occurred even though the independent variable subtype 
appeared to have been adequately manipulated. That is, the 
univariate analysis of variance on the specific measures of 
response classes relevant to depression suggested that the 
high subtypes' scores were significantly worse than the 
low subtypes' scores. Still, this dimension of severity 
did not predict subjects' responsiveness to the therapeutic 
components. 
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The initial prorated frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire may not have predicted responsiveness 
to the components for two reasons. First, it may be that 
in order for behavioral assessment to show treatment validity, 
distinctions must be made across different responses classes 
rather than within the same response class. For example, 
in the present study the "severity" of dysfunctional thoughts 
(a "within" response class comparison) did not predict 
responsivenss to components. Yet, in the McKnight et al. 
study, matching the depressives1 treatment to their identi­
fied problem area (cognitive, interpersonal, or cognitive 
plus interpersonal) (a "between" response class comparison) 
did affect subjects* responsiveness to treatment. In other 
words, if a treatment has a strong effect and the individual 
has some problem in the area influenced by the treatment, 
then there is a match between what is needed and what is 
provided. The severity of the individual's problem may 
be somewhat irrelevant. The severity of the treated 
response class compared to untreated response classes, how­
ever, may be very important. For example, take an individual 
who has severe problems in interpersonal relationships but 
only limited problems in dysfunctional thoughts. Suppose 
the selected treatment influences only dysfunctional thoughts. 
Assessment which compared responses classes would suggest that 
interpersonal relationships needed treatment more than dys­
functional thoughts and would suggest that a treatment target­
ing this area should be selected. This match between problem 
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areas and treament may be critical only when assessment 
comparisons are made "across" response classes. 
In the present study, subject classification may have 
been more likely to predict responsivenss to treatment com­
ponents if comparisons had been made across response classes 
(e.g., if subjects with a high frequency of dysfunctional 
thoughts were compared to subjects with a low frequency of 
pleasant events). A disadvantage of this research approach 
is that it requires a large pool of depressive subjects; 
many subjects may be screened who do not have the 
combination of response classes being examined in a given 
treatment validity study. 
The second reason that the severity of dysfunctional 
thoughts may not have predicted responsiveness to components 
follows. It could be argued that cognitive-behavioral 
treatment would have "helped" any depressive regardless of 
the initial problem. Support for this argument comes 
from the fact that the subjects' scores on every measure 
(not just on measures of dysfunctional thoughts) were more 
adaptive after treatment than before. At least one argument 
counters the reasoning the cognitive-behavioral' therapy will 
"help anyone," however. 
That argument is the fact that seven subjects were 
diagnosed as depressed at the end of the study, and many 
scores at the end of the study continued to fall outside 
the normal range (see Table 1). In short, there were 
differences in the subjects' responsiveness to treatment, 
even though this study did not select the crucial variable 
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which predicts these differences. In other words, although 
the initial prorated frequency scores on the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire did not predict subjects' responsive­
ness to each component, differences in responses to treatment 
existed within the sample. These differences may be the 
product of difference between subjects in their compliance 
with the suggested strategies or differences in matches 
between subjects' problems and the problems that cognitive-
behavioral therapy is the most likely to influence. 
Conclusion 
This study complements previous research by demonstrat­
ing that after exposure to cognitive-behavioral therapy, non-
bipolar depressives report fewer depressive symptoms than 
before treatment. The study contributed to the existing 
body of literature by demonstrating that cognitive-behavioral 
therapy also reduced depressives' frequency and credence of 
dysfunctional thoughts, increased their frequency of pleasant 
events, and improved their interpersonal relationships, accord­
ing to self-report. These findings are important, inasmuch 
as Beck has argued that cognitive-behavioral therapy ameliorates 
depression by changing dysfunctional thoughts. Although 
Beck's treatment affected both depression and numerous re­
sponse: classes, it cannot be concluded that these response 
classes cause depression. Nonetheless, changes in specific 
response classes are noteworthy, both conceptually and practically. 
. When the therapeutic components within cognitive-
behavioral therapy were compared, exposure to logical 
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analysis or hypothesis testing resulted in more adaptive 
scores (on all measures) than exposure to self-monitoring 
or than scores collected before treatment began. It appears 
that the component logical analysis was more effective in 
reducing the credence of dysfunctional thoughts, in increas­
ing the frequency and enjoyment of pleasant events, and in 
enhancing interpersonal events than hypothesis testing. On 
the Beck Depression Inventory and the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire—Frequency Scores, it appeared that the com­
bination of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and hypothesis 
testing was more effective than self-monitoring plus 
logical analysis (for both measures), or than self-monitoring 
plus hypothesis testing (for the Automatic Thoughts Question­
naire—Frequency Scores). These results may suggest that the 
combination of self-monitoring, logical analysis, and 
hypothesis testing is more effective than its subsets. This 
conclusion must be viewed as tentative, however, because the 
therapeutic component received last often resulted in the 
greater change. 
Although subjects in this study were divided into two 
distinct subtypes, those with high and low frequencies of 
dysfunctional thoughts, this distinction did not predict 
subjects' responsiveness to treatment. However, differences 
in subjects' responsiveness to treatment were apparent. 
The implications that these results have for clinical 
practice follow. Until more research is done, it is likely 
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that cognitive-behavioral therapy is more effective when it 
is used as a unit rather than divided into components. 
Similarly, this study showed that cognitive-behavioral 
therapy can be successfully implemented in a group setting. 
One of the primary weaknesses of this study was the 
reliance on self-report data. As mentioned earlier, future 
research would need to assess overt behavior to demonstrate 
whether these findings are replicable or that they are an 
artifact of questionnaires. Assessment of overt, motoric 
behavior, as well as verbal behavior, might provide clues 
to the relationship between these two types of responses 
when depression is being treated. 
The present findings must be interpreted with some 
caution, in that the division of Beck's treatment into 
Components A, B, and C was based on the author's judgment. 
Another researcher might divide the package into different 
units and thus might produce different results. 
In order to understand the mechanisms through which 
treatments for depression, including cognitive-behavioral 
therapy, have their effects, the following areas must be 
assessed: (a) the presenting problem area(s) of a given 
depressed subject/client, (b) the effect of a given treat­
ment on a particular response class, (c) the relationship 
among response classes. Discerning the relationships among 
response-classes would allow one to learn whether response 
classes within the depressive cluster are independent or 
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interdependent. Such information would assist in predicting 
whether changes in one response class would be followed by 
changes within another response class. Attention to the 
proceeding issues would advance not only the assessment and 
treatment of depressive disorders, but also the understand­
ing of depressive disorders. 
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Footnotes 
-'-In an attempt to clarify the results, two additional 
analyses were performed. The first analysis was performed 
on a 2 (sequences) X 3 (measurement occasions) experimental 
design. In this design, the first three chronological 
measurement occasions comprised the within subjects factor 
(Before A, After A, and After B for Sequence ABC; and 
Before A, After A, and After C for Sequence ACB). The 
second analysis was performed on the sequences at the third 
chronological measurement occasion only (B versus C for ACB 
and ABC, respectively). Using either design, there were no 
significant differences between Components B and C on any 
dependent measures (in contrast to the results of other 
analyses reported in the text). These nonsignificant results 
may have occurred because the n had been halved. In the 
comparisons reported in the text, n = 37, whereas in the 
analyses reported in this footnote, the n per condition 
was either 17 or 20, depending on sequence. A second reason 
for the loss of significant results in the analyses reported 
in the text was that approximately half of the subjects had 
received both Component B and C at each comparison point. 
For example, "After B" 20 subjects (in Sequence ACB) re­
ceived A, B, C, and the other 17 subjects (in Sequence ABC) 
had received only A and B. 
^In order to assess whether there were differences among 
the six therapy groups, means (for each therapy group) from 
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the Depression Adjective Check List at five occasions were 
inspected. The scores at the five measurement occasions 
included raw scores collected at the beginning of the first 
treatment session, three means from the scores collected 
at the beginning of the four sessions corresponding to 
Components A, B, and C, and raw scores, collected at the. 
debriefing session. Scores from the Depression Adjective 
Check List were selected for inspection because it was 
weighted most in the main effect for measurement occasion 
within the multivariate analysis of variance on the global 
measures and because it was collected at each session. 
Inspection of the means for each therapy group at the 
occasions outlined above showed that the differences among 
therapy groups were very small, especially after subjects 
were exposed to Components B and C. A typical analysis of 
variance was not performed on the therapy group means at 
each occasion because there were only six therapy groups. 
Thus, the probability of obtaining differences was low 
because of the small n. 
•^Neither a multivariate analysis of covariance on the 
global measures of depression or a univariate analysis of 
covariance on the Beck Depression Inventory was pursued 
because the covariate adjustments equal zero for the within 
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APPENDIX E-l 
SADS Interview Outline: Shortened Version 
Dysphoria 
How is it going? (Work, school, home life) 
Feeling good or bad about it? 
Worried? 
Feeling under pressure? From where? 
j 
If things are bad, what are the prospects for improvement in the 
immediate or distant future? • 
Major happenings during the past year: best? worst? 
Goals for the future? Expectations for attainment? 
Self-description: good points? bad points? 
Aspects Gf self that would be desirable to change? 
Mood: ups and downs? How severe and long-lasting are the downs? 
Any highs? 
Any thoughts or ideas about suicide? Previous attempts? Plans? 
-Reduced Rate of Behavior 
Describe typical day. 
Interests and activities that are enjoyable? 
Any change from previous level of activity or enjoyment? 
Difficulty in initiating action? 
Having to exert a lot of effort to do things? 
Problems making decisions? 
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Social-Interactional Problems 
How involved with other people? 
Number of close friends? Acquaintances? 
Ability to share with friends? 
Are relationships a source of discomfort, anxiety, and/or conflict? 
Feelings of social adequacy/inadequacy? 
Guilt 
Religious background; importance of religion at present? 
Concern for welfare of family and friends? 
Blame self for present condition? 
Perceive self as failure in important responsibilities? 
Material Burden 
Depression attributed to external problems (e.g., finances, children, 
demands of relatives or employers)? 
If external problem could be resolved, would that affect the depression? 
Somatic Manifestations (not attributable to physical condition) 
Feeling slow? Tired all the time? Without energy? 
Problems sleeping? Difficulty in falling asleep? Waking frequently 
during the night? Sleep not restful? Problems with waking 
early in the morning and not being able to get back to sleep? 
Sleeping more than usual? 





Have you ever had any unusual experiences, like hearing 
voices which others did not hear or feeling that 
something was controlling your actions? 
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APPENDIX E-2 
Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder 
A. One or more distinct periods with dysphoric mood or per­
vasive loss of interest or pleasure. The disturbance 
is characterized by symptoms such as the following: 
depressed, sad, blue, hopeless, low, down in the dumps, 
"don't care any more," or irritable. The disturbance 
must be prominent and relatively persistent but not 
necessarily the most dominant symptom. It does not 
include momentary shifts from one dysphoric mood to 
another dysphoric mood, e.g., anxiety to depression 
to anger, such as are seen in states of acute psychotic 
turmoil. 
B. At least five of the following symptoms are required to 
have appeared as part of the episode for definite and 
four for probable (for past episodes, because of memory 
difficulty, one less symptom is required). 
1. Poor appetite or weight loss or increased appetite 
or weight gain (change of 0.5 kg a week over several 
weeks or 4.5 kg a year when dieting). 
2. Sleep difficulty or sleeping too much. 
3. Loss of energy, fatigability, or tiredness. 
4. Psychomotor agitation or retardation (but not mere 
subjective feeling of restlessness or being slowed 
down). 
5. Loss of interest or pleasure in usual activities, 
including social contact or sex (do not include if 
limited to a period when delusional or hallucinating). 
(The loss may or may not be pervasive.) 
6. Feeling of self-reproach or excessive or inappropriate 
guilt (either may be delusional). 
7. Complaints or evidence of diminished ability to think 
or concentrate, such as slowed thinking, or indecisive-
ness (do not include if associated with marked formal 
thought disorder). 
8. Recurrent thoughts of death or suicide, or any 
suicidal behavior. 
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C. Duration of dysphoric feature's at least one week, begin­
ning with the first noticeable change in the subject's 
usual condition (definite if lasted more than two weeks, 
probable-if one to two weeks). 
D. Sought or was referred for help from someone during the 
dysphoric period, took medication, or had impairment 
in functioning with family, at home, at school, at work, 
or socially. 
E. None of the following that suggest schizophrenia is present: 
1. Delusions of being controlled (or influenced), or of 
thought broadcasting, insertion, or withdrawal (as 
defined in this manual). 
2. Nonaffective hallucinations of any type (as defined in 
this manual) throughout the day for several days or 
intermittently throughout a one-week period. 
3. Auditory hallucinations in which either a voice keeps 
up a running commentary on the subject's behaviors 
or thoughts as they occur, or two or more voices 
converse with each other. 
4. At some time during the period of illness had more 
than one month when he exhibited no prominent 
depressive symptoms but had delusions or halluci­
nations (although typical depressive delusions such 
as delusions of guilt, sin, poverty, nihilism, or 
self-deprecation, or hallucinations with similar 
content are not included). 
5. Preoccupation with a delusion or hallucination to 
the relative exclusion of other symptoms or concerns 
(other than typical depressive delusions of guilt, 
sin, poverty, nihilism, self-deprecation or halluci­
nations with similar content). 
6. Definite instances of marked formal thought disorder 
(as defined in this manual), accompanied by either 
blunted or inappropriate affect, delusions or 
hallucinations of any type, or grossly disorganized 
behavior. 
F. Does not meet the criteria for schizophrenia, residual 
subtype. 
From Archives of General Psychiatry, Vol. 35, June 1978 































Descriptive Data on Subjects Completing the Project 
Pre-intervention Pos t-interventlon 
Years 
Sex Age Educated Occupation ATQ-Fb BDIC MMPI-D BDIC MMPI-Dd 
Me 38 13 Salesman 84 31 31 24 34 
Ff 54 12 Housewife 68 23 40 20 39 
F 27 15 Student 123 . 41 46 18 44 
F 19 13 Student 101 26 39 10 25 
M 32 15 Manager 116 20 38 12 28 
M 36 16 Salesman 61 21 41 11 33 
F 51 13 Secretary 63 31 . 34 21 35 
F 20 15 Student 100 21 38 14 30 
F 43 12 Secretary 128 35 40 36 37 
F 32 13 Beautician 78 22 45 15 38 
F 31 13 Clerical Worker 68 22 30 22 33 
F 57 10 Retired 130 41 41 31 36 
M 23 12 Unemployed 94 29 39 16 32 
F 32 18 Housewife 132 43 37 21 38 
F 24 16 Teacher 117 37 35 20 32 
F 49 13 Secretary 87 39 37 23 32 
F 35 17 Clerical Worker 80 27 35 27 30 
F 30 16 Student 100 27 32 23 36 
F 41 18 Student 86 31 37 7 36 
F 36 17 Student 125 42 45 10 26 
F 42 16 Salesperson 139 42 40 43 41 
F 37 14 Salesperson 119 45 43 20 38 
F 42 13 Secretary 87 24 34 21 38 
F 39 14 Secretary/S tudent 133 26 36 10 . 23 
F 43 15 Health Professional 101 28 39 14 37 
M 41 17 Manager 83 27 32 10 25 
F 54 16 Industrial Supervisor 107 24 29 6 23 
Table 1 (cont'd.) 
Pre-intervention Post-intervention 
Subject Group Years 
Number Number3 Sex Age Educated Occupation ATQ-F^ BDIC MMPI-D^ BDIC MMPI-D^ 
28 5 F 34 12 Business Representative 87 41 39 17 33 
29 5 Me 30 14 Unemployed 96 31 33 23 34 
30 5 •F 42 14 Salesperson 126 38 39 22 37 
31 6 M 41 15 Salesman 124 32 34 19 33 
32 6 F 27 16 Photographer 97 38 43 8 25 
33 6 F 41 12 Industrial Supervisor 100 27 36 10 22 
34 6 F 55 13 Housewife 89 31 36 4 25 
35 6 M 36 18 Unemployed 113 26 30 2 21 
36 6 F 26 19 Health Professional 92 44 36 7 24 
37 6 F 29 12 Secretary 125 46 40 37 39 
aGroups 1, 4, and 6 received Sequence ABC, and Groups 2 ,  3 ,  and 5 received Sequences ACB. Each group contained 
subjects with high and low prorated frequency scores on the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire. 
^ATQ-F * prorated frequency scores from the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire collected before Component A. 
CBDI - prorated raw score from Beck Depression Inventory* 
dMMPI-D = prorated raw score from Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale, 
eM = Male 
^F = Female 
Table 2 
Sketch of Experimental Design 
Initial Scores Measurement Occasions5 
on Automatic 
Thoughts Number 0 Number 1 Number 2 Number 3 Number 4 







aFive measurement occasions were used only with dependent variables collected 
during the screening session (i.e., the Beck Depression Inventory and the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale), and with 
the Depression Adjective Check List data (collected at each treatment 
session, but averaged to form five measurement occasions). 
Table 3 
Measurement Occasions 
Component B or Component C or 
Treatment Stage Screening Pre-interventlon Component A Component Ca Component Ba Post-intervention 
Duration of each ; Typically 
Treatment Stage 1 week Hot applicable 2 weeks 2 weeks 2 weeks 1 week 


























used for diagnosis 
Intervals at which After B ora After C ora 
measurement occurs Screening Before A After A After C After B 
aThe therapeutic component subjects received and the measurement occasion analyzed depended on whether subjects were assigned 
to the sequence ABC or ACB. 
bRDC = Research Diagnostic Criteria. 
cThe following dependent measures were included Before A, After A, and After B or C: 
(1) Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
(2) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—Depression Scale (MMPI-D) 
(3) Depression Adjective Check List (DACL) 
(A) Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency and Belief Scores (ATQ-30) 
(5) Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood Related Subscale (PES) 
(6) Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale (IES) 
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Table 4 
Description of the Therapy Groups 
Subtypes 
Low Subtype High Subtype 
Sequence (N = 17) (N = 20) 
ABC (N = 17) Group 12 2 
Group 4 2 4 
Group 6 3 4 
ACB (N = 20) Group 2 2 3 
Group 3 4 3 
Group 5 4 4 
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Table 5 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion: 
(4) Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the 
Global Measures of Depression 
Wilks' 
Lambda df F E 
Subtype .941 3, 31 ' .65 .587 
Sequence .927 3, 31 .81 .496 
Subtype X Sequence .972 3 / 31 .30 .826 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) 
Measurement Occasion .340 9, 236 14.63 .0001**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
O.ccasions .907 9, 236 1.08 .381 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasions .785 9, 236 2.75 .005** 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion .980 9, 236 .22 .990 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) X 
Measurement Occasion 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***E < •°01 
****£ < .0001 
Table 6 
Scheffe Post Hoc Tests: Canonical Means of the 
Global Measures of Depression for Sequence 
and Measurement Occasion 
Sequence ABC 
.455 (After C) .460 (After B) .668 (After A) .829 (Before A) 
.455 (After C) 
.460 (After B) 
.668 (After A) 








.506 (After B) .630 (After C) .851 (After A) .955 (Before A) 
.506 (After B) 
.630 (After C) 
.851 (After A) 










Scheffe Post Hoc Tests: Canonical Means of 
the Global Measures of Depression for 
Measurement Occasion and Sequence 
Before A .829 (ABC) .955 (ACB) 
.829 (ABC) - .126** 
.955 (ACB) - -
After A .668 (ABC) ' .851 (ACB) 
.668 (ABC) .183** 
.851 (ACB) - -
After B .460 (ABC) .506 (ACB) 
.460 (ABC) — .046 
.506 (ACB) - -
After C .455 (ABC) .630 (ACB) 
.455 (ABC) — .175** 
.630 (ACB) * 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Table 8 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement 
Occasion (5) Analysis of Variance for the 
Beck Depression Inventory 
(Including Screening) 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 209.864 .95 
Sequence 1 379.925 1 .72 
Subtype X Sequence 1 30.203 .14 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) 33 221.415 
Measurement Occasion 4 1623.522 53 . 80**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 4 6.552 .22 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 4 112.733 3 .74** 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 4 6.612 .22 
Subject (Subtype X Sequence) 
X Measurement Occasion 132 30.177 
*p < .05 
**P < .01 
***£ < .001 
****p <. .0001 
Table 9 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the Beck 
Depression Inventory for Sequence and Measurement 
Occasion (Including Screening) 
Sequence ABC 
17.000 (After C) 
21.706 (After B) 
27.312 (After A) 
30.882 (Before A) 
34.059 (Screening) 
Sequence ACB 
13.275 (After B) 
18.250 (After C) 
24.700 (After A) 
27.912 (Before A) 
30.000 (Screening) 
17.000 (After C) 21.706 (After B) 27.312 (After A) 30.882 (Before A) 34.059 (Screening) 



















*£ < .05 
* *£ f: • 01 
df .= 132 
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Table 10 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the 
Beck Depression Inventory for Measurement 



































df = 132 
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Table 11 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(5) Analysis of Variance for the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory--
Depression Scale (Including Screening) 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 .000 .0 
Sequence 1 45.424 .41 
Subtype X Sequence 1 15.870 .14 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) 33 110.465 
Measurement Occasion 4 350.546 17.45**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 4 36.580 1.82 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 4 30.227 1.50 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 4 3.968 .20 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 132 20.085 
*£ < .05 
**£ < .01 
***p < .001 
****p < .0001 
Table 12 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory— 
Depression Scale for Measurement Occasion 
(Including Screening) 
31.408 (After B) 32.207 (After C) 37.269 (Screening) 37.276 (After A) 37.482 (Before A) 
31.408 (After B) - .799 5.861** 5.868** 6.074** 
32.207 (After C) - 5.062** 5.069** 5.275** 
37.269 (Screening) - .007 .213 
37.276 (After A) - - - - .206 
37.482 (Before A) - - - -
*£ *. .05 
**£ < .01 
df - 132' 
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Table 13 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Analysis of Variance for the Depression 
Adjective Check List (Included in Packets) 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 127.357 1.63 
Sequence 
• 
1 2.468 .03 
Subtype X Sequence 1 58.867 .75 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) 33 78.039 
Measurement Occasion 3 837.286 40.55**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 3 2.512 .12 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 3 19.460 .94 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 3 5.422 .26 
Subject (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 99 20.649 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
****p < .0001 
Table 14 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Testi Means of the Depression Adjective 
Check List (Included in Packets) for 
Measurement Occasions 
10.486 (After B) 10.892 (After C) 16.541 (After A) 20.405 (Before A) 
10.486 (After B) .406 6.055** 9.919** 
10.892 (After C) - 5.649** 9.513** 
16.541 (After A) - - 3.864** 
20.405 (Before A) - -
*£ < .05 
**E < -01 
df = 99 
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Table 15 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(5) Analysis of Variance for the Depression 
Adjective Check List (Administered 
at Sessions) 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 161.932 2.72 
Sequence 1 .031 .000 
Subtype X Sequence 1 80.329 1.35 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 33 59.501 
Measurement Occasion 4 567.845 46.25**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 4 3.466 .28 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 4 23.163 1.89 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 4 7.882 .64 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 127 12.277 
*p < . 05 
**p < .01 
***P < -001 
****p .0001 
9.562 (Debriefing) 
12.234 (Sessions B) 
12.975 (Sessions C) 
15.975 (Sessions A) 
20.405 (Before A) 
*£ ± .05 
**£ < .01 
df - 127 
Table 16 
Newman-KeulB Post Hoc Tests: Scores and Means of the 
Depression Adjective Check List (Included at all 
Sessions) for Measurement Occasions 
9.562 (Debriefing) 12.234 (Sessions B) 12.975 (Sessions C) 15.975 (Sessions A) 20.405 (Before A) 
2.672** 3.413** 6.413** 10.843** 
.741 3.741** 8.171** 
- - 3.000** 7.43** 
- - 4.43** 
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Table 17 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the 
Specific Measures of Depression 
Source 
Wilks' 
Lambda F Equivalent 
df F P 
Subtype .586 4, 30 5.29 .002** 
Sequence .924 4 , 30 .62 .653 
Subtype X Sequence .892 4, 30 .91 .473 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 
Measurement Occasion .438 12, 254 7.75 . 0001**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion .848 12, 254 1.36 .186 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion .845 12, 254 1.39 .171 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion . 892 12, 254 .94 .508 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement -
*p < .05 
**p <. .01 
***£ < .001 
****£ <. .0001 
Table 18 
Scheffe Post Hoc Tests: Canonical Means of the Specific 
Measures of Response Classes Relevant to 
Depression for Measurement Occasion 
.199 (After B) .264 (After C) .377 (After A) .394 (Before A) 
199 (After B) - .065 .178** .195** 
,264 (After C) - - ' .113* .13** 
,377 (After A) - - - .017 
,39 4 (Before A) - • - -
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Table 19 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Analysis of Variance for the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire—Frequency Scores 
Source df MS_ F 
Subtype 1 25711.006 21.800**** 





Subtype X Sequence 1 409.318 .35 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 33 1179.286 
Measurement Occasion 3 6948.301 27 .38**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 3 147.567 .58 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 3 982.214 3.87** 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 3 77.551 .31 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 99 253.768 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p <L .001 
****p < .0001 
Table 20 
•Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire Frequency Scores 
for Sequence and Measurement Occasion 
.Sequence ABC 
76.000 (After C) 82.882 (After B) 102.910 (After A) 103.817 (Before A) 
76.000 (After C) 
82.882 (After B) 
102.817 (Before A) 
103.817 (Before A) 
6 . 8 8 2  26.91** 





67.850 (After B) 86.150 (After C) 100.156 (After A) 100.739 (Before A) 
67.850 (After B) 
86.150 (After C) 
100.156 (After A) 






*£ < .05 
**£ < .01 
df = 99 
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Table 21 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire Frequency Scores 
for Measurement Occasions and Sequence 
Before A 



























*p < .05 
**P < .01 
df = 99 
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Table 22 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Analysis of Variance for the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire—Belief Scores 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 22472.823 15.32*** 
Sequence 1 300.849 .21 
Subtype X Sequence 1 275.728 .19 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 33 1466.767 
Measurement Occasion 3 6457.480 26.20**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 3 29.935 .12 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 3 362.143 1.47 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 3 200.239 .81 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 99 246.504 
*£ < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
****p < .0001 
Table 23 
Newman-Keula Post Hoc Tests: Prorated Means of the 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire--Belief Scores 
for Measurement Occasions 
74.231 (After B) 83.809 (After C) 100.401 (Before A) 101.450 (After A) 
74.231 (After B) - 9.578** 26.170** 27.219** 
83.809 (After C) - 16.592** 17.641** 
100.401 (Before A) - - 1.049 
100.450 (After A) -
*£ < .05 
**£ < .01 
df = 99 
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Table 24 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Analysis of Variance for the Pleasant Events 
Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 4.397 3.75 
Sequence 1 1.462 1.25 
Subtype X Sequence 1 1.990 1.70 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 33 1.173 
Measurement Occasion 3 1.873 13.33**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 3 .185 1.32 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 3 .335 2.39 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 3 .178 1.27 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 99 .140 
*jo < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
****p < .0001 
Table 25 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Average Cross-Product 
of the Pleasant Events Schedule—Mood-Related Subscale 
for Measurement Occasions 
1.850 (After B) 1.664 (After C) 1.432 (After A) 1.332 (Before i 
1.850 (After B) - .186* .418** .518** 
1.664 (After C) - - .232** .332** 
1.432 (After A) - - - .100 
1.332 (Before A) - - - -
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Table 26 
Subtype (2) X Sequence (2) X Measurement Occasion 
(4) Analysis of Variance for the Interpersonal 
Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related Subscale 
Source df MS F 
Subtype 1 2.241 3.19 
Sequence 1 .366 .52 
Subtype X Sequence 1 .122 .17 
Subjects (Subtype 
X Sequence) 33 .703 
Measurement Occasion 3 2.110 17.48**** 
Subtype X Measurement 
Occasion 3 .126 1.04 
Sequence X Measurement 
Occasion 3 .145 1.20 
Subtype X Sequence X 
Measurement Occasion 3 .063 .52 
Subjects (Subtype X 
Sequence) X Measurement 
Occasion 99 .121 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
***p < .001 
****£ < .0001 
Table 27 
Newman-Keuls Post Hoc Tests: Average Cross-Product Means 
of the Interpersonal Events Schedule—Dysphoria-Related 
Subscale for Measurement Occasion 
-.105 (After B) -.284 (After C) -.524 (After A) -.642 (Before 1 
-.105 (After B) - . 179* .419** .537** 
-.284 (After C) - - .240** .358** 
-.524 (After A) - - - .118* 
-.642 (Before A) - - - -
*£ < .05 
**E S -01 
df = 99 
Table 28 

















Minnesota Pleasant Interpersonal 
Multiphasic Automatic Automatic Events Events 
Personality Depression Thoughts Thoughts Schedule— Schedule-
Beck Inventory— Adjective Questionnaire— Questionnaire— Mood- Dysphoria-
Depression Depression Check Frequency Belief Related Related 
Inventory® Scale® List Scores3 Scores® Subscale^ Subscale 
.604 .705 .762 .706 -.484 -.480 
G to Gc G to Gc G to Sd G to Sd G to Sc G to Sd 
.413 .467 .430 -,496 -.369 
G to Gc G to Sd G to Sd G to Sd G to Sd 
.639 .365 -.409 -.376 
G to Sd G to Sd G to Sd G to Sd 
.884 -.565 -.457 
S to Se S to Se S to Se 
-.551 -.376 
S to Se S to Se 
.231 
S to Se 
®Prorated scores 
^Average-cross product scores 
^Global measure of depression and global measure of depression 
Global measure of depression and specific measure relevant to depression 




Component A: Detecting and monitoring dysfunctional thoughts 
All subjects in this study received Component A first. The 
basic purposes of Component A were: (a) to provide the 
subject with a general rationale for and description of 
cognitive-behavioral therapy; (b) to describe the general 
guidelines for participating in the group therapy and 
research project; (c) to teach the subject to detect and 
to self-monitor "dysfunctional thoughts"; and (d) to 
establish rapport among the group members and therapist. 
The major technique used in Component A was self-monitoring. 
Component A included four sessions. Each session lasted 
approximately 120 minutes. 
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Component A: Session 1 
1. As the group members gather, they complete the "assessment 
packet." 
2. Therapist introduces herself and outlines agenda for the 
session. The agenda which is written on the board in­
cludes : 
a. describing the therapy used in the project 
b. reviewing the guidelines for participating in the 
group therapy and research project 
c. giving each client an opportunity to describe the 
problems which were involved in his/her decision to 
participate in the project (i.e. , the problem related 
to depression 
d. learning a skill—detecting and monitoring automatic 
thoughts 
e. preparing to do the assigned homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist gives the following, general rationale for 
and description of cognitive-behavioral therapy: The 
treatment offered in this project is called cognitive-
behavioral therapy. The main idea behind the therapy 
is that what people think influences the way they feel 
and the way they behave. This therapy assumes that as 
depressed people develop, they have learned to take a 
negative view of themselves (e.g., "I'm no good"), of 
the world (e.g., "The world's unfair"), and of the 
future (e.g., "Things won't work out"). This negative 
view includes a set of assumptions that people use when 
they are stressed. These assumptions influence the way 
depressed people deal with world and what they think of 
themselves (e.g., "I can't concentrate," "I'm not good 
at anything," "I can't get along with anybody."). The 
depressive assumption which people make are unique to 
each depressed individual, although common things often 
occur (e.g., a theme of loss). Although depression is 
a serious disorder, research has suggested that cognitive-
behavioral therapy represents an effective approach. 
That is, most depressed people who are selected for this 
treatment begin to feel better by the end of treatment. 
If at the end of the seven weeks we should find that 
the treatment has not been effective in a particular 
case, we will offer referrals for alternative forms of 
treatment. (Allow 10 minutes) 
4. The therapist reviews the following guidelines for par­
ticipating in the group therapy and research project 
and elicits agreement from the group members. 
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a. The therapist mentions issues of confidentiality: 
Members are free to discuss their own goals, prog­
ress, and procedures with anyone they choose. How­
ever, no other member is identified, nor are any 
member's concerns discussed outside the group setting. 
b. The therapist mentions the notion of "setting 
agendas"; The therapist acknowledges the time-limted 
nature of cognitive-behavioral therapy and suggests 
that an "agenda" will be written on the board at 
the beginning of each session in order to facilitate 
the group's coverage of all the material. 
c. The therapist mentions the notion of "going around": 
Essentially the therapist is encouraging participa­
tion from each member in all sessions. When new 
skills are learned or homework is reviewed, each 
member will be given an opportunity to raise one 
of his/her concerns. 
d. The therapist provides a rationale for homework: 
1. Homework is a vital part of therapy, and there 
is some suggestion that homework is instrumental 
in maintaining clients' improvement after 
termination. 
2. Homework allows clients to practice what they 
learn in the session in their every day world. 
3. Homework provides useful data for the sessions. 
Homework helps the therapist review the client's 
weekly activities. During each session homework 
from the previous session will be reviewed by 
"going around." 
e. The therapist asks the group to discuss briefly, the 
preceding points and raise any questions or concerns. 
(Allow 10 minutes) 
The therapist asks each member to introduce himself/ 
herself and give no more than a five minute description 
of the factors which were involved in his/her decision 
to participate in the project (i.e., his/her "presenting 
problems"). (Allow 30 minutes) 
The therapist introduces the concepts "cognition" and 
"automatic thoughts" by stating that treatment will 
begin by learning a new skill (i.e., to detect and to 
self-monitor automatic thoughts). The therapist notes 
that the first four sessions will be spent learning to 
detect and to monitor automatic thoughts. The last 
eight sessions will be spent learning skills to cope 
with automatic thoughts. 
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The therapist defines "cognition"—"either a thought 
or a visual image that you may not be very aware 
of unless you focus your attention on it." In 
depression, these cognitions are called "automatic 
thoughts" and have a negative theme. Some of the 
characteristics of automatic thoughts follow. They 
are: 
1. automatic (they just seem to happen) 
2. based on a low opinion of oneself 
3. unreasonable, inaccurate, and dysfunctional 
although they seem plausible at the time—the 
more one believes them, the more discomfort they 
cause 
4. they are involuntary—one has difficulty turning 
them off. 
The therapist further elaborates the relationship 
between thoughts, feelings, and behavior. 
1. Therapist illustrates relationship be contrast­
ing differences between thoughts and feelings 
when one's at home alone in the evening and hears 
a noise and things, "It's a burglar" vs. "It's 
my spouse." 
2. The therapist asks group to shut eyes and imagine 
an unpleasant scene and note their emotional re­
sponse. Therapist gives some instruction with 
pleasant scene and stresses contrast. 
3. The therapist further illustrates negative 
automatic thoughts by describing Beck's example 
of a client who described her anxieties regarding 
sexual activity and noted her correlated negative 
automatic thoughts about descrigin such anxieties 
(e.g., "The therapist must think. I'm dumb." "He 
probably wishes I wasn't his client." "This isn't 
going to help." 
4. Other examples of negative automatic thoughts 
may be: 
1. "Being depressed means I'm weak." 
2. "I should be able to solve this alone." 
3. "I'll never meet all the requirements of 
the project." 
4. "The other group members may not like me." 
The therapist suggests the following to aid in identi­
fying automatic thoughts: 
1. increases in negative and positive emotions 
2. troublesome situations or life events 
The therapists attempts to elicit automatic thoughts 
from group by asking—would some of you share the 
thoughts you had prior to the group meeting today? 
(Response may include negative automatic thoughts 
which are related to feeling depressed and/or 
coming to group therapy.) (Allow 15 minutes) 
227 
7. Therapist provides rationale for the following homework 
assignment (i.e., self-monitoring automatic thoughts) 
and passes out Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts— 
Form I (one record for each day). 
a. Automatic thoughts are the core of cognitive-behavior 
therapy, so it is important that we identify them. 
The Daily Record of Dysfunction Thoughts—Form I 
will aid in meeting this goal. 
b. This form should be completed every day each time 
your emotions change (i.e., feel happy or sad, calm 
or anxious) or each time you experience dysphoria. 
Ideally the form should be completed when the 
automatic thoughts occur; however, if this is impossi­
ble you need to have a standard time each day (e.g., 
15 minutes after supper) to complete the form. You 
need to make several entries each day since we will 
use these data in the next session. 
c. Therapist explains how to complete all parts of the 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form II by 
referring to sample form she passes out. 
1. A positive or negative change in emotion or a 
depressed mood is a cue to complete the form. 
Therefore, complete the "EMOTION" column first 
(i.e., describe emotion and rate its degree). 
2. Fill in the date. 
3. Complete the "SITUATION" column (i.e., describe 
event and thoughts preceding the emotion). 
4. Complete the "AUTOMATIC THOUGHT(S)" column 
(i.e., describe the negative thoughts that pre­
ceded the emotion and rate its believability). 
d. The therapist answers questions and has the group 
practice several entries. (Allow 10 minutes) 
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Component A: Session 2 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist review each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of 
the task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/ 
she is instructed to make at least three entries rele­
vant to dysphoric mood or a positive or negative change 
in affect). The subjects complete the Depression 
Adjective Check List. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the concepts covered in Session 1 
b. discuss each member's expectation of therapy 
c. review homework from Session 1 
d. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins a discussion of the concepts covered 
in Session 1 by stating: During the last session we 
covered a lot of important material. To make sure that 
we understand each other, I wonder if some group members 
would tell me in their own words what we mean by: 
a. automatic thoughts and cognitions 
b. the importance of automatic thoughts 
c. the focus of and rationale for cognitive-behavioral 
therapy? (See Session 1 for answers.) If miscon­
ceptions occur, the therapist corrects them. (Allow 
10 minutes) 
4. The therapist raises the issue that negative automatic 
thoughts can occur during treatment. "For example, 
negative thoughts may occur in relation to the treatment 
sessions, the therapist, or the homework. If such 
automatic thoughts occur, it is important that you 
record them and bring them and bring them up for us to 
discuss. 
a. The therapist attempts to elicit examples from group. 
b. The therapist provides typical examples taken from 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery et al., 1979, Chapter 14. 
See Handout entitled "Examples of Negative Automatic 
Thoughts Regarding Therapy." 
c. The group discusses negative automatic thoughts con­
cerning therapy from both sources a and b. 
5. The therapist asks each group member to: 
a. describe his/her thoughts regarding the homework 
assignment 
b. detail the negative automatic he/she self-monitored 
(Allow 50 minutes) 
Note: If the client makes any errors completing the 
homework, then the therapist provides feedback. 
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The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form I and passes out blank records. Therapist 
reviews rationale and cues for completion. (Allow 10 
minutes) 
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Component A: Session 3 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/she 
is instructed to make at least three entries relevant 
to dysphoric mood or positive or negative change in 
affect.) The subjects complete the Depression 
Adjective Check List. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. introduction to new concepts—depressive assumptions 
1. what they are 
2. how to identify them 
b. "go around" and review homework 
1. individual identifies themes 
2. group learns how to identify logical errors in 
an effort to identify depressive assumptions 
3. individual identifies assumptions 
c. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist defines, describes, and stresses the im­
portance of depressive assumptions: "Faulty assumptions 
appear to be involved in the likelihood that a person will 
become depressed. It is important that we detect these 
faulty assumptions to decrease the chance that you will 
become depressed in the future. In order to identify 
these depressive assumptions, we will pay particular 
attention to the automatic thoughts which you have re­
corded. Often common "themes" can be identified from 
the automatic thoughts. Yet, every person has his/her 
own set of assumptions which they probably learned during 
childhood from their parents or peers. For example, a 
parent may say to the child, "Be nice or Nancy won't like 
you." After repeating such phrases the child may develop 
a more general rule: "My worth depends on what others 
think of me." Examples of faulty assumptions that 
increase the chance that a person will become depressed 
include (from Beck et al., 1979) : 
a. "In order to be happy, I have to be successful in 
whatever I undertake." 
b. "To be happy, I must be accepted by all people at 
all times." 
c. "If I make a mistake, it means that I am inept." 
d. "I can't live without you." 
e. "If somebody disagrees with me, it means he doesn't 
like me." 
f. "My value as a person depends on what others think 
of me." (Allow 10 minutes) 
4. The therapist introduces aids for identifying depressive 
assumptions: "In identifying depressive assumptions 
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it helps to use the following steps: 
a. monitor automatic thoughts 
b. identify them 
c. infer the primary assumption or rule 
(Therapist provides illustration) For Example, one 
client reported these automatic thoughts. "My work is 
of poor quality. I can't fix the bicycle. I can't cut 
the grass. I can't make a sale. The wallpaper wasn't 
lined up well." 
d. What are the themes? (Performance and perfectionistic 
standards) 
e. What is a possible primary assumption? (My worth 
depends on the quality of my work.) (Allow 5 minutes) 
The therapist introduces the group's exercise. "We will 
use these steps (4a-c) to help you identify your depressive 
assumptions." It is very important for each member to 
think for himself/herself in identifying depressive 
assumptions. Yet, the group can help each member by 
looking for "signals" that as depressive assumptions 
may be occurring or the therapist can help by asking 
questions. Helpful signals include: 
a. the frequent use of global, vague words (e.g., stupid, 
silly, dumb) 
b. "absolute words" (e.g., never, always, should) 
c. "logical errors" or "thinking errors" 
Therapist passes out hand-out entitled, "Logical Errors 
or Thinking Errors" and discusses it. (Allow 15 
minutes. 
The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunction Thoughts using the following 
framework: 
a. Look back over your homework and identify any common 
themes and/or assumptions. (If necessary, self-
monitoring from Session 1 and 2 can also be reviewed.) 
b. As we "go around" the group can help by identifying 
signals of depressive assumptions. 
c. On the board, we'll fill in this diagram for each 
person: 
1. emotions 
2. automatic thoughts 
3. themes 
4. depressive assumptions 
d. Subjects are instructed to copy their diagram on the 
back of a Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts. 
Note: In this section as members "go around" the therapist 
makes very few statements. Instead the therapist asks 
questions. Questions which may be helpful when anyone 
gets "stumped" are: 
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What made you particularly happy or unhappy 
about this event? (e.g., "I did well because 
someone praised me.") 
How do you look at the behavior of others? 
(e.g., "Mary is happy because she has a husband.") 
How are you justifying your feelings? (e.g., 
"Anyone who always makes mistakes would feel 
this depressed.") (Allow 45 minutes) 
7. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form I and passes out blank records. The 
therapist instructs the group to continue to complete the 
forms as usual, but at the end of each day, on the back 
of the form, identify: 
a. common themes 
b. depressive assumptions (Allow 5 minutes) 
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Component A: Session 4 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/she 
is instructed to make at least three entries relevant 
to dysphoric mood or positive or negative change in 
affect, to note the common themes, and to infer the 
depressive assumptions.) The subjects complete 
the Depression Adjective Check List. (Allow 10 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the concepts covered in Session 3 
b. review the homework from Session 3 
c. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins a discussion of the concepts covered 
in Session 3 by stating: "During the last session we 
covered a lot of important material. To make sure that 
we understand each other, I wonder if some group members 
would tell me in their own words what we mean by: 
a. faulty or depressive assumptions? 
1. What are some examples of depressive assumptions? 
2. Why are faulty assumptions important? 
3. What are the steps involved in identifying 
depressive assumptions? 
4. What are some "signals" of depressive assumptions 
b. logical errors or thinking errors 
1. What are some examples? 
2. Why are logical errors important? (Allow 20 
minutes) 
4. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts using the 
following framework: 
a. Look back over your homework and identify any common 
themes and/or assumptions. 
b. As we "go 'around" the group can help by identifying 
the signals of depressive assumptions. 
c. On the board, we'll fill in this diagram for each 
person: 
1. emotions 
2. automatic thoughts 
3. themes 
4. depressive assumptions 
d. Subjects are instructed to copy their diagram on 
the back of a Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts-
Form I. 
Note: Again the therapist asks many questions during thi 
section and makes few statements. (See Session 3, #6). 
(Allow 45 minutes) 
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5. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form I and passes out blank records. The 
therapist instructs the group to continue to complete 
the forms as usual, but at the end of each day, on the 
back of the form, identify: 
a. common themes 
b. depressive assumptions (Allow 5 minutes) 
6. The therapist passes out the questionnaires for "Assess­
ment A" (i.e., Assessment of Component A). Clients are 
instructed to complete the questionnaires before the next 
group meeting. Therapist stresses the importance of 
completing the questionnaires for: 
a. research project 
b. evaluating progress (Allow 5 minutes) 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form I 
EMOTION(S) 
1. Specify sad, 
anxious, 
angry, etc. 




1. Write automatic thought(s) that 
preceded emotion(s) 




1. Actual event leading to 
unpleasant emotion, or 
2. Stream of thoughts, day­
dream, or recollection 
leading to unpleasant 
emotion. 
EXPLANATION: When you experience an unpleasant emotion, note the situation that seemed to 
stimulate the emotion. (If the emotion occurred while you were thinking, daydreaming, 
etc., please note this.) Then note the automatic thought associated with the emotion. 
Record the degree to which you believe this thought. 0% = not at all, 100% completely. 
In rating degree of emotion: 1 = a trace; 100 = the most intense possible. 
Adapted from Beck, Shaw, Rush, and Emery, 1979, p. 403. 
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Examples of Negative Automatic Thoughts Regarding Therapy* 
1. "Cognitive therapy is a rehash of 'the power of positive 
thinking1." 
2. "I'm not depressed because I distort reality, but be­
cause things really are bad. Anyone would become 
depressed." 
3. "I know I look at things in a negative way, but I can't 
change my personality." 
4. "I believe what you are saying intellectually, but not 
emotionally." 
5. "Since I don't like these negative thoughts, the reason 
they come must be that I want to be depressed." 
6. "I'm afraid once I'm over being depressed, I'll become 
anxious like I was before." 
7. "I want a guarantee this therapy will cure my depression." 
8. "Cognitive therapy is concerned with mundane things in 
life and not with the serious problems that make me 
depressed." 
9. "If negative cognitive distortions make me unhappy, does 
that mean that positive cognitive distortions make me 
happy?" 
10. "I have been coming to therapy for several weeks, and 
I'm not any better." 
11. "You can't treat my depression without seeing my spouse, 
too. He/she caused the depression." 
12. "I'm smarter than the therapist. How can she help me?" 
13. "You are more interested in doing research than in 
helping me." 
14. "Cognitive therapy won't work because my depression is 
biological. " 
15. "I have to assert my independence by not letting the 
therapist get the best of me." 
*Beck, Shaw, Rush, and Emery, 1979. 
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Logical Errors or Thinking Errors 
(These signal depressive assumptions) 
Cognitive Error Assumption 
1. Overgeneralizing If it's true in one case, it ap­




The only events that matter are 
failures, deprivation, etc. 






I am responsible for all bad 
things, failures, etc. 





If it has been true in the past, 
then it's always going to be 
true. 
5. Self-references I am the center of everyone's 
attention—especially my bad 
performances. I am the cause 
of misfortunes. 
6 . "Catastrophizing" Always think of the worst. It's 
most likely to happen to you. 
7. Dichotomous 
thinking 
Everything either is one extreme 
or another (black or white; 
good or bad). 
Taken from Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery, 1979, p. 261. 
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Component B: Evaluating and correcting dysfunctional thoughts 
through logical means. 
All subjects in this study received Component B as their 
second or third element of treatment. The purpose of 
Component A was to teach subjects to evaluate the logical 
evidence for and against their dysfunctional thoughts. 
Subjects were encouraged to decrease the frequency of 
dysfunctional thoughts and to increase the frequency of 
adaptive thoughts through such methods as noting that the 
dysfunctional thoughts are illogical, listing the consequences 
of holding depressive beliefs, noting that thoughts are not 
facts, etc. These verbal strategies were contrasted with 
experimental strategies in Component C, which teach the 
subjects to validate or refute their assumptions by actually 
gathering data. Component B included four sessions. Each 
session lasted approximately 120 minutes. 
Note regarding review of the concepts and rationale covered 
in Component A; These particular treatment plans were 
written as if Component B was the second component which 
subjects received. When Component B was the third component 
received, review sections were not stressed as much. 
Specifically, the therapist reviewed only the main ideas 
and asked fewer questions of the group. 
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Component B: Session 1 
1. As the group members gather, they complete the "assess­
ment packet." The therapist reviews each member's 
homework (praising the completion). If a client did 
not complete the homework assignment, he/she is instructed 
to make at least three entries relevant to dysphoric 
mood or positive or negative change in affect. 
(Allow 15 minutes. 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. description of next step in therapy—evaluating and 
correcting dysfunctional thoughts 
b. group discussion of alternative explanations using 
negative expectations about therapy as an example 
c. review homework looking for alternative explanations 
or for negative thoughts 
d. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist describes the next step in treatment: 
"We have been practicing and will continue to practice 
detecting automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions 
because we think that there is a relationship between 
feeling depressed and looking at the self, the world, 
and the future in a negative manner. However, just as 
important as the skill of identifying depressive thoughts 
and assumptions is the skill of correcting them. The 
goal of this step in therapy is for you to examine the 
evidence for and against your thoughts, using standards 
which a nondepressed person would use. Some of the steps 
which are important in correcting negative automatic 
thoughts include: 
a. recognizing that thoughts and beliefs are inferences 
about the world rather than facts. 
b. examining the logical evidence for and against the 
thought or belief 
c. providing an alternative response to the negative 
cognition." (Allow 10 minutes) 
4. The therapist begins discussion of some of the negative 
thoughts which may occur in relation to therapy: "In 
Session 2 we noted that negative automatic thoughts 
can occur in relation to therapy, the therapist, or 
homework. 
a. What were some of the examples we raised? (If 
needed, the therapist refers to the Handout 
entitled "Examples of Negative Automatic Thoughts 
Regarding Therapy".) 
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b. What evidence is there to support and to refute the 
thought? 
c. What are some alternative explanations for each 
thought? (See Chapter 14 in Beck et al., 1979 for 
alternative explanations.) 
For example/ regarding the following negative automatic 
thought: "You are more interested in doing research 
than in helping me": 
1. Evidence to support—the project does involve 
research. Evidence to refute—the research 
and the treatment are not incompatible. 
2. Alternative response—"My participation in 
this research-treatment project stands to help 
me and to help others as researchers learn 
more about depression, its assessment, and 
treatment." (Allow 15 minutes) 
5. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts using the 
following framework: "As we 'go around,1 please: 
a. identify your negative automatic thoughts 
b. describe the evidence you have to support and to 
refute the thoughts 
c. suggest an alternative interpretation for your 
negative automatic thoughts." 
"If you get 'stumped' in suggesting an alternative re­
sponse, the following questions may aid you: 
1. What part of this situation is a fact and what 
part is my belief? 
2. How would a nondepressed person evaluate this 
event? 
3. Even if it is true, is it as bad as it seems?" 
Note: Again the therapist's major activity is asking 
questions rather than making statements, as the group 
members "go around." (Allow 30 minutes) 
6. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form I and passes out the Daily Record of 
Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form II. Therapist instructs 
clients to: 
a. Complete this form every day each time you feel sad 
and depressed or each time your emotions change. 
Ideally the form should be completed when the 
automatic thoughts occur; however, if this is 
impossible you need to have a standard time each 
day (e.g., 15 minutes after supper) to complete 
the form. You need to make several entries each 
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day since we will use these data in the next session. 
(See Component A, Session 1 for directions on how 
to complete the first four columns of the Daily 
Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts.) 
Provide a "RATIONAL RESPONSE" to each automatic 
thought and to rate the believability of the response 
(Therapist reminds group of questions to aid alterna­
tive, rational response.) 
Write the "OUTCOME" of the automatic thought (i.e., 
re-rate believability and emotion). 
Therapist explains how to complete all parts of the 
form by reviewing the sample; answers questions; 
has the group practice one entry. (For a-c allow 
15 minutes) 
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Component B: Session 2 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/she 
is instructed to make at least three entries relevant 
to dysphoric mood of positive or negative change in 
affect and to supply the rational responses to go with 
each negative automatic thought.) The subjects 
complete the Depression Adjective Check List. (Allow 
5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the steps of and rationale for providing 
alternatives to automatic thoughts 
b. review depressive assumptions acknowledging the fact 
that they are difficult to give up, but suggesting 
skills for coping with depressive assumptions 
c. review homework; identify depressive assumptions 
from homework, their pros and cons and long-term 
and short-term consequences; supply alternatives 
d. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins review of the skills covered in 
Session B, 1. "During the last session we focused 
on correcting negative automatic thoughts. As a brief 
review, I wonder if any would tell me in their own words:-
a. Why is it important to evaluate and to correct 
negative automatic thoughts? 
b. What are some of the steps involved in correcting 
negative automatic thoughts? 
c. What types of questions might you ask yourself if 
you have difficulty providing an alternative response 
to a negative automatic thought? (Allow 10 minutes) 
4. The therapist begins a review of depressive assumptions 
and the importance of evaluating them and providing 
alternative responses to them: "During this session, we 
will apply the skills that we have been practicing to 
depressive assumptions. You may remember that depressive 
assumptions are important because their presence and use 
increases the likelihood that a person will become 
depressed. Some examples of the depressive assumptions 
we talked about included: "To be happy, I must be 
accepted by all people at all times." "If I make a 
mistake, it means that I am inept." We mentioned that 
the following cues often signal the presence of 
depressive assumptions: 
a. the frequent use of global, vague words (e.g., 
stupid, silly, dumb) 
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b. the frequent use of "absolutes" (e.g., should, 
ought, never) 
c. "logical errors" (e.g., overgeneralization, magni­
fication) . 
In identifying depressive assumptions, we examined the 
common themes of negative automatic thoughts and 
inferred the depressive assumptions. (Allow 5 minutes) 
5. The therapist provides rationale for group exercise 
used in this session: Since depressive assumptions 
are important in the reoccurrence of depression, we are 
going to practice evaluating the logical evidence for 
and against the ass'imptions, and reevaluate the depres­
sive assumptions. However, it is first important to 
recognize that it is difficult to "give up" an 
assumption or rule you have used your entire life which 
you may have learned from someone very significant to 
you. In order to cope with this reluctance we will 
examine the pros and cons, and the long-term and short-
term consequences of each of the depressive thoughts 
that you identify. 
The therapist applies the above to the following 
depressive assumption: "I'm only as good as my work." 
a. short-term consequences: work hard, promoted 
b. long-term consequences: loses job, thinks he/she is 
a loser 
c. pros: encourage effort 
d. cons: insecure when job is insecure; effort seems 
motivated by fear (Allow 5 minutes) 
6. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts using the 
following framework: 
a. "Look back over your homework and identify any 
common themes and/or assumptions. 
b. As we 'go around' the group can help by identifying 
the signals of depressive assumptions. 
c. On the board, we'll fill in this diagram for each 
person: 
1. emotions 
2. automatic thoughts 
3. themes 
4-. depressive assumptions 
5. advantages of keeping this assumption 
6. disadvantages of keeping this assumption 
7. short-term effects of operating under this 
assumption 
8. long-term effects of operating under this 
assumption 
9. alternative assumption that is more useful 
than the depressive assumption" 
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d. Subjects are instructed to copy their diagram on the 
back of a Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts 
Form 
Note: Again the therapist asks many questions during 
this section and makes few statements. (Allow 55 minutes) 
7. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form II and passes out blank forms. The 
therapist instructs the group to continue to complete 
the forms as usual, but at the end of each day, on 
the back of the form, identify: 
a. common themes 
b. depressive assumptions 
c. alternatives to the depressive assumption (Allow 
5 minutes) 
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Component B: Session 3 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework, and praises his/her completion of 
the task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/ 
she is instructed to make at least three entires relevant 
to dysphoric mood or positive or negative change in 
affect, to note the common themes and to infer the 
depressive assumptions, and to provide alternative 
rational responses to each automatic thought and de­
pressive assumption.) The subjects complete the 
Depression Adjective Check List. (Allow 10 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review logical errors 
b. describe the skills one can use to cope with 
logical errors 
c. review homework; look for logical errors; apply 
skills to cope with logical errors in offering 
alternative to negative automatic thoughts and 
depressive assumptions. (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins a review of "logical errors" or 
"thinking errors": "In our early sessions, we dis­
cussed 'logical errors' or 'thinking errors' as signals 
of depressive assumptions. During this session we will 
review these logical errors and will practice skills 
designed to cope with them or decrease their likeli­
hood." (Allow 5 minutes) 
4. The therapist distributes handout entitled, "Skills to 
Cope with Logical Errors." For each of the seven 
cognitive errors, the therapist: 
a. describes the error 
b. gives an example of the error 
c. elicits examples from the group members 
d. describes the skill used to cope with the cognitive 
error (Allow 20 minutes) 
5. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form II using 
the following framework: 
a. "Look back over your homework and identify any 
of the logical errors we have discussed. 
b. As we 'go around', we'll fill in this diagram on 
the board for each person: 
1. emotions 
2. automatic thoughts 
3. themes 
4. depressive assumptions and logical errors 
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5. skills to cope with logical errors 
6. an alternative assumption that is more useful 
than the depressive assumption 
c. Subjects are instructed to copy their diagram on 
the back of a Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts— 
Form II 
Note: Again the therapist asks many questions during 
this section and makes few statements. (Allow 45 minutes) 
6. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form II and passes out blank forms. The 
therapist instructs the group to continue to complete 
the form as usual and at the end of each day, on the 
back of the form, identify: 
a. common themes 
b. depressive assumptions 
c. alternatives to the depressive assumptions (Allow 
5 minutes) 
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Component B: Session 4 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/she 
is instructed to make at least three entries relevant 
to dysphoric mood or positive or negative changes in 
affect, to note common themes, to infer the depressive 
assumptions, and to provide alternative rational re­
sponses to each automatic thought and depressive 
assumption.) The subjects complete the Depression 
Adjective Check List. (Allow 10 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the boards 
a. review the concepts and the skills we have used in 
the four sessions 
b. review homework using the skills and concepts that 
we have learned 
c. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins the review of the basic concepts 
and skills covered in the last four sessions: 
a. negative automatic thoughts 
1. Why is it important to evaluate and to correct 
negative automatic thoughts? (They are related 
to depression) 
2. What are some of the steps involved in correct­
ing negative, automatic thoughts? 
a. recognizing that thoughts and beliefs are 
inferences not facts 
b. examining the evidence for and against the 
thought or belief 
c. providing an alternative response to the 
negative thought 
3. What are some questions you can ask yourself if 
you have difficulty substituting a rationale 
response? 
a. What's my evidence? 
b. Is there any other way of looking at that? 
c. Even if it is true, is it as bad as it seems? 
d. How would a nondepressed person look at it? 
b. logical errors 
1. What are some examples of logical errors? (See 
Handout entitled, "Skills to Cope with Logical 
Errors) 
2. Why are logical errors important? (They signal 
depressive assumptions) 
3. What skills can be used to cope with logical 
errors? (See Handout) 
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c. depressive assumptions; 
1. Why are depressive assumptions important? 
(They increase the likelihood that any 
individual will become depressed.) 
2. Why are depressive assumptions difficult to 
"give up"? (We learn them from significant 
others and have used them for years.) 
3. What exercises can be useful in examining the 
evidence for and against "giving up" depressive 
assumptions? (Listing the pros and cons of 
"giving up: the assumption, listing the short-
term and long-term consequences of operating 
under the assumption.) (Allow 20 minutes for 
review) 
The therapist introduces the group exercise as an 
opportunity to practice the skills we have learned. 
4. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts using the 
following framework: 
a. "Look back over your homework and identify any 
common themes and/or assumptions." 
b. On the board, we'll fill in this diagram for each. 
person: 
1. emotions 
2. automatic thoughts 
3. themes 
4. depressive assumptions 
5. logical errors 
6. alternative to logical error and depressive 
assumption 
7. advantages vs. disadvantages of depressive 
assumption 
8. short-term vs. long-term consequences of using 
the depressive assumption 
9. alternative assumption after reviewing all the 
evidence (i.e., Steps 1-8) 
Note: Again the therapist asks many questions during 
this section and makes few statements. (Allow 4 5 minutes) 
5. The therapist collects Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form II and passes out blank forms. The 
therapist instructs the group to continue to complete the 
form as usual. At the end of each day, on the back 
of the form, identify: 
a. common themes 
b. depressive assumptions 
c. alternatives to the depressive assumptions (Allow 
5 minutes) 




1. Actual event leading 
to unpleasant emotion, 
or 
2. Stream of thoughts, 
daydream, or recol­
lection, leading to 
unpleasant emotion. 
EMOTION(S) 
1. Specify sad, 
anxious, 
angry, etc. 




1. Write automatic thought(s) 
that preceded emotlons(s). 
2. Rate belief in automatic 
though t(s). 0:100% 
RATIONAL RESPONSE 
1. Write rational re­
sponse to automatic 
thought(s). 













EXPLANATION: When you experience an unpleasant emotion, note the situation that seemed to stimulate the emotion 
(If the emotion occurred while you were thinking, daydreaming, etc., please note this.) Then note the 
automatic thought associated with the emotion. Record the degree to which you believe the thought: 
0% • not at all; 100% completely. In rating degree of emotion: 1 • a trace; 100 • the most intense possible. 
Adapted from Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery, 1979, p. 403. 
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Skills to Cope with Logical Errors 




















If it's true in one 
case, it applies 
to any case which 
is even slightly 
similar. 
Exposure of faulty 
logic. Establish 
criteria of which 
cases are "similar 
and to what degree 
The only events that Use "log" to identi 
matter are failures successes patient 
deprivation, etc. forgot. 
Should measure self 
by errors, weak­
nesses, etc. 
I am responsible 





If it has been true Expose faulty logic 
in the past, then 
it's always going 
to be true 




ances . I am the 
cuase of mis­
fortunes . 
Always think of the 
worst. It's most 
likely to happen 
to you. 
Everything either 
is one extreme or 
another (black or 




other than past 
events. 
Establish criteria 
to determine when 
patient is the 
focus of atten­
tion and also the 
probable facts 




Focus on evidence 
that the worst did 
not happen. 
Demonstrate that 
events may be 
evaluated on a 
continuum. 
Taken from Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery, 1979, p. 261. 
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Component C: Evaluating and correcting dysfunctional 
thoughts through an empirical means 
All subjects in this study received Component C as their 
second or third element of treatment. As with Component B, 
the purpose of Component C was to teach subjects to evaluate 
the evidence for and against their dysfunctional thoughts. 
However, Component C encouraged subjects to operationalize 
their thoughts and put these thoughts to an empirical test. 
The subjects were taught a general skill of hypothesis-
testing which they used in evaluating their dysfunctional 
thoughts, and the subjects were taught general problem 
solving strategies which were used to test typical depressive 
thoughts (e.g., graded task assignment, activity schedules, 
and mastery/pleasure technique). Component C includes four 
sessions. Each session lasted approximately 120 minutes. 
Note regarding review of concepts and rationale covered in 
Component A: These particular treatment plans were written 
as if Component C was the second component which subjects 
received. When Component C was the third component received, 
review sections were not stressed as much. Specifically, 
the therapist reviewed only the main ideas and asked fewer 
questions of the group. 
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Component C: Session 1 
1. As the group members gather, they complete the "assess­
ment packet." The therapist reviews the homework. 
If a client did not complete the homework assignment, 
he/she is instructed to make at least three entries 
relevant to dysphoric mood of positive or negative 
change in affect. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. description of the next step in therapy—evaluating 
and correcting dysfunctional thoughts and assumptions 
by designing experiments 
b. steps involved in designing experiments 
c. examples of experiments 
d. discuss new homework assignment 
e. practice new homework assignment by "going around" 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist describes the next step in treatment: 
"We have been practicing and will continue to practice 
detecting automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions 
because we think that there is' a relationship between 
feeling depressed and looking at the self, the world, 
and the future in a negative manner. To review, you 
may remember that depressive assumptions are important 
because their presence and use increases the likelihood 
that a person will become depressed. Some examples of 
the depressive assumptions we talked about included: 
"To be happy, I must be accepted by all people at all 
times." "If I make a mistake, it means that I am 
inept." 
We mentioned that the following cues often signal the 
presence of depressive assumptions: 
a. the frequent use of global, vague words (e.g., stupid 
silly, dumb) 
b. the use of "absolutes" (e.g., should, ought, never) 
c. "logical errors" (e.g., overgeneralization, magni­
fication) 
In identifying depressive assumptions, we examined the 
common themes of negative automatic thoughts and inferred 
the depressive assumptions. However, just as important 
as the skill of identifying depressive thoughts and 
assumptions is the skill of correcting them. Since 
we have stated earlier that there is a difference between 
a thought and a fact, we will try now to subject thoughts 
to an experimental test. We will look at thoughts as 
hypotheses to be tested empirically and will gather 
data to refute and/or to support the hypotheses. (Allow 
5 minutes) 
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The therapist illustrates: For example, one depressed 
person used the assumption—"If I assert myself (express 
myself openly and honestly), I will be rejected." The 
negative automatic thoughts which went along with this 
assumption were—"If I tell my supervisor I want to 
take the day off she will think that I am lazy and that 
I'm trying to avoid work." The experiment consisted 
of actually talking with the supervisor, recording what 
happens, and comparing these results with the predictions. 
A depressed student predicted that she would be a failure 
in college because her English professor suggested many 
revisions on her essay. One of her automatize thoughts 
included—"The professor probably wishes I wasn't in 
his class since I am doing so poorly." The experiment 
consisted of going to talk with the professor, who said 
that the student's paper was very creative, and it needed 
revising. He pointed out that he had written a lot to 
guide her revisions and make them easier. (Allow 5 
minutes) 
The therapist mentions that there are several types of 
experiments. Some automatic thoughts are examined best 
by taking data on oneself (like the two outlined above). 
Other automatic thoughts are tested best by "surveying" 
others. For example, one depressed woman assumed: 
"Only unattractive women go out alone." When this 
client actually counted the numbers of attractive women 
who went out alone vs. the number of unattractive women 
who went out alone, she found the numbers were approxi­
mately equal. (Allow 5 minutes) 
The therapist outlines the steps involved in testing 
assumptions: 
a. identify the depressive or faulty assumption to be 
tested 
b. deduce a specific prediction from this general rule 
(often it helps to look at the automatic thoughts 
in order to deduce a specific prediction) 
c. state this prediction in a form that can be tested. 
Define vague terms and list behaviors necessary to 
carry out the test. Look at the situation in which 
corresponding negative, automatic thoughts occur 
for ideas about how to specify the hypothesis. 
d. record the results from the experiment in an objective 
. manner. That is, record the outcomes of the experi­
ment in terms of what happened, rather than in terms 
of what you think about what happened. 
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e. compare the results you got to the prediction that 
you made 
f. ask yourself if other experiments are necessary 
(Allow 10 minutes) 
7. The therapist introduces the new homework assignment 
Daily Record of Dy~sfunctional Thoughts—Form III as an 
aid in learning to test assumptions and/or negative, 
automatic thoughts. 
a. The therapist points out that the first four columns 
(e.g., date, situation, emotions, automatic thoughts) 
are identical to Forms I and II. The therapist 
reminds the group that the cues for completing the 
form are dysphoria or a change in emotion. "If it 
is impossible to complete the form at that moment, 
go back to the form at a standard time each day." 
b. The therapist mentions that column five, "WAYS TO 
TEST," (the negative thought or depressive assumption) 
involves creating a method which would support or 
refute the thought. This column is used to specify 
how you will collect your data. 
c. The therapist mentions that column six "OUTCOME OF 
TEST" involves recording the results of the experi­
ment. Clients are encouraged to record the results 
of your experiment like "you would like for a news­
paper reporter to report the news." 
d. The therapist mentions that column seven "THOUGHTS 
AND BELIEFS" involves re-rating the belief in the 
initial automatic thought or assumption and spefi-
fying and rating the new emotion. (Allow 10 minutes) 
8. The therapist suggests that the group "go around" using 
the new Form III to review their homework from the last 
session. The following format is used: 
a. What depressive assumption would you like to test? 
(If client can't identify a depressive assumption, 
the therapist reviews. Such review is accomplished 
by listing emotions, automatic thoughts, themes, 
and-deducing the assumptions.) 
b. What specific prediction can you deduce from this 
general assumption? (Aids: look at corresponding 
situations and automatic thoughts.) 
c. How can we state this prediction in a testable form? 
d. (Define vague terms. List behaviors necessary to 
carry out the test.) 
d. What type of data would you record? Are there any 
precautions you might take to make sure these data-
are objective? 
e. If any applicable examples arise, the therapist has 
group members conduct the experiment in the group 
setting. In so doing the client practices: 
1. recording data objectively 
2. comparing the results with the prediction 
3. asking if other experiments are necessary 
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(When this is done, the therapist makes sure that 
the client has another or similar experiment to 
conduct as homework.) (Allow 40 minutes) 
The therapist assigns homework: 
a. Carry out the experiments which you designed and 
record the results. 
b. Complete the Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts— 
Form III. Complete Columns 1-5 each time you 
feel dysphoric or your emotions change. Complete 
Columns 6 and 7 (i.e., actually perform an experiment) 
once a day. (Allow 5 minutes) 
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Component C: Session 2 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, he/she 
is instructed to make at least three entires relevant 
to dysphoric mood or positive or negative change in 
affect, completing columns 1-5, Form III. Then the 
therapist stresses the importance of actually carrying 
out the experiments and attempts to get the subject to 
agree to carry out one of these experiments as his/her 
new homework.) The subjects complete the Depression 
Adjective Check List. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the rationale for and steps for hypothesis 
testing 
b. review homework (Form III) 
c. learn a new skill which is particularly useful in 
testing hypotheses regarding problems (e.g.,. graded 
task assignment) 
d. apply graded task assignment to a problem/hypothesis 
relevant to you 
e. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins review of the skills covered in 
Session C-l: "During the last session we focused on 
correcting negative automatic thoughts and depressive 
assumptions by hypothesis-testing or by setting up 
experiments. As a brief review, I wonder if anyone 
would tell me: 
1. Why is it important to set up experiments to evaluate 
automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions? 
(Automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions are 
beliefs, not facts. Experiments help in establishing 
or refuting their validity.) 
.2. What are the steps involved in testing assumptions? 
a. identify the depressive or faulty assumption 
to be tested 
b. deduce a specific prediction from this general 
rule (often it helps to look at the automatic 
thoughts in order to deduce a specific prediction) 
c. state this prediction in a form that can be 
tested. Define vague terms and list behaviors 
necessary to carry out the test. Look at the 
situation in which corresponding negative, 
automatic thoughts occur for ideas about how 
to specify the hypothesis 
d. record the results from the experiment in an 
objective manner. That is, record the outcomes 
of the experiment in terms of what happened, 
rather than in terms of what you think about what 
happened. 
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e. compare the results you got to the prediction 
that you made 
f. ask yourself if other experiments are necessary 
(Allow 10 minutes) 
The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III by 
"going around." Therapist asks each member to review 
one experiment, beginning with Column 1 through 
Column 7. If a group member has not carried out an 
experiment, the therapist helps him/her design an 
experiment that he/she can carry out in the group 
session, at this time. (Allow 30 minutes) 
The therapist introduces the rationale for and steps 
involves in graded task assignment: 
a. Rationale: 
Graded task assignment offers one way of testing 
hypotheses that have to do with problems or doubts. 
This strategy is designed to help test automatic 
thoughts or assumptions like: "I can't do anything" 
of "I'll never be able to solve this problem." 
Graded task assignment will offer you a method of 
solving problems through your own effort and skill. 
b. Steps: 
1. identify the problem (i.e., belief) on which 
you would like to work (e.g., '1 can't accomplish 
my goals.") 
2. formulate a project. That is, write down the 
behaviors which are involved in the task. 
Start with the simplest and move to the more 
complicated 
3. perform these behaviors. Check off the parts 
of the task as you do them 
4. compare the results with the prediction that 
you made (Allow 5 minutes) 
The therapist suggests that the group practice using 
graded tas-k assignment to test hypotheses which are 
relevant to each group member using this format: 
a. The therapist gives the group a chance to ventilate 
and to express any cynical doubts they have regard­
ing the utility of this task. (The therapist responds 
with, "This is an experiment. We can test your 
automati c thoughts.") 
b. The therapist suggests that clients refer to the 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III 
during this exercise. The therapist suggests that 
the client write down the "plan" in the following 
places. 
c. Identify the assumption which can be tested throught 
the use of graded task assignment. (Write in Column 4) 
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d. Write down the steps involved in the task, Column 5. 
Note: The therapist aids client in setting modest goals. 
(Allow 30 minutes) 
7. For homework the therapist instructs the group to: 
a. perform the behaviors listed in 6d, checking off 
the tasks as they are accomplished 
b. complete Columns 6 and 7 
c. use graded task assignment to test at least one 
other belief before the next session 
d. continue to complete Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III, Columns 1-5, at least. (Allow 
5 minutes) 
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Component C: Session 3 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of the 
task. (If a client did not complete the task, then 
he/she is instructed to make at least three entries 
relevant to dysphoric mood or positive or negative change 
in affect, completing Columns 1-5, Form III. Then 
the therapist stresses the importance of actually carry­
ing out one of these experiments as his/her new homework.) 
The subjects complete the Depression Adjective Check 
List. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the rationale and steps involved in using 
graded-task assignment to test hypotheses 
b. review homework, Form III 
c. learn a new skill which is particularly useful in 
testing hypotheses regarding fultilling daily goals 
(e.g., activity scheduling) 
d. apply activity scheduling to a hypothesis relevant 
to you 
e. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist begins a review of the skills covered in 
Session C-2: "During the last session we focused on 
correcting negative automatic thoughts related to problems 
or doubts by graded task assignment. As a brief review, 
I wonder if anyone would tell me: 
1. What are the steps involved in graded task assignment? 
a. identify the problem (i.e., belief) on which you 
would like to work 
b. formulate a project. That is, write down the 
behaviors which are involved in the task. Start 
with the simplest and move to the more compli­
cated 
c. perform the behaviors. Check off the parts of 
the task as you do them 
d. compare the results with the prediction that 
you made" (Allow 5 minutes) 
4. The therapist suggests that each person share his/her 
Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III by 
"going around." Therapist asks each member to review 
one experiment in which he/she used graded task assign­
ment to test a hypothesis. The therapist instructs the 
members to review what they place in Columns 1 through 
7 on the Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III. 
If a group member has not carried out an experiment using 
graded task assignment, the therapist helps him/her design 
an experiment that he/she can carry out in the group 
session, at this time. (In some cases this may not be 
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possible; therefore, the client is encouraged to imple­
ment the experiment as homework.) (Allow 20 minutes) 
The therapist introduces the rationale for and steps 
involved in activity scheduling: 
a. Rationale: 
Activity scheduling offers one way of testing 
hypotheses that have to do with not accomplishing 
enough, being unable to carry out, and not doing 
anything pleasurable. Activity scheduling offers 
a method for collecting data on these hypotheses. 
b. Steps: (The therapist hands out Activity Schedules 
and blank Form III, asking the group to complete the 
steps involved in planning activities as she de­
scribes them.) 
1. identify a hypothesis you use or have used 
which is related to inability to accomplish 
daily activities and not doing anything 
pleasurable (e.g., "I can't get anything done" 
or "I don't do anything fun.") Write this 
hypothesis in Column 4 of the Daily Record of 
Dysfunctional Thoughts--Form III. (Members 
"go around" and state hypotheses). 
2. In Column 5 write that activity scheduling will 
be your method of testing the hypothesis 
3. On the Activity Schedule, go through and write 
down all the standing appointments you have 
made (e.g., go to work, come to group meeting). 
(Members "go around" and list activities.) 
4. On the Activity Schedule, go through and write 
down something for each day that you want to 
do (e.g., watch the evening news, play with 
my pet, write a letter, etc.) (Members "go 
around" and list activities.) 
5. Leave some time each day unscheduled. "Right 
now what's more important than actually accomplish­
ing the activity is planning the activity. 
Nobody accomplishes everything that he/she 
plans. Even if you don't carry out every activity, 
trying to carry them out and carrying out some 
of the activities is very important. 
6. For homework on the Activity Schedule, check off 
the tasks as you complete them. 
7. For homework on the Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III in Column 6, write down the 
outcome of.the experiment which involved scheduling 
activities. 
8. For homework, complete Column 7 of the Daily 
Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III. 
(Allow 45 minutes) 
For homework the therapist instructs the group to: 
a. carry out their experiments on Activity Scheduling 
(review steps 1-7 above). 
b. continue to complete Form III, Columns 1-5, at 
least (Allow 10 minutes) 
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Component C: Session 4 
1. As the group members gather, the therapist reviews each 
member's homework and praises his/her completion of 
the task. (If a client did not complete the Activity 
Schedule and related columns of the Daily Record of 
Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III, retrospectively. Then 
the therapist stresses the importance of actually carrying 
out the experiments and attempts to get the subject to 
agree to implement his/her experiments from Session 4.) 
The subjects complete the Depression Adjective Check 
List. (Allow 5 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: 
a. review the homework from Session 3 by "going around" 
b. learn a new skill for testing hypotheses rated to 
"mastery and pleasure" (e.g., "I did tasks, but not 
well." "I did it, but didn't enjoy it." 
c. review the concepts and skills learned in the past 
three sessions 
d. practice skills by designing new experiments 
e. assign homework (Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist suggests each member share his/her test of 
a hypothesis using Activity Scheduling. The therapist 
"goes around" asking each member to refer to the Daily 
Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III and the 
Activity Schedule to answer the following questions: 
a. What hypothesis were you using Activity Scheduling 
to test? 
b. What was the outcome of your test? 
c. How much did you believe the hypothesis after the 
test? 
d. What emotions did you experience after the test? 
e. Are other experiments necessary? (Allow 25 minutes) 
4. The therapist reviews the rationale for Activity 
Scheduling and introduces a related skill, mastery and 
pleasure ratings: 
a. To review briefly, will someone tell me how Activity 
Scheduling is related to automatic thoughts and 
depressive assumptions? (Activity Scheduling offers 
a methodology for actually examining the evidence for 
and against thoughts regarding inability to accomplish 
daily tasks or to engage in pleasant events.) The 
therapist hands our blank Activity Schedules for 
clients to complete as homework. 
b. Why is important to test out negative automatic 
thoughts and depressive assumptions? (Untested they 




This new skill, called mastery and pleasure ratings, deals 
with some of the thoughts people often have when using 
an activity schedule. Sometimes people state that they 
experience no sense of accomplishment (i.e., no mastery) 
although they are engaging in a task. Similarly, often 
people state that they experience no pleasure after 
engaging in an activity. The idea here is that depressed 
people often "devalue" what the future may hold in terms 
of accomplishment or pleasure. These mastery and pleasure 
ratings may aid you in noting some degree of accomplish­
ment or pleasure you experience when engaging in activi­
ties. These ratings are designed to test such hypotheses 
as: "Even though I'll go to work, I'll do a completely 
Unacceptable job" or "I will play tennis, but it won't 
be any fun." That is, this exercise is designed to help 
you test hypotheses regarding lack of mastery or pleasure. 
This exercise simply adds one step onto the Activity 
Schedule which you have already used. When you "check off" 
activities, give each event a "mastery" and "pleasure" 
rating. Use the following scale: 0 = no mastery or 
pleasure and 5 = maximum mastery or pleasure. In using 
these ratings simply write a M beside each event for 
mastery (and rate) and write a P beside each event for 
pleasure (and rate). Then as usual, you would complete 
Columns 6 and 7 of the Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III to note the outcome of your experi­
ment. (Allow 10 minutes) 
The therapist, asks one member to volunteer and uses his/ 
her data to provide an example of all of the following 
steps involved in mastery and pleasure ratings: 
a. identify the hypothesis that you are going to use 
mastery and pleasure ratings to test. Write this 
hypothesis in Column 4 of the Daily Record of 
Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III. (These hypotheses 
typically involve negative expectations about future 
mastery or pleasure.) 
b. in Column 5 write that mastery and pleasure ratings 
will be your method of testing the hypothesis 
c. for homework, gather the data by rating each event 
in terms of its mastery and pleasure on the Activity 
Schedule as you check off the events 
d. for homework, on the Daily Record or Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III in Column 6, write down the 
results of your experiment regarding mastery and 
pleasure 
e. for homework, complete Column 7 of the Daily Record of 
Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III (Allow 5 minutes) 
The therapist begins a review of the remaining skills 
covered in the past four sessions: 
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graded task assignment 
1. For what types of hypotheses is graded task 
assignment a useful method of testing hypotheses? 
(Hypotheses regarding problems or inability to 
accomplish goals.) 
2. What are the steps involved in graded task 
assignment? 
a. identify the problem (i.e., belief) on which 
you would like to work 
b. formulate a project. That is, write down 
the behaviors which are involved in the 
task. Start with the simplest and move to 
the more complicated 
c. perform the behaviors. Check off the parts 
of the task as you do 
d. compare the results with the prediction 
that you made 
hypothesis testing in general (which is not bound by 
a particular strategy—see Session C-l) 
1. What are the two types of experiments that a 
person can use in testing experiments? (Conduct­
ing a survey on other people or using yourself 
as an experimental subject) 
2. What are the steps involved in testing an 
assumption? 
a. identify the depressive or faulty assumption 
to be tested 
b. deduce a specific prediction from this general 
rule (often it helps to look at the automatic 
thoughts in order to deduce a specific pre­
diction) 
c. state this prediction in a form that can be 
tested. Define vague terms and list be­
haviors necessary to carry out this test. 
Look at the situation in which corresponding 
negative, automatic thoughts occur for ideas 
about how to specify the hypothesis. 
d. record the results from the experiment in 
an objective manner. That is, record the 
outcomes of the experiment in terms of what 
happened, rather than in terms of what you 
think about what happened 
e. compare the results you got with the pre­
diction that you made 
f. ask yourself if other experiments are necessary 
(Allow 10 minutes) 
7. The therapist suggest that the group practice using the 
skills reviewed by "going around" and designing new 
experiments. The therapist suggests that each member 
write his/her experiment on the Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III in the appropriate columns. The 
following questions are posed: 
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What depressive assumption would you like to test? 
(If client can't identify a depressive assumption, 
the therapist reviews. Such a review is accomplished 
by listing emotions, automatic thoughts, themes, 
and deducing the assumptions.) (Column 4) 
What specific prediction can you deduce from this 
general assumption? (Aids: look at corresponding 
situations and automatic thoughts) 
How can we state this prediction in a testable form? 
(Define vague terms. List behaviors necessary to 
carry out the test.) (Column 5) 
What type of data would you record? Are there any 
precautions you might take to make sure these data 
are objective? 
If any applicable examples arise, the therapist has 
group members conduct the experiment in the group 
setting. In so doing, the client practices: 
1. recording data objectively 
2. comparing the results with the prediction; 
asking if other experiments are necessary 
(When this is done, the therapist makes sure 
that the client has another or similar experiment 
to conduct as homework.) (Allow 30 minutes) 
therapist assigns homework: 
Carry out the experiments which you designed and 
record the results on the Daily Record of Dysfunctional 
Thoughts—Form III. There will be two types of 
experiments: 
1. experiments designed in #7 
2. experiments designed to test thoughts regarding 
mastery and pleasure (Clients are reminded of 
the blank Activity Schedules they were given to 
complete) 
Complete the Daily Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts--
Form III. At a minimum complete Columns 1-5. 
Actually test the experiments which you design when 
possible. (Allow 10 minutes) 
D.ally Record of Dysfunctional Thoughts—Form III 
SITUATION 
Describe 
1. Actual event leading 
to unpleasant 
emotion, or 
2. Stream of thoughts, 
daydream, or re­
collection, lead­
ing to unpleasant 
emotion. 
EMOTION(S) 
1. Specify sad, 
anxious, 
angry, etc. 



















OUTCOME OF TEST 
Record results 
objectively. 
THOUGHTS AND BELIEFS 
1. Re-rate belief In 
automatic thought(s) 
0-100% 
2. Specify and rate 
subsequent emotion 
0-100% 
EXPLANATION: When you experience an unpleasant emotion, note the situation that seemed to stimulate the emotion. (If the 
emotion occurred while you were thinking, daydreaming, etc., please note this.) Then note the automatic thoughts 
associated with the emotion. Record the degree to which you believe this thought. 0% « not at all, 100% = completed. 
In rating degree of emotion, 1 - a trace, 100 = the most intense possible. 
Adapted from Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery, 1979, p. 403. 
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Consent Form I 
I understand that I am answering questions (by completing 
questionnaires and being interviewed) to be used in select­
ing subjects who report that they are depressed for a 
psychological investigation involving the assessment and 
treatment of depression. I have been informed that although 
the information I supply will be available to my therapist 
and my therapist's supervisors, the information will remain 
confidential. I have been informed that my screening inter­
view may be audiotaped and agree to this. In addition, I 
have been informed that I am participating in research and 
alternative treatment for my problem is available through 
my local mental health clinic or through psychologists or 
psychiatrists involved in private practice. I have also 
been informed that I may withdraw from this screening session 
at any time. 
I understand that if I am not eligible for participation 
in this program, I will be referred to the UNC-G Psychology 
Clinic, to my community mental health center, and to private 
practitioners, for evaluation and treatment. However, if 
I am eligible I understand that experimental procedures will 





Responsibility for the professional aspects of this research 
is shared by Dr. Rosemery 0. Nelson and Robin B. Jarrett. 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the 
Psychology Department, and the Human Subjects Committee 
are not responsible for the professional aspects of the 
research. 
APPENDIX M 
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288 
APPENDIX M 
Consent Form II 
I, , hereby agree to participate 
in psychological research to be conducted under the direction 
of Dr. Rosemery 0. Nelson, Professor of Psychology, involving 
assessment and treatment for depressive disorders. As explained 
to me, for the next six and one-half weeks, I will be required 
to attend group therapy sessions twice a week (i.e., attend 
13 group therapy sessions) and to complete the homework as­
signed to me by my therapist. I have agreed to complete a 
packet of questionnaires at four different points during 
this project. At the end of therapy, I have agreed to be 
interviewed again. I have been assured that all data that 
I supply will be kept confidential. 
I understand that my therapist is an advanced graduate student 
in clinical psychology who has received training in the tech­
niques employed here. The therapist(s) will be supervised 
by Dr. Rosemery 0. Nelson, Professor of Psychology and 
Robin B. Jarrett, principal investigator. I am aware that 
these supervisors will observe some of my treatment sessions 
through a one-way mirror and/or listen to audiotapes of the 
sessions. 
I understand that if I miss a session, I need to telephone 
my therapist for a make-up session. I understand that this 
"make-up" session will consist of (a) discussing the past 
and present homework assignment; (b) listening to an audio­
tape of the group session which I missed and must be scheduled 
before the group meets again (e.g., if I miss Session 2 I must 
reschedule before the group meets' for Session 3). I under­
stand that if I miss two group sessions, the principal in­
vestigator will consider finding me an alternative form of 
treatment. 
I understand that if I become dissatisfied with this program 
I can withdraw and an appropriate referral can be arranged. 
I understand that the purpose of this investigation is doctoral 
dissertation research to investigate an approach to assessing 
and treating depressive disorders, an approach which has shown 
some promise in the past. However, I also realize that there 
can be no guarantee that I will not be depressed because I 
participate in this research. Hopefully, my participation 
here will contribute to the development of effective assess­
ment and treatment for others, as well as for myself. I 
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have been informed that there is no deception in this research 
and, at the end of the study, the research will be explained 
to me. In addition, at the end of this investigation, if I 
am not satisfied with my progress I will receive a referral 





Responsibility for the professional aspects of this research 
is shared by Rosemery 0. Nelson, Ph.D. and Robin B. Jarrett, 
M.A. The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the 
Psychology Department, and the Human Subjects Committee are 





Session 13: Debriefing Session 
All subjects in this study will be exposed to the debriefing 
session after they have.received Components A, B, and C. 
The purposes of this session are to: (a) deal with termina­
tion issues; (b) debrief the subjects regarding the nature 
of the research hypotheses; (c) provide referrals for 
potential future or further treatment. 
1. The therapist reviews each client's homework individually 
and deals with any questions or problems regarding the 
homework. The subjects complete the Depression Adjective 
Check List and the Questionnaire Administered at the 
Debriefing Session. (Allow 20 minutes) 
2. The therapist outlines the following agenda which is 
written on the board: (a) review any part of the project 
or deal with any negative automatic thoughts or depressive 
assumptions the group wants to raise; (b) deal with 
negative thoughts regarding the termination of therapy; 
(c) describe the hypotheses involved in this research; 
(d) provide referrals for further or future treatment. 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
3. The therapist asks the group if there are any parts of 
the project they would like to review of if there are 
any negative automatic thoughts or depressive assumptions 
they would like to raise? (Allow 20 minutes) 
4. The therapist inquires about any thoughts group members 
may have about terminating treatment. The therapist 
suggests that these thoughts are just like the others 
we have been working on during therapy. (Therapist 
should refer to Beck et al. (1979), Chapter 15 for ideas 
about how to deal with termination issues. (Allow 20 
minutes) 
5. The therapist passes out the debriefing statement and 
verbally describes the rationale for and hypotheses of 
this dissertation. The therapist answers any questions 
raised. (Allow 15 minutes) 
6. The therapist provides each client with a list of possible 
referrals should they want to continue treatment or need 
assistance in the future. (Allow 5 minutes) 
7. The therapist thanks subjects for their participation. 
(Allow 5 minutes) 
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Questionnaire Administered at the 
Debriefing Session 
Name: Date: 
Circle the number which best indicates how much you 
think that you have improved during the course of this 
project 




Would you recommend this project to a friend who was 
feeling depressed? 
yes maybe no 
What did you hope to accomplish by participating in 
this project? 
4. What could we have done to have made it easier for you 
to meet these goals? 
5. What do you think was the strongest component of this 
project? 
6. At this time, do you feel it will be necessary for you 
to continue your treatment for depression? 
yes no 




FOLLOW-UP TELEPHONE CALL 
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Date Telephone call was made: 
Please telephone this client during the week of . 
Converse with the client briefly asking the following 
questions and recording the relevant information. 
1. . Ask how the client feels in general: 
_ very depressed 
mildly depressed 
not depressed at all 
2. Ask whether the client is continuing his/her therapy else­
where? 
___ Yes No 
3. Ask whether the client wants to continue therapy else­
where: 
Yes (if so see list of appropriate referrals 
attached) 
No 
4. What is your judgment of this client's condition? 
(i.e., should we make an effort to call her again?) 
5. Other comments: 
APPENDIX Q 
CHECK ON MANIPULATION 
297 
APPENDIX Q 
Check on Manipulation 
Group Nunberi Enters 
Session Number: Date: 
You have been asked to listen to audiotapes of group therapy sessions and to 
discriminate which treatment component was implemented. The treatment components 
are described, on pp. 67 - 71 and their labels follow: 
Component A:. teaching subjects to detect and to monitor their dysfunctional thoughts 
(i.e., "negative automatic thoughts and depressive assumptions") 
Conponent Bs teaching subjects to evaluate and to correct their dysfunctional thoughts 
through a logical means 
Component C: teaching subjects to evaluate and to correct their dysfunctional thoughts 
by designing experiments or by "hypothesis testing" 
Please remember that Component A is Included in both Component B and Component C. 
1. The therapist was using Component in this session. 
2. Croup members (subjects): 
(fcheck one). 
a. followed the procedures proposed by the therapist (i.e., the therapist 
and subjects used the same component) 
b. incorporated components that the therapist was not emphasizing 
3. If 2.b. is checked: 
a. How many subjects incorported a component the therapist did not use?_ 
b. How many times did this/these subject(s) incorporate a component the therapist 
was not using? 
c. Approximately how mar.y minutes did the subject(s) spend on the component 
not emphasized by the therapist? ; 
4. How well do you think that the majority of the subjects understood the skills and 
concepts taught in this session? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
no complete 
understanding understanding 
5. Hat® the therapist's use of clinical skill (i.e., professional manner, good rapport 
with group members, and adequate understanding of the problems group members de­
scribed). 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
these skills these skills were 




ON SADS INTERVIEW 
APPENDIX R 
Interobserver Agreement on SADS Interview 
Subject's initials: Eater: 
Circled Number or Letter: • Date: 
Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder 
Instructions: Record as subject mentions. 
A. One or more distinct periods with dysphoric mood or pervalsve loss of interest 
or pleasure. The disturbance is characterized by symptoms such as the following: 
depressed, sad, blue, hopeless, low, down in the dumps, "don't care any more," or 
Irritable. The disturbance must be prominent and relatively persistent but not 
necessarily the most dominant symptom. It does not include momentary shifts from 
one dysphoric mood to another dysphoric mood, e.g., anxiety to depression to anger, 
such as are seen In states of acute psychotic turmoil. 
present absent 
List descriptors, if present: 
B. At least five of the following symptoms are required to have appeared as part of the 
episode for definite and four for probable (for past episodes, because of memory 
difficulty, one less symptom is required). 
Poor appetite or weight loss or increased appetite or weight gain (change 
of 0.5 kg a week over several weeks or 4.5 kg a year when dieting). 
Sleep difficulty or sleeping too much. 
Loss of energy, fatigability, or tiredness. 
Psychomotor agitation or retardation (but not mere subjective feeling' of 
restlessness or being slowed down). 
Loss of interest of pleasure In usual activities, including social contact 
or sex (do not include if limited to a period when delusional or hallucinat­
ing). (The loss may or may not be pervasive.) 
Feeling or self-reproach or excessive or inappropriate guilt (either may 
be delusional). 
Complaints or evidence of diminished ability to think or concentrate, such 
as slowed thinking, or indecisiveness (do not include if associated with 
marked formal thought disorder). 
1 Recurrent thoughts of death or suicide, or any suicidal behavior. 
C. Duration of dysphoric features at least one week, beginning with the first notice­
able change in the subject's usual condition (definite if lasted more than two 
weeks, probable if one to two weeks). 
= Duration 
D. Sought or was referred for help from someone during the dysphoric period, took 
medication, or had Impairment in functioning with family, at home, at school, as. 
work, or socially. (Unless stated otherwise, assume subject has requested help). 
present absent 
300 
B. Hone of the following that suggest schizophrenia is presents 
Delusions of being controlled (or influence), or of thought broadcasting, 
insertion, or withdrawal (as defined in this manual). 
Honaffective hallucinations of any type (as defined in this maflual) through­
out the day for several days or intermittently throughout a one-week period. 
Auditory hallucinations in which either a voice keeps up a running commentary 
on the subject's behaviors or thoughts as they occur, or two or more voices 
converse, with each other. 
At some time during the period of illness had more than one month when he 
exhibited no prominent depressive symptoms but had delusions or hallucin­
ations (although typical depressive delusions such as delusions of guilt, sin, 
poverty, nihilism, or self-deprecation, or hallucinations with similar con­
tent are not included). 
Preoccupation with a delusion or hallucination to the relative exclusion 
of other symptoms or concerns (other than typical depressive delusions of 
guilt, sin, poverty, nihilism, self-deprecation, or hallucinations with < 
similar content). 
Definite instances of marked formal thought disorder (as defined in this 
manual), accompnied by either blunted or inappropriate affect, delusions, or 
hallucinations of any- type, or grossly disorganized behavior. 
F. Does not meet the criteria for schizophrenia, residual subtype. 
G. Depression is the MAJOR form of psychological disturbance (i.e., the depressive 
disorder is not secondary to another psychological disturbance (e.g., organicity, 
sexual deviation, marital discord, alcoholism, obsessive-compulsive disorder.)) 
is the major psychological disturbance. 
H. Conclusions 
Subject meete the criteria for a major depressive disorder. 
Subject meets the crieteria for a minor depressive disorder. (Meets all 
of the above criteria and has at least two of the' symptoms listed under 
B). 
Subject meets the criteria for a major or minor depressive disorder, but 
depression is secondary to another psychological disturbance. 
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Figure 1: Canonical Means from the Global Measures of Depression 
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Figure 2: Prorated Means from the Beck Depression Inventory 
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Figure 3: Canonical Means from the Specific Measures of Response 
Classes Relevant to Depression for the Nonsignificant 
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Hgura 4: Prorated Means from the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire-Frequency Scores for the Significant 
Sequence x Measurement Occasion Interaction 
